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Abstract 
 
It is well documented that the economic status of men and women is not equal in most 
societies. However, South Asia stands out as an extreme case. The region is well-known for 
its strong son preference, it has a large number of ‘missing women’ and low female labor 
force participation. Motivated by the stark gender differences both within the household and 
at the point of labor market entry, this thesis examines issues that are pertinent to son 
preference and labor market entry of young women.  
   
Son preference manifests itself in different ways, including unequal parental allocation of 
monetary and non-monetary resources within a household. However, direct empirical 
evidence on the unequal allocation of monetary resources on children within a household is 
limited.  
 
Chapter 2 of this thesis use recently available gender-disaggregated household survey data on 
shadow educational expenditures (or private supplementary tuition) to examine parental 
allocation of educational resources in India (Chapter 2).  The analysis shows a birth order 
disadvantage for later-born children. Girls face disadvantages in every birth order compared 
to their male peers. The pattern may be causally attributed to parental preferences for elder 
sons. Furthermore, the gender disparity in intra-household allocation of educational resources 
accounts for a substantial proportion of the gender gap in cognitive test scores.  
 
Chapter 3 deals with similar issues in the context of Pakistan. The chapter demonstrates that 
the gender gap in mathematics in Pakistan may plausibly be explained by parental 
preferences for elder sons combined with family size. The gender gap in math does not exist 
at the age of five, but monotonically increases with the age of children. Similar to the 
situation in India, this chapter shows that birth order disadvantages for later-born children, 
and gender gaps at every birth order. The chapter further demonstrates that the gender gap is 
less likely to be observed in small families.  
 
Chapters 2 and 3 document gender differences in educational expenditure and gender gaps in 
cognitive achievement. These differences are likely to translate into gender gaps in labor 
market achievements. Such disadvantages are exacerbated if there is demand-side 
discrimination in the labor market. In fact, a large number of studies have documented labor 
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market disadvantages for women. One of the key disadvantages experienced by women is 
associated with motherhood, and the incidence of motherhood penalty has been well-
documented in high income countries, but less so in the context of developing countries.  
While motherhood is likely to exert a penalty in low-income countries, the magnitude of the 
penalty may vary depending on the (perceived) community gender norms. Based on an 
experimental approach, Chapter 4 of this thesis examines the extent of the motherhood 
penalty in urban India, and the link between community gender norms (patrilineal versus 
matrilineal communities) and the motherhood penalty. Chapter 5 extends the experiment to 
examine the extent to which access to childcare support mitigates the motherhood penalty.  
 
The analysis shows a large motherhood penalty in India which is particularly pronounced for 
women belonging to patrilineal communities. In contrast, mothers from matrilineal 
communities face no such penalty. The extension in chapter 5 shows that signaling the 
availability of childcare at home leads to a partial reduction in the motherhood penalty in a 
patrilineal community. A common phenomenon in India and perhaps other developing 
countries is the widespread possibility of acquiring gray degrees or potentially bought 
degrees to combat disadvantages at labor market entry. The last chapter of this thesis 
examines the impact of gray degrees, or potentially bought academic credentials from 
legitimate universities, on callback rates to job applications using a resume experiment in 
India.  The evidence show that applicants with gray degrees fare better – have higher callback 
rates, as compared to applicants with no degrees, but do worse as compared to applicants 
with authentic degrees. The evidence also shows that gray degrees have a larger positive 
impact on women applicants compared to their male counterparts.    
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Samenvatting 
 
Het is een bekend gegeven dat mannen en vrouwen in de meeste samenlevingen geen gelijke 
economische status hebben. In Zuid-Azië is het statusverschil echter extreem groot. De regio 
staat bekend om een sterke voorkeur voor zonen, er is een groot aantal 'vermiste vrouwen', en 
de arbeidsparticipatie van vrouwen is er laag. De grote sekseverschillen, zowel binnen het 
huishouden als op het moment van toetreding tot de arbeidsmarkt, vormden de aanleiding 
voor dit onderzoek naar aspecten die te maken hebben met de voorkeur voor zonen en de 
toetreding tot de arbeidsmarkt van jonge vrouwen.  
   
De voorkeur voor zonen komt op verschillende manieren tot uitdrukking, zoals door een 
ongelijke toewijzing van financiële en niet-financiële middelen door ouders binnen een 
huishouden. Er zijn echter slechts weinig directe empirische gegevens die wijzen op de 
ongelijke verdeling van financiële middelen over kinderen binnen een huishouden.  
 
In hoofdstuk 2 van dit proefschrift wordt beschreven hoe ouders in India onderwijsmiddelen 
toewijzen. Dit is onderzocht op basis van naar sekse uitgesplitste onderzoeksgegevens over 
schaduwuitgaven aan onderwijs (of aanvullend privéonderwijs) die sinds kort beschikbaar 
zijn. Hieruit blijkt dat later geboren kinderen achtergesteld worden. Meisjes worden ongeacht 
de geboortevolgorde achtergesteld ten opzichte van jongens. Het patroon kan veroorzaakt 
worden door de voorkeur van ouders voor eerder geboren zonen. Bovendien is een 
substantieel deel van het sekseverschil in cognitieve testscores te wijten aan de 
sekseongelijkheid bij de toewijzing van onderwijsmiddelen binnen het huishouden.  
 
Hoofdstuk 3 gaat over vergelijkbare kwesties in de context van Pakistan. Dit hoofdstuk laat 
zien dat de sekseverschillen op het gebied van wiskunde in Pakistan plausibel kunnen worden 
verklaard door de voorkeur van ouders voor oudere zonen in combinatie met de grootte van 
het gezin. Op de leeftijd van vijf jaar zijn er nog geen sekseverschillen op het gebied van 
wiskunde, maar deze worden steeds groter naarmate kinderen ouder worden. Uit dit 
hoofdstuk blijkt dat de geboortevolgorde nadelig is voor later geboren kinderen en dat er bij 
elke geboortevolgorde sprake is van sekseverschillen, net als in India. Verder blijkt dat de 
kans dat sekseverschillen worden waargenomen kleiner is in kleine gezinnen.  
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Hoofdstuk 2 en 3 beschrijven sekseverschillen in onderwijsuitgaven en cognitieve prestaties. 
De kans is groot dat deze verschillen zullen leiden tot sekseverschillen in prestaties op de 
arbeidsmarkt. Dergelijke verschillen worden nog verergerd als er sprake is van discriminatie 
aan de vraagzijde van de arbeidsmarkt. Uit een groot aantal studies is inderdaad gebleken dat 
vrouwen een achterstand op de arbeidsmarkt hebben. Een van de belangrijkste 
belemmeringen die vrouwen ondervinden, houdt verband met het moederschap. De 
benadeling op de arbeidsmarkt vanwege het moederschap is goed gedocumenteerd in landen 
met een hoog inkomen, maar in ontwikkelingslanden is dat minder het geval. Hoewel het 
moederschap in lage-inkomenslanden waarschijnlijk nadelig is, kunnen de (gepercipieerde) 
normen voor mannen en vrouwen binnen de gemeenschap van invloed zijn op hoe nadelig dit 
is. Hoofdstuk 4 van dit proefschrift beschrijft experimenteel onderzoek in stedelijk India naar 
hoe nadelig het moederschap is, en naar het verband tussen de normen voor mannen en 
vrouwen binnen de gemeenschap (patrilineaire versus matrilineaire gemeenschappen) en de 
nadeligheid van het moederschap. In dit experiment is ook onderzocht in hoeverre toegang 
tot kinderopvang het moederschapsnadeel vermindert. Dit deel van het onderzoek wordt 
beschreven in hoofdstuk 5.  
 
Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat moederschap in India een groot nadeel is op de arbeidsmarkt, 
vooral voor vrouwen die tot patrilineaire gemeenschappen behoren. Moeders uit matrilineaire 
gemeenschappen ondervinden dit nadeel daarentegen niet. Uit het deelonderzoek in 
hoofdstuk 5 blijkt dat wijzen op de beschikbaarheid van kinderopvang thuis leidt tot een 
gedeeltelijke vermindering van het moederschapsnadeel in een patrilineaire gemeenschap.  
Een veel voorkomend verschijnsel in India en misschien ook in andere ontwikkelingslanden 
is dat mensen dubieuze diploma's behalen of diploma's kopen om te compenseren voor 
nadelen bij de toetreding tot de arbeidsmarkt. Het voorlaatste hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift 
beschrijft een cv-experiment in India. Dit gaat over het effect van dubieuze of mogelijk 
gekochte diploma's van legitieme universiteiten op terugbelpercentages bij sollicitaties. Uit 
dit experiment blijkt dat sollicitanten met dubieuze diploma's het beter doen (hogere 
terugbelpercentages hebben) dan sollicitanten zonder diploma's, maar het slechter doen dan 
sollicitanten met echte diploma's. Ook blijkt uit de resultaten dat vrouwelijke sollicitanten 
meer profijt hebben van dubieuze diploma's dan mannelijke sollicitanten.1   

1 Dit hoofdstuk is gepubliceerd als Majilla, T., & Rieger, M. (2020). Gray University Degrees: Experimental 
Evidence from India. Education Finance and Policy, 15(2), 292-309.  
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation consists of six essays in the field of empirical development economics. 
These essays are united by a clear intellectual theme - each chapter attempts to uncover 
different facets of disadvantages for women in developing countries, particularly in South 
Asia. The various chapters explore economically important and socially relevant 
disadvantages in different periods in women’s lives. Methodologically, the first three 
chapters rely on observational data and attempt to exploit natural experiments while the last 
three chapters are based on field experiments. Chapter 2 focuses on intra-household resource 
allocation decisions, chapter 3 on gender gap in math test scores, chapters 4 and 5 on the 
motherhood penalty, and chapter 6 on the labor market impact of gray or potentially bought 
academic degrees. Although linked, the thesis consists of two parts. The first part comprising 
chapters 2 and 3 deal with pre-labor market gender disadvantages while chapters 4, 5 and 6 
deal with gender disadvantages at the point of labor market entry.    
A number of empirical observations regarding gender-based discriminations have triggered 
this dissertation. It has been well documented that parental investments play a crucial role in 
children’s skill accumulation (Carneiro et al., 2013). In developing countries, boys 
outperform girls in educational and labor market achievements. Differential within-household 
parental investments are typically cited to explain this. In a number of developing countries 
parents prefer sons over daughters. For instance, mothers are less likely to breastfeed 
daughters (Jayachandran and Kuziemko, 2011), and, parents may make less health (Bhalotra 
et al., 2010) and educational investments (Zimmerman, 2012) in daughters. Given the 
importance of parental investments in skill accumulation, educational attainments and future 
labor market achievements of their children, it is important to understand what drives such 
within-household allocation of parental investments. Understanding these forces is also 
important when designing policies to mitigate gender gaps in academic and labor market 
achievements. 
Likewise, in many developing countries a substantial number of women do not participate in 
the labor marker, and when they participate, they earn less compared to men. As depicted in 
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Figure 1.1, the gender gap in labor market participation is sharper in India as compared to 
many South-East Asian and African countries notwithstanding many favorable conditions.2  
Figure 1.1: Labor Force Participation in Few Developing Countries
 
Source: Verick (2018) 
Labor market penalties are often exacerbated with motherhood in many parts of the world 
(Kleven et al., 2018). While a number of studies have reported a motherhood penalty in the 
global north, the literature on such penalties in the global south is still in its infancy. The 
motherhood penalty in the global south may be even more important where becoming a 
mother is likely to further exacerbate gender-based discrimination.   
Against this backdrop, the first three chapters document disadvantages experienced by girls 
in intra-household parental resource allocation and how such intra-household parental 
behavior may translate into gender disparity in educational achievements. The next two 
chapters document the motherhood penalty in India. In particular, respectively, they explore 
the interaction between the motherhood penalty and community gender norms (matrilineal 
vs. patrilineal), and, the impact of one potential mitigating factor -  childcare support at home, 
on the motherhood penalty. The last chapter explores the gendered impact of gray degrees (or 
potentially bought degrees) on labor market entry. 
The various chapters are linked in terms of the overall scope and agenda of this dissertation. I 
begin with (Chapters 2 and 3) gender discrimination during childhood, which adversely 

2 In India, 22% of women participate in the labor market, compared to more than 30% in Bangladesh, 50% in 
Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand, and more than 70% in Vietnam (Verick, 2018). 
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affects human capital accumulation. Even if there is no gender discrimination in the labor 
market, a gender gap in labor market achievements is inevitable as it may simply echo 
differences in pre-market skills. The conditions may worsen with the presence of demand-
side discrimination in the labor market, as seems to be the case. However, as shown in 
chapters 5 and 6, women may find some strategies to ease, at least partially, the labor market 
penalties.   
In the following paragraphs, I provide a brief summary of each of the substantive chapters.  
In chapter 2, I explore intra-household allocation of parental educational resources in India. 
Studying intra-household allocation of resources is challenging as direct parental monetary 
expenditure on children is difficult to isolate from aggregate household expenditure. Due to 
such limitations, previous studies tend to examine parental allocation of resources indirectly 
from household expenditures or through other child outcomes. This article studies intra-
household allocation of direct parental monetary expenditure on private supplementary 
tutoring or shadow education. I show a birth order disadvantage for later-born children in 
shadow education expenditure and find evidence of disadvantages for girls in every birth 
order. I attribute these patterns to the well-documented preference for elder sons, which is 
typical of the context, and I subsequently test several features which stem out of this 
preference. Shadow education appears to be effective in enhancing children’s educational 
achievements with a larger effect for girls. These results indicate inefficient intra-household 
allocation of educational resources. The analysis also shows that a substantial proportion of 
intra-household disparity in shadow education expenditure translates into gender gaps in test 
scores. 
In chapter 3, I document substantial gender gaps in mathematics test score using a large 
nationally representative dataset from Pakistan. The gender gap in mathematics has been 
documented in many contexts, yet little convincing evidence exists to explain it. I find that 
boys and girls have similar levels of achievement at the age of five, after which a 
monotonically increasing gap emerges. I also report a negative birth-order effect with boys 
outperforming girls at every birth order, but with a weaker gap in later-borns. I show that 
strong elder son preference, which skews parental resource allocation, is one of the 
underlying mechanisms of these gendered patterns. Elder son preference induces girls with 
elder brothers to do worse compared to those without. The gender gap is relatively more 
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pronounced in larger families. In sum, elder son preference coupled with the adverse effects 
of family size explain the gender gap. 
In chapter 4, co-authors Arjun Bedi, Matthias Rieger and I use a field experiment to study 
the effect of perceived gender norms on the motherhood penalty in the Indian labor market. 
We randomly reported motherhood on fictitious CVs sent to service sector jobs. We 
generated variation in gender norms by signaling community origins of applicants. 
Employers are less likely to callback mothers relative to women or men without children. 
Mothers from North-East India experience a smaller motherhood penalty and those of 
matrilineal origin face no penalty, unlike those of patrilineal origin. We discuss our findings 
in relation to the influence of ethnicity, the Indian context and theories of discrimination. 
While there is growing evidence that mothers are discriminated in terms of labor market 
entry, experimental evidence from the Global South or of underlying mechanisms is st ill 
scant. Building on chapter 4, in chapter 5, based on a CV experiment conducted in one large 
city in India, co-authors Arjun Bedi, Matthias Rieger and I examine whether access to 
childcare support may offset the motherhood penalty associated with labor market entry.  We 
randomly varied motherhood, as well as a childcare support signals in online applications 
sent to service sector jobs. Indicating motherhood on a CV led to a 57% or 20 percentage 
point reduction in callback rates as compared to non-mothers. Signaling childcare support 
offset the motherhood penalty by 20% or 4 percentage points.  
In chapter 6, co-author Matthias Rieger and I study the impact of gray degrees, or potentially 
bought academic credentials from legitimate universities, on callback rates to job applications 
using a resume experiment in India.3 The experiment varied the type of degree (no, gray and 
authentic) in online applications to entry level jobs that require no university qualification. 
We find that gray degrees increase callback rates by 42% or 8%-points relative to having no 
degree. However, we also document that gray degrees fare on average worse than authentic 
degrees. These empirical patterns are consistent with a model where employers have beliefs 
about the authenticity of degrees and are discounting gray degree universities 
probabilistically. With respect to gender, the callback rate for women with gray degrees was 
higher as compared to their male peers. We discuss our findings with respect to the Indian 
context.   

3 This chapter has been published in Education Finance and Policy. 2020. 15(2), 292-309. 
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Chapter 2
Shadow Education, IntraHousehold Resource 
Allocation and Educational Achievements in India
 
2.1 Introduction 
Childhood circumstances lay the foundation for future achievements (Almond et al., 2018). 
Since, childhood is predominantly the domain of the family, understanding the relative status 
of children in the family and particularly how a child’s status within a family affects intra-
household allocation of resources is crucial (Dunbar et al., 2013). Any within-household 
inequality between children based on gender or other attributes, may have adverse lifetime 
effects.  
 
In a number of developing countries, parents tend to favor boys. Empirical evidence shows 
that son preference alters parental allocation of resources across children. As a consequence, 
substantial gender differences in consequent economic and other (e.g., anthropometric) 
outcomes are inevitable. One strand of the literature investigates parental allocation of non-
monetary resources such as visits to clinics, breastfeeding and time spent on childcare 
(Jayachandran and Pande, 2017; Barcellos et al, 2014; Jayachandran and Kuziemko, 2011). 
Another approach uses household expenditures on children-specific goods to examine gender 
differences in resource allocation within household (Deaton, 1997, 1989). Empirically, these 
two strands of the literature often report conflicting results. The first strand of the literature 
frequently reports evidence of gender specific differences in parental investments, in contrast, 
studies using the expenditure approach do not tend to find much gender disparity. This may 
well be because it has been challenging to isolate individual expenditures form aggregate 
household data. Exceptions are Zimmerman (2011), Aslam and Kingdon (2008) and Kingdon 
(2005). These studies use parental educational expenditures on children to examine intra-
household resource allocation, but these studies report conflicting results. For instance, 
Zimmerman (2011) finds gender discrimination in educational expenditures in India and so 
do Aslam and Kingdon (2008) in Pakistan, while Kingdon (2005) fails to identify any such 
disparity in India. In addition to the paucity of individual level data, estimating within-
household allocation of educational resources is in fact more challenging as education is free 
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in most developing countries. Though these studies have made significant progress, a primary 
concern is the measurability of direct parental monetary investments on individual children. 
 
This chapter tries to address these by making two primary contributions. The first is to 
explore gender differences in intra-household resource allocation by making use of 
(escalating) educational expenditures on children as the primary variable of interest. In 
particular, the chapter shows intra-household gender disparities in parental expenditures on 
private supplementary education or ‘shadow education’. Then, I quantify the consequence of 
such intra-household inequality on educational achievements. To be specific, using a 
decomposition analysis, I quantify the relative importance of gender disparity in shadow 
educational expenditures on gender gaps in cognitive test scores. 
 
This study draws on the three distinctive strengths of shadow education. First, a major 
advantage of looking at expenditure on shadow education is that it is a direct measure of 
parental allocation of monetary resources. Thus, a novel element of this study is the 
availability of data which captures direct parental monetary expenses on individual children. 
Second, in some contexts, including India, expenditure on shadow education accounts for a 
substantial proportion of total household income and may be more central to student learning 
than formal schooling (Bray, 2014).  As will be discussed in detail later in the text, the data 
shows that shadow education expenditures accounts for around 5% of household annual 
income. Third, compared to other educational expenditures, shadow education captures 
parental choices more effectively. For instance, parents may choose between different 
schools in urban areas but school fess are regulated in private schools and free in public 
schools.4 Thus, parents may not have full freedom to spend money on formal schooling 
according to their preferences. 
 
My primary analysis is based on the Indian Human Development Survey II data collected in 
2011-12. The study proceeds by showing that parents spend more on boys as compared to 
girls in every birth order, although the disparity weakens for later-born children. To be 
specific, firstborn girl children on average receive around 0.079 SD (or INR 211 yearly) less 
shadow education expenditures compared to firstborn boys, the disparity falls to 0.071 SD 

4 Rural parents may not even have such options. In most villages, there is only one public school available, and 
private schooling is an urban phenomenon. 
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(INR 189) for the second borns and drops further down the birth order. Additionally, I 
demonstrate a birth order disadvantage for later-born children. For instance, moving from 
firstborn boys to second born boys results in 0.036 standard deviation (INR 96) drop in 
shadow education expenditures. The birth order disadvantage increases to0.065 standard 
deviations between firstborn boys and third born boys. The birth disadvantage appears to be 
flatter for girls. I also observe similar patterns in weekly duration of shadow education 
attendance.5 These patterns clearly indicate elder son advantage in intra-household resource 
allocation. The evidence further demonstrates heterogeneity in effects. The gender gap is 
sharper in families belonging to forward castes and those with children in private schools. In 
other words, families with better socioeconomic backgrounds exhibit greater gender 
discrimination.  
 
To ensure that differential fertility selection and other confounding characteristics do not 
drive the results, I also include mother, household and neighborhood fixed effects in the 
baseline specification. The empirical patterns appear to be robust. Afterwards, I further 
replicate and obtain fairly similar results in a sample of mothers who are likely to have 
completed fertility.  
 
Next I replicate the main results with a more recent, larger but less extensive Annual Status 
of Education Report (hereafter ASER), 2016 data. ASER lacks fertility data and the survey 
recruits only children between five to sixteen years of age. Thus, I do not observe precise 
birth orders. In spite of the above caveats, the birth order – gender patterns are remarkably 
consistent with the baseline estimates. 
 
In interpreting these results, I examine whether the preference for sons, particularly for elder 
ones, may explain such a gendered pattern. I perform several tests: First, following 
Jayachandran and Pande (2017), I find that both boys and girls without elder brothers have an 
advantage over their peers with elder brothers, which points to strong elder son preference. 
Moreover, boys without elder brothers have an advantage over girls without elder brothers, 
which indicates within-household hierarchy in resource allocation. Second, I further 
demonstrate that families who prefer an extra child to be a son invest 0.052 SD less on their 
existing children compared to families with no such preference. In other words, these families 

5 In our data, most children attend shadow education conditional on at least one child in the family attends 
shadow education, indicating that within-household selection is not likely to be an issue here. 
546567-L-bw-Majilla
Processed on: 6-8-2020 PDF page: 22
 22 
reserve more resources for their yet unborn son compared to what they would have kept for 
daughters. Third, boys and elder children are provided with more expensive tutors compared 
to girls and later-born children. Put differently, boys and elder children face higher unit prices 
for shadow education, and these higher prices may reflect better quality tutors. Besides, 
although not particularly a consequence of elder son preference, but this rather stems out of 
ideal family size effects, I find that parental resource allocation on shadow education 
decreases once the family achieves its ideal fertility size. In sum, intra-family allocation 
decisions appear to be the determining factor of such patterns. 
 
I then quantify the explanatory power of such unequal intra-household distribution in 
children’s educational achievements. Specifically, I examine to what extent the disparity in 
shadow education expenditures may account for the widely documented gender gap in 
cognitive test scores (Fryer and Levitt, 2010). The evidence comes from a decomposition 
analysis which identifies the contribution of various observable factors on the gender gap in 
test scores. First, I find a sharp gender gap in math, reading, and writing test scores. It 
appears that there is a robust positive correlation between shadow education expenditures and 
mathematics, writing, and reading test scores. Decomposing the data, I find that around 14% 
of the explained variations (composition effect) in gender gap in math test score may be 
attributed to the disparity in shadow education expenditures. The contributions appear to be 
smaller but still significant in writing and reading tests, amounting to 11% and 8%, 
respectively. The inequality contributions of the disparity in shadow education expenditures 
in test scores are highest among the firstborns, and then a decreasing pattern emerges down 
the birth orders. For instance, shadow education accounts for about one-third of the explained 
variation in the gender gap in math among the firstborns. The corresponding contributions 
among the firstborns are 27.84% and 16.49% in writing and reading scores. Moreover, 
shadow education expenditures explain substantial proportion of the unexplained gap (due to 
structure effect). Together, it appears that intra-household disparity in educational resources 
translates into gender gap in test scores, and consequently puts girls in disadvantage in 
educational attainments. 
 
In interpreting these results, it is important to keep in mind the descriptive nature of the 
analysis. While the chapter shows evidence of elder son preference in shadow education 
expenditures, and some of its possible consequences, it is silent on the causal link between 
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shadow education expenditures and cognitive test scores.6 The chapter is also silent on the 
causes of elder son preference.7 8  
 
This chapter adds to several strands of the literature. First, and most directly, I contribute to 
the literature on son preference in low and middle income countries (Jayachandran and 
Pande, 2017; Bhalotra et al., 2010; Tarozzi and Mahajan, 2007; Kingdon, 2005; Deaton, 
1997). This study is closer to the expenditure based approach that tends to estimate within-
household gender disparity from aggregate household expenditures data (Deaton, 1997). I 
deviate methodologically by exploring resource allocation from individual data, and thus I 
am not compelled to indirectly estimate gender discrimination through an Engel curve 
approach. A few studies though examine son preference from individual data on educational 
expenditures (Zimmerman, 2012; Kingdon, 2005),9 capturing educational expenditure data 
nonetheless is found to be challenging as formal education is free in most countries. In fact, 
exploiting the phenomenon of shadow education is the major advance which enable us to 
circumvent primary limitations in the literature. I further add to the existing evidence by 
showing parental preference for both sons and elder children, and thus elder son is found to 
be situated at the top of the hierarchy in intra-household resource allocation.  
 
Second, I also contribute to a small economics literature on private supplementary tutoring. 
The literature is still in its infancy, although a few papers have examined shadow education 
in varied contexts (Dang and Rogers, 2015; Jayachandran, 2014; Lee, 2008). For instance, 
Jayachandran (2014) explores how shadow education incentivizes teachers in Nepal to teach 
less during school hours. As a consequence, she finds that students suffer in exams. Whereas 
the primary objective of Lee (2008), and Dang and Rogers (2012) is to test the quantity-
quality tradeoff. Similar to them, this chapter shows that shadow education may be used as a 

6 However, there is abundant evidence on the importance of parental investments on children’s economic 
success (see Almond et al., 2018). 
 
7 There is a sizeable literature on the potential sources of son preference in developing countries (see Carranza, 
2014; Alesina et al., 2013). 
 
8 It is also important to know who in the family decides on investments in children. There is a large literature 
documenting that children enjoy more resources if mothers have the decision making power (Attanasio and 
Lechene, 2012; Browning et al., 2010). In the Indian context, advantaged mothers at least are better informed of 
child functioning (See Blunch and Datta Gupta, 2020a, 2020b). 
 
9 Few studies examine intra-household gender disparity in school choice in India. See Sahoo (2017) and Maitra 
et al. (2016). 
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measure of direct parental monetary investments, but I do so to study intra-household 
resource allocation.   
 
Third, my results also speak to the literature on gender gaps in test scores, in particular 
mathematics test scores (Contini et al, 2017; Bharadwaj et al, 2016; Fryer and Levitt, 2010). 
The empirical evidence is remarkably consistent. Gender gaps in mathematics increase with 
years of schooling. Socio-economic background often fails to explain such gender gaps. I 
provide suggestive evidence that intra-household resource allocation may play a significant 
role. Specifically, I find that a substantial proportion of gender gaps in test scores may be 
attributed to disparity in shadow education expenditures. In fact, shadow education is more 
important when it comes to math as compared to other tests. While a significant portion of 
gender variation in math test scores cannot be explained, these results highlight one possible 
channel through which gender gaps in test scores may arise. 
 
Fourth, this study is also related to the literature on parental investment and skill 
development. A number of studies identify and estimate production functions of skills 
(Attanasio et al., 2018; Falk et al., 2019; Cunha et al., 2010). One of the primary obstacles in 
the literature is that parental investments are inherently unobservable. My primary 
contribution to the literature is that I use direct parental educational investment that was 
previously unnoticed in the literature.  
 
This chapter unfolds as follows: Section 2.2 provides background information, a brief 
introduction to shadow education, and a description of the data. Section 2.3 describes the 
empirical strategy and presents baseline estimates. Section 2.4 replicates baseline estimates 
using an alternative data set. Section 2.5 tests for several features in the data that may be 
attributed to elder son preference. Section 2.6 explores the impact of shadow education on 
test scores. Section 2.7 concludes.      
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2.2 Background and Data 
 
Relevant Institutional Details 
 
Shadow education is an integral part of a student’s educational curriculum in many 
countries.10 One strand of the literature argues that shadow education is going to be the norm 
in many parts of the world, rather than the exception (Bray, 2010). Nonetheless, it is difficult 
to conceptualize the exact nature of shadow education and it takes diverse shape in different 
contexts (Mori and Baker, 2010; Bray, 2010, 2009, 1999). Bray (1999) for instance identifies 
three dimensions of shadow education: supplementation, privateness and academic subjects. 
Shadow education is ‘supplementary’ to formal education and does not replace formal 
education. Tuitions are given on academic subjects only. These supplements are not provided 
by public providers but typically by a private entity, or quite often by public teachers in 
private settings. Nevertheless, these characteristics take different shapes in different places 
and are often adapted to the local setting. In the Indian context, arguably, it should be seen as 
private supplementary tutoring, especially out of school private tuition, and data used in this 
chapter capture this private supplementary tutoring.11 Parental expenditure on shadow 
education constitutes a substantial proportion of household income. In fact, a typical middle 
class household often spends more money on shadow education than formal education (Roy, 
2010). 
 
Data and Summary Statistics 
 
The data used in this chapter comes from the Indian Human Development Survey (henceforth 
IHDS) II (2011-12) and includes a sample of more than 52,000 school/college-going 

10 In Hong Kong, for example, around 72% of 12th grade students take shadow education (Zhan et al, 2014). The 
figures are significant and growing in new contexts where shadow education was relatively unknown, such as 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia (Kobakhidze, 2017; 2014), Egypt (Hartman, 2008), many states in the 
Mediterranean (Bray et al. 2013), Canada (Aurini and Davies, 2004) and increasingly in many European 
countries. In many contexts, the growth is substantial. For instance, shadow education in major Canadian cities 
has grown between 200-500% in the past 30 years (Aurini and Davies, 2004).  
 
11 From a parental view, investment in shadow education can be a compensating investment or a reinforcing 
one. Shadow education investment is also norm-driven. In other words, parents respond to the current trend of 
shadow education expenditures in their community and peers. In that sense shadow education may be 
interpreted as a positional good (Bray and Lykins, 2012). As a consequence, shadow education expenditures 
may not be driven purely by individual ability, rather by existing cultural and gender norms.   
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students.12 My main variable of interest is shadow education expenditures. In addition, I also 
analyze the likelihood of shadow education attendance and weekly duration of shadow 
education.  
 
To be included in the sample, children should be at school or in college. I restrict the sample 
to children on whom there is information (without missing information) about expenditure on 
private supplementary tutoring.13  
 

12 IHDS is a panel data with a first round conducted in 2004-05. In my analysis, I use the second round of data. 
 
13 To be precise, I drop 1641 observations which amounts to 3% of the total observations.  
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics 
Variables Full Sample Boys Sample Girls Sample 
Yearly Expenditures on Shadow Education (INR) 692.02 
(2660.93) 
774.98 
(2923.16) 
598.13 
(2325.25) 
Weekly Duration of Shadow Education (Hour) 2.40 
(2.40) 
2.59 
(5.41) 
2.19 
(5.08) 
Proportion of Students Taking Shadow Education 0.23 
(0.42) 
0.24 
(0.43) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
Yearly Expenditures on Shadow Education for Students 
with Non-Zero Expenditures 
3061.11 
(4906.09) 
3190.82 
(5241.76) 
2888.88 
(4415.78) 
Age 12.06 
(4.88) 
12.17 
(4.95) 
11.94 
(4.80) 
Math Test Score  standardized 0.071 
(0.99) 
-0.045 
(1.00) 
Writing Test Score  standardized 0.029 
(0.99) 
0.001 
(1.00) 
Reading Test Score  standardized 0.046 
(0.98) 
-0.007 
(1.00) 
Standard1 6.51 
(4.31) 
6.52 
(4.32) 
6.49 
(4.31) 
Private School 0.32 
(0.47) 
0.35 
(0.48) 
0.29 
(0.45) 
Teacher Attendance 0.16 
(0.37) 
0.16 
(0.36) 
0.16 
(0.37) 
Ever Repeated an Exam 0.08 
(0.27) 
0.09 
(0.28) 
0.07 
(0.26) 
Mother Age 36.62 
(6.78) 
36.76 
(6.81) 
36.46 
(6.73) 
Mother Education2 5.11 
(4.88) 
5.05 
(4.88) 
5.17 
(4.89) 
Proportion of Families Desire Extra Son 0.20 
(0.40) 
0.18 
(0.39) 
0.22 
(0.42) 
Desired Fertility 2.55 
(0.99) 
2.53 
(0.97) 
2.58 
(1.01) 
Household Head’s Education (No. of Years) 8.51 
(4.96) 
8.49 
(4.97) 
8.53 
(4.95) 
Yearly Household Income (INR) 139714 
(248990) 
141774 
(265770) 
137382 
(228497) 
Hindu 0.80 
(0.80) 
0.80 
(0.40) 
0.79 
(0.40) 
Forward Caste 0.28 
(0.45) 
0.28 
(0.45) 
0.28 
(0.45) 
Urban 0.35 
(0.48) 
0.35 
(0.48) 
0.35 
(0.48) 
Notes: This table reports means of the dependent variables and covariates. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. Around 47% of the full sample constitutes girls. Average sample sizes 
(sample sizes vary across outcomes): Full 52360, Boys 27800, and Girls 24560. 
(1) Grade of study: A bachelor’s degree is coded as 15, above bachelor’s as 16, and 1-12 grades are 
coded as 1-12 respectively. 
(2) Education: A bachelor’s degree is coded as 15, above bachelor’s as 16, and 1-12 grades are coded 
as 1-12 respectively. 
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Table 2.1 reports summary statistics. On average, parents spend INR 692.02 (~ USD 12.8214) 
yearly on every child in shadow education, and the average duration of shadow education is 
2.40 hours per week. Conditional on shadow education attendance, the expenditure amounts 
to INR 3061.11 per child, which is slightly lower than the yearly expenditures on formal 
schooling, INR 3695. In the Indian context, this expenditure is substantial. The annual 
shadow education expenditures constitute around 5% of annual household income in these 
families. In the data, nearly 23% of students take shadow education.15  
The average family16 size in the sample is 2.94, and around 47% of the sample are girls. The 
average age of the children in the sample is about 12.06 years.17  
 
In the more recent ASER, 2016 survey data that I use in section 2.4, conditional on shadow 
education attendance, annually, parents spend INR 3205 per child on shadow education.18 
 
Columns 2 and 3 in Table 2.1 show stark gender differences in shadow education 
expenditures and weekly duration of shadow education. In both cases, boys have an 
advantage over girls. For instance, on average, parents spend almost 30% more on boys as 
compared to girls. In absolute terms, annual household expenditures on shadow education 
averages INR 598 for girls and INR 775 for boys. In addition, girls are 3%-points less likely 
to be engaged in shadow education. I also observe gender disparity in the type of schooling. 
To be precise, 35% boys are reported to be in private schooling as compared to 29% for girls. 
Girls tend to come from slightly better educated families, and families with higher ideal 
family size. In other words, families on average with lower ideal family size are more likely 
to have more boys than girls. Another noteworthy difference is whether a child has ever 
repeated in an exam. Girls are less likely to repeat an exam than boys. To be specific, around 

14 I use an exchange rate of INR 54/ USD for 2011. 
 
15 The phenomenon is rapidly growing. The data collected in 2011-12. I may expect the pattern to be reversed in 
more recent data. 
 
16 Throughout, family size refers to the number of children per mother. Another potential candidate, perhaps a 
better fit in a context of extensive joint families, is the number of children present in the household. However, I 
follow the literature and measure family size at the mother level. In addition, I do not account for expected 
number of unborn children. As I discuss later, this may substantially limit the ability to control for family size.  
 
17 The corresponding sample size by birth order and gender is reported in Table A1 in the Appendix A. 
 
18 With an average of 2.11 children between five to sixteen in the survey data, parents on average spend INR 
6763 on shadow education. However, parents are likely to spend more on children above sixteen, the 
expenditures reported here are a lower bound of parental expenditures on shadow education.  
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7% of girls have ever repeated an exam as compared to 9% for boys. Most other background 
variables are fairly similar in magnitude.  
 
Overall, the evidence in Table 2.1 indicates that on average parents spend less on girls as 
compared to boys and girls are less likely to be enrolled in shadow education as compared to 
boys. This suggests that girls are in disadvantageous position in intra-household resource 
allocation, and parents clearly favor boys over girls in allocating monetary resources. In the 
next section, I provide formal evidence of whether these descriptive patterns hold after 
controlling for confounding characteristics by investigating different facets of son advantage. 
 
 
2.3 Son Preference and Parental Resource 
Allocation 
 
A. Empirical Framework 
 
My objective is to explore intra-household allocation of shadow education expenditures by 
gender. Specifically, I examine such gender differences across birth orders. As I will be using 
another data to check the robustness of the empirical patterns, I standardize shadow education 
expenditures to have zero mean and standard deviation one.  I consider the following 
specification:  
 
(2.1)       	

   

     

 , 
 
where, Yi is the shadow education expenditure of individual i, and BOij is a dummy for birth 
order j. Here  captures coefficients on the birth order variables,  captures coefficients on 
the birth order and girl interaction variables, and,  is an error term. X is a vector of 
background variables that includes a set of child, mother, household and school-specific 
covariates. X includes child age and its quadratic and standard of current study. I also control 
for two school level variables – private school dummy, and another dummy for whether 
teachers attend school regularly. I include maternal literacy, age and a quadratic in maternal 
age. Other covariates are household specific, e.g., caste, religion, income, education of the 
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head of household and dummy for urban residence. Standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering at the primary sampling unit (PSU) level. 
 
In specification (2.1),  and  are the primary parameters of interest. The identification 
assumption is that the birth order effects reflect prenatal and postnatal environments, but 
genetic makeup remains constant. In fact, treating birth orders as a natural experiment is a 
common identifying assumption (Black et al., 2018). The crux of my identification strategy is 
thus to compare children at different birth orders who are otherwise genetically similar. 
However, later-born children are more likely to be observed in larger families. As a first 
response, I augment (2.1) to control for family size. Formally, I estimate a baseline model 
 
(2.2)       	

   

       

  
 
where S denotes family size. While one may control for family size, it is quite challenging to 
observe precise family size in the data as most families may not have completed their fertility 
yet. In addition, larger families are more likely to be poor, less educated and rural.19 In other 
words, fertility and family characteristics are highly correlated. I have four strategies to 
enhance (2.2) to ensure that such differential fertility selection and confounding 
characteristics do not drive the results. These are controlling for observable maternal 
characteristics, controlling for observable household characteristics, controlling for 
observable neighborhood characteristics, and replicating estimates in a sample of families 
who are likely to have completed fertility. While the first three strategies directly control for 
confounding characteristics, the fourth specifically addresses the potential omitted variable 
bias due to unobserved family size.    
 
To elaborate, my primary approach to control for factors that are fixed within a family is to 
include mother fixed effects, and thus difference out time-invariant family characteristics 
including family size. This approach will further remove any residual association between 
birth order and family factors. Essentially, this approach generates comparisons between 

19 The average family size in rural and urban samples is 3.04 and 2.75, respectively. Likewise, average annual 
household income in the rural sample is INR 116,707, much lower than INR 182,592, that an average urban 
household earns annually.  
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siblings within the same family by examining the extent to which differences in shadow 
education expenditures between two siblings is due to birth order and gender.  
 
Inclusion of mother fixed effects addresses confounds due to factors that are fixed within 
families. It cannot address confounds due to household characteristics.20 Fertility behavior is 
highly correlated with household factors, and one may also expect a close association 
between birth order and household characteristics. To address these, I include household 
fixed effects. By doing so, I control for within household fixed factors, and also remove any 
association between birth order and household characteristics. Perforce, I compare children 
within the same household to estimate birth order and gender effects. 
 
Specification (2.2) may suffer from confounding neighborhood factors. Shadow education 
can be extremely norm-driven, and the culture may vary substantially across neighborhoods. 
For instance, shadow education is highly prevalent in some areas, but may not be of the same 
magnitude in other areas. Such area-specific factors may drive the results. I do not have 
detailed variables to control for neighborhood characteristics. I control for neighborhood 
specific fixed factors by including PSU (primary sampling unit) fixed effects. In rural areas, 
PSU is a village, and in urban areas it denotes a neighborhood. This approach eliminates any 
such area-specific confounding characteristics.    
 
To implement the fourth strategy, I select a sub-sample of mothers who are likely to have 
completed fertility. Families who are yet to complete fertility may keep (or save) resources 
for future births, which may affect the estimates. To that end, I make an attempt to select a 
sample of families with completed fertility in two ways: First, I use a survey question to 
select a completed fertility sample. IHDS II asked women whether they wanted any more 
children. My subsample consists of those women who answered negatively. Additionally, I 
include those women who expressed that either they or their husbands were sterilized, and 
those who were not fertile anymore. Second, I use biological age of mothers to proxy for 
completed fertility. Specifically, women who crossed forty years of age are likely to have 
completed fertility. Eventually, the completed fertility sample consists of the union of these 
two subsamples. 
 

20 In the case of nuclear families, a household is equivalent to a family. In the case of joint families there is a 
distinction between the nuclear family and the household/joint family.   
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In the data a large number of children do not attend shadow education. If there is within 
household selection on shadow education attendance, the estimates could be biased. 
Nonetheless, only a small number of children in the data do not attend shadow education 
when at least one child in the family attends shadow education, indicating that shadow 
education attendance is a household level choice rather than a choice based on individual 
children.21 Likewise another concern is selection on schooling type (i.e., public vs private), in 
particular when parents have to pay tuition fees in private schools compared to almost free 
public schools.22 In other words, in such a situation shadow education spending could be 
conditioned on within household choice of school type.23 Similar to shadow education 
attendance, few children go to private schools when any other sibling is in public school.24 
 
B. Results 
 
Figure 2.1: Shadow Education Expenditures  
 

21 In the data, there are 2046 (or 4% of the sample) such children in multi-child families.  
 
22 In the state of West Bengal at least, public schools collect a very small fee. 
 
23 For instance, parents may send some children to private schools and compensate others who are in public 
schools by purchasing shadow education, or vice versa. 
 
24 To be precise, only 415 (or 0.01% of the sample) children in multiple children families are in public school 
when at least one child in the family is in a private school.  
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Notes: This figure shows unconditional yearly shadow education expenditures by birth order and 
gender. 
 
I start by graphically documenting parental allocation of resources on shadow education by 
birth order and gender. Figure 2.1 plots mean yearly shadow education expenditures by birth 
order segregated by gender. Irrespective of gender, I observe a birth order disadvantage for 
later-born children in shadow education expenditures. For instance, firstborn boys attract INR 
175 or 22.29% more household shadow education expenditure compared to second born 
boys. Upon further examining these patterns by gender, I observe a sharp gender difference 
in every birth order. For instance, parents outspend on boys compared to girls by 24.03% 
(INR 186), 33.50% (INR 197) and 55.53% (INR 206) in first three birth orders. 
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Table 2.2: Main Results 
 
Dep. Var. Shadow 
Education 
Expenditures (SD) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Girl -0.066*** 
(0.011) 
     
Girl × 1st Child  -0.079*** 
(0.018) 
-0.093*** 
(0.030) 
-0.093*** 
(0.029) 
-0.079*** 
(0.017) 
-0.083*** 
(0.020) 
Girl × 2nd Child  -0.071*** 
(0. 018) 
-0.063** 
(0.028) 
-0.067** 
(0.027) 
-0.068*** 
(0.018) 
-0.073*** 
(0.019) 
Girl × 3rd Child  -0.055*** 
(0.018) 
-0.060 
(0.037) 
-0.062 
(0.037) 
-0.051*** 
(0.019) 
-0.057*** 
(0.018) 
Girl × 4th+ Child  -0.022 
(0.015) 
-0.027 
(0.026) 
-0.028 
(0.026) 
-0.024 
(0.018) 
-0.023 
(0.015) 
2nd Child  -0.036* 
(0.020) 
-0.017 
(0.030) 
-0.015 
(0.029) 
-0.001 
(0.020) 
-0.040 
(0.021) 
3rd Child  -0.065** 
(0.025) 
-0.006 
(0.041) 
-0.002 
(0.040) 
-0.021 
(0.026) 
-0.070** 
(0.025) 
4th+ Child  -0.040 
(0.025) 
0.024 
(0.053) 
0.027 
(0.051) 
0.017 
(0.026) 
-0.045 
(0.026) 
Forward Caste 0.140*** 
(0.02) 
0.140*** 
(0.020) 
- - 0.023 
(0.021) 
0.141*** 
(0.021) 
Hindu 0.046*** 
(0.02) 
0.046*** 
(0.016) 
- - 0.040** 
(0.018) 
0.045** 
(0.017) 
Urban 0.150*** 
(0.02) 
0.150*** 
(0.023) 
- - - 0.152*** 
(0.024) 
Private School 0.019 
(0.02) 
0.018 
(0.018) 
0.107* 
(0.059) 
0.102* 
(0.057) 
0.101*** 
(0.024) 
0.020 
(0.018) 
Standard 0.027*** 
(0.00) 
0.028*** 
(0.004) 
0.041*** 
(0.008) 
0.041*** 
(0.008) 
0.041*** 
(0.004) 
0.027*** 
(0.004) 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mother Fixed Effect No No Yes No No No 
Household Fixed 
Effect 
No No No Yes No No 
PSU Fixed Effect No No No No Yes No 
Completed Fertility No No No No No Yes 
Observations 45148 45148 41660 41660 45148 43184 
Notes: Every column reports a separate linear regression. Standard errors reported in parentheses are 
robust to within primary sampling unit (PSU) clustering. The dependent variable, shadow education 
expenditures is standardized. 2nd and 3rd child are indicators for children whose birth orders are 2 and 
3, and, 4th+ indicates children with birth order 4 or later. In columns 3, 4 and 5, caste, religion and 
urban/rural effects are absorbed by mother, household and PSU fixed effects respectively. Other 
controls always include child’s age and its square, mother age and its square, maternal education, 
household income, household head’s education, family size and a dummy for teacher attendance at 
school. Backward caste refers to those belong to the scheduled caste category. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; 
*p < 0.10. 
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Next, I report estimates based on specification (2.2) in Table 2.2. In column 1, I show that 
parents spend 0.066 SD (INR 175.43)25 less on girls compared to boys, and the effect is 
statistically significant. In column 2, I explore gender disparity across birth orders. Two 
patterns in shadow education expenditures are immediate from the estimates in column 2: 
first, I observe sharp gender differences and this disparity is consistent across birth orders, 
and second, the evidence further shows that later-born children attract less shadow education 
expenditures. Column 2 of Table 2.2 shows that coefficients of birth order and girl interaction 
terms are negative and significant. In other words, parents spend less on girls than boys in 
every birth order, indicating son advantage in intra-household allocation of shadow education 
expenditures. For instance, I observe that yearly shadow education expenditure is on average 
0.079 SD (INR 211.17) less for firstborn girls than firstborn boys. The effect is significant. In 
contrast to evidence in Figure 1, once I control for confounding factors, the inequality tends 
to fall with birth orders. For instance, moving from firstborns to second-borns, the magnitude 
of gender difference estimate falls from 0.079 SD to 0.071 SD, then further drops to 0.055 
SD and 0.022 SD for children at third, and fourth or later birth orders respectively.  
 
I also estimate the role of birth orders in shadow education allocation. Column 2 of Table 2.2 
depicts male birth order disadvantages (i.e., coefficients of 2nd child, 3rd child and 4th+ child 
are negative). I observe a decreasing shadow education expenditure by birth orders. For 
instance, parents on average spend yearly 0.036 SD less on second born boys compared to 
firstborn boys. This unequal distribution is further inflated to 0.065 SD between firstborn 
third born boys, but eases to 0.040 SD between first and fourth or later born boys. The drop 
in shadow education expenditures appear to be non-linear. For instance, the gap between 
second born boys and on third born boys is 0.029 SD (3rd Child - 2nd Child), but fourth or 
later-born boys gain by 0.025 SD as compared to third borns.  
 
Furthermore, the birth order disadvantage appears to be flatter for girls. For instance, parents 
on average spend 0.028 SD less yearly on second born girls than the first one (i.e., 2nd Child 
+ Girl × 2nd Child - Girl × 1st Child). Moving from firstborns to third borns, girls lose, on 
average, 0.041 SD in shadow education expenditures.  
 

25 The empirical patterns are invariant to the dimension on which the outcome is measured. The corresponding 
estimates for shadow education expenditures in monetary value is reported in Table A2 in the Appendix A. 
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A parallel analysis with weekly duration of shadow education, reported in Table A3 in the 
Appendix A, show qualitatively similar patterns. Taken together, these observed patterns 
presented above clearly indicate elder son advantage in intra-household parental resource 
allocation. 
 
In column 3 of Table 2.2, I control for factors fixed within family by adding mother fixed 
effects. The estimates for birth order – girl interactions increase from -0.079 SD to -0.093 SD 
for the firstborns. However, the estimates tend to decline for later-born children. The 
coefficients remain statistically significant, although effects are estimated less precisely. 
Therefore, by using sibling comparison for identification, the girl disadvantage tends to be 
smaller compared to the baseline estimates. Likewise, the magnitude of the birth order 
disadvantage decreases, but at the cost of significant loss in precision. Taken together, the 
estimates are in general smaller in magnitude, yet, the overall empirical patterns remain 
qualitatively similar. 
  
The household fixed effects estimates reported in next column 4 are markedly close to the 
mother fixed effect estimates.26 The empirical patterns remain similar after controlling for 
PSU fixed effects (column 5). In fact, the PSU fixed effect estimates are closer to the baseline 
estimates.27  
 
The last set of estimates pertains to effects based on the sample of mothers with completed 
fertility. Since 96% of the children are included in the sample with completed fertility, the 
effects reported in column 6 are similar to those reported in column 2..28 Together, the 
evidence suggests that heterogeneous family selection is not likely to drive the results.  
 
Turning now to other regressors, column 2 shows that children from better socioeconomic 
backgrounds spend more on shadow education. Specifically, forward caste children spend 
0.14 SD more compared to backward caste children. I find similar advantage for urban 

26 This is perhaps not surprising as household fixed effects are the same as mother fixed effects in nuclear 
families. The sample consists of 27,821 unique families, and 24,156 unique households. 
  
27 I also estimated a specification controlling for mother, household and PSU fixed effects simultaneously, and 
observed fairly similar results. Estimates are available on request. 
 
28 I also replicated using a sample without biological age restriction and got qualitatively similar results. 
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children; parents on average spend 0.15 SD more on children than their rural counterparts. 
Furthermore, Hindus spend more on shadow education compared to non-Hindus. 
 
C. Heterogeneous Effects 
 
Next I ask whether the empirical patterns discussed above differ depending on family 
circumstances. For instance, son preferences may differ between higher and lower caste 
families, and may also depend on other group identities. For example, the rural-urban divide 
is well-documented in the current context. It would be interesting to quantify such birth order 
disadvantages and girl disadvantage separately for these groups. Table 2.3 presents baseline 
estimates by allowing for heterogeneous effects by different groups. The patterns are 
qualitatively similar across groups but vary in magnitudes.  
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Table 2.3: Heterogeneity in Effects 
Dep. Var. 
Shadow 
Education 
Expenditures 
Rural Urban Forward 
Caste 
Backward 
Caste 
Private 
School 
Public 
School 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Girl × 1st Child -0.080*** 
(0.018) 
-0.080** 
(0.039) 
-0.145*** 
(0.042) 
-0.055*** 
(0.019) 
-0.076*** 
(0.028) 
-0.083*** 
(0.024) 
Girl × 2nd Child -0.069*** 
(0.021) 
-0.076** 
(0.034) 
-0.136*** 
(0.045) 
-0.048** 
(0.019) 
-0.123*** 
(0.041) 
-0.050*** 
(0.023) 
Girl × 3rd Child -0.050** 
(0.020) 
-0.073* 
(0.039) 
-0.111* 
(0.064) 
-0.042*** 
(0.013) 
-0.158*** 
(0.049) 
-0.013 
(0.015) 
Girl × 4th+  Child -0.019 
(0.015) 
-0.037 
(0.035) 
-0.010 
(0.039) 
-0.028* 
(0.015) 
-0.088*** 
(0.033) 
0.004 
(0.015) 
2nd Child 0.001 
(0.023) 
-0.089** 
(0.037) 
-0.064 
(0.053) 
-0.022* 
(0.018) 
0.027 
(0.046) 
-0.067** 
(0.026) 
3rd Child -0.032 
(0.029) 
-0.096** 
(0.047) 
-0.048 
(0.084) 
-0.060*** 
(0.017) 
0.065 
(0.059) 
-0.125*** 
(0.023) 
4th+  Child -0.022 
(0.029) 
-0.023 
(0.051) 
-0.080 
(0.072) 
-0.022 
(0.023) 
0.065 
(0.053) 
-0.083*** 
(0.026) 
Observations 29432 15716 12761 32387 14392 30756 
Notes: Every column reports a separate linear regression. Standard errors reported in parenthesis are 
robust to within primary sampling unit (PSU) clustering. Controls always include child’s age and its 
square, current standard of study, mother age and its square, maternal education, household income, 
household head’s education, family size, dummy for teacher attendance at school, and Hindu.  ***p < 
0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10. 
 
Columns 1 and 2 report baseline estimates for rural and urban children separately.29 I observe 
that girl disadvantage is greater for urban children. Also of interest are separate estimates for 
forward and backward caste children. Likewise, I find that girl disadvantage is larger for 
forward caste children compared to their backward caste peers (columns 3 and 4). For 
instance, forward caste parents spend 0.145 SD and 0.136 SD less on firstborn and 
secondborn girls compared to firstborn and second born boys. By comparison, such disparity 
amounts to 0.055 SD and 0.048 SD for firstborns and second borns respectively in backward 
caste families. These estimates are highly significant. The gender gap appears to be steeper 
for private school children (columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.3).  

29 The sample split could be endogenous. 
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One striking pattern revealed in the analysis is that families with better backgrounds exhibit 
greater gender discrimination.30 These families also have higher incidence of shadow 
education. Shadow education expenditures, in fact, can be quite different from investments in 
normal goods. Shadow education is often interpreted as a positional good in the literature. 
For instance, in analyzing shadow education expenditures, Bray and Lykins (2012) note that 
expenditure depends on “whether the amount is adequate relative to the amounts held by 
peers and competitors” (P. 68). Thus, it could be that these families invest more on their 
children, but do so more selectively. Another possible explanation could be that these 
families may have higher future (job market) expectations on their children, specifically on 
sons. Considering the highly competitive (urban) job market and low female labor force 
participation in India, these families invest more on their children’s future, and do so 
selectively, seems to be a plausible explanation.31 However, I do not have such expectation 
data to test this.32 
 
2.4 Evidence from Alternative Data 
 
Next, I try to replicate baseline estimates in an alternative more recent data. I use the ASER 
data collected in 2016. My analysis with the alternative data can shed light on whether the 
observed patterns are specific to the IHDS data I am using. Annual Status of Education 
Report (ASER) is a survey on educational achievements of children between 5 and 16 years 
of age, conducted every year by a nongovernmental organization, Pratham. ASER enrolls all 
the children in the household irrespective of their schooling status. I provide some summary 
statistics in Table A4 in Appendix A.  Before going to the estimates, I note few caveats of the 
ASER data. First, the ASER 2016 data is more recent and larger, but less extensive. For 
instance, ASER does not collect data on religion, caste, household income and many other 
important background variables. Second, ASER recruits all children between the age of five 

30 This pattern is not unusual in the South Asian context. A large literature on gender discrimination finds 
similar pattern (Chamarbagwala and Ranger, 2010; Srinivasan and Bedi, 2008; Agnihotri, 2003). Richer 
communities and families are more likely to have skewed sex ratios, practice dowry, and have lower female 
labor force participation as compared to poorer families.  
 
31 Molina (2020) for instance show that labor market opportunities drive gender differences in human capital 
decisions in Mexico. 
 
32 Another possibility could be that parental intra-household resource allocation, at least some part of it, is 
driven by the migration prospects of the children (see Shrestha and Palaniswamy (2017) for an example of how 
parental resource allocation responds to increased migration prospects of men in Nepal). 
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to sixteen in a household. Thus, the exact birth order and family size cannot be observed as 
ASER recruits only children between 5 and 16 years of age. 
 
With these caveats in mind, I construct birth orders within children in the age range 5 to 16 . 
Consequently, I can compare the empirical patterns but magnitudes are not directly 
comparable to those based on the IHDS data.  
 
Figure 2.2: Shadow Education Expenditures in ASER data 
 
Notes: This figure shows mean yearly shadow education expenditures in ASER data by birth order 
and segregated by gender. 
 
I first graphically demonstrate that the empirical patterns appear to be markedly similar to the 
baseline analysis. Figure 2.2 presents the intra-household allocation of shadow education 
expenditures across birth orders and gender. I find both birth order disadvantages for later-
born children, and greater expenditure on boys in every birth order. Next, I replicate the 
baseline specification with ASER, 2016 data. Column 1 of Table 2.4 shows that the 
coefficients of birth order – girl interactions are remarkably close to the baseline estimates. 
To be specific, the gender gap appears to be 0.071 SD and 0.057 SD among first and second 
borns. I also find a clear birth order disadvantage for later-born children. In columns 2 and 3, 
I difference out fixed factors by including mother and household fixed effects respectively. 
Together, the empirical patterns appear to be robust to the use of an alternative dataset. 
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Table 2.4: Baseline Estimates with ASER Data 
 
Dep. Var. Shadow 
Education Expenditures 
(1) (2) (3) 
Girl × 1st Child -0.071*** 
(0.005) 
-0.077*** 
(0.010) 
-0.079*** 
(0.009) 
Girl × 2nd Child -0.057*** 
(0.005) 
-0.039*** 
(0.008) 
-0.039*** 
(0.007) 
Girl × 3rd Child -0.048*** 
(0.007) 
-0.047*** 
(0.012) 
-0.046*** 
(0.010) 
Girl × 4th+ Child -0.027*** 
(0.010) 
-0.033* 
(0.018) 
-0.033* 
(0.015) 
2nd Child -0.033*** 
(0.005) 
-0.026** 
(0.011) 
-0.026** 
(0.009) 
3rd Child -0.013* 
(0.008) 
0.019 
(0.018) 
0.020 
(0.015) 
4th+ Child -0.011 
(0.012) 
0.043 
(0.026) 
0.044* 
(0.022) 
Mother Fixed Effect No Yes No 
Household Fixed Effect No No Yes 
Observations 346231 247420 247420 
Notes: Every column reports a separate linear regression. Standard errors reported in parentheses are 
robust to within village clustering. 2nd and 3rd child are indicators for children whose birth orders are 2 
and 3, and, 4th+ indicates children with birth order 4 or later. All estimates include controls for child 
age and its square, current standard of study, mother age and its square, parental education, family 
size, and dummies for private school, electricity and toilet at home and presence of graduate in the 
household. In columns 2 and 3, the effects of some of the variables is absorbed by mother and 
household fixed effects respectively. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10. 
 
2.5 Elder Son Preference and Desired Family Size 
In the previous two sections, I observed a birth order disadvantage in shadow education 
expenditures and a sharp gender disparity in every birth order. In addition, I also observe that 
inequality in shadow education expenditures is more pronounced in early birth orders, 
pointing to an elder son advantage. To interpret these results, I examine whether the observed 
empirical patterns in shadow education expenditures may be attributed to the well-
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documented elder son preference typical in the current context. To that end, I test several 
predictions that stem out of elder son preference.    
 
Prediction 1: If parental resource allocation is due to elder son preference, both boys and 
girls without an elder brother would receive more shadow education expenditures than their 
counterparts with an elder brother. Moreover, there would be less shadow education 
expenditure on girls with an elder brother than boys with an elder brother. 
 
Son preference predicts that girls without an elder brother should be in an advantageous 
position as sons extract more resources in the sibling rivalry game. On the other hand, sex 
biased fertility behavior further indicates that girls without an elder brother may be in 
disadvantageous position for two reasons: first, if these girls have a younger brother, then the 
younger brother being the elder son in the family could draw more resources, and, second, if 
the family lacks a son, they may try again for a son and in turn may keep a chunk of their 
resources for the unborn son. The net effect depends on the relative strength of one 
mechanism over the other.  
 
The second part of prediction 1 implies: girls with elder brother would have different 
outcomes than boys with elder brother due to son preference. Girls with elder brother face 
two adverse positions in the intra-household hierarchy – being ‘girl’ and having an elder 
brother, however, for boys, such gender disadvantage does not exist although they may suffer 
from a birth order disadvantage.  
 
To test the above prediction, I estimate the following specification: 
 
(2.3)      	

            
  
 
where, EBi is a dummy which takes on a value of 1 if child i does not have an elder brother 
and zero otherwise. 
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Table 2.5: Son-Biased Behavior 
 
Dep. Var. Shadow Education 
Expenditures 
(1) (2) (3) 
Girl -0.048*** 
(0.015) 
 -0.068*** 
(0.012) 
No Elder Brother 0.033** 
(0.016) 
  
No Elder Brother × Girl -0.027 
(0.023) 
  
Son Desire  
 
-0.052*** 
(0.015) 
 
∆Ideal    0.007 
(0.013) 
1 (∆Ideal ≥ 0)   0.009 
(0.018) 
1 (∆Ideal ≥ 0) × ∆Ideal   -0.010 
(0.017) 
p-values    
No Elder Brother + No Elder 
Brother × Girl = 0 
0.77   
Girl + No Elder Brother × Girl = 
0 
0.00   
Observations 45148 45148 43411 
Notes: Every column reports a separate linear regression. Standard errors reported in parentheses are 
robust to within primary sampling unit (PSU) clustering. 2nd and 3rd child are indicators for children 
whose birth orders are 2 and 3, and, 4th+ indicates children with birth order 4 or later. Controls always 
include child’s age and its square, current standard of study, mother age and its square, maternal 
education, household income, household head’s education, family size and dummies for private 
school, teacher attendance at school, Hindu, forward caste and urban residence. No Elder Brother is a 
dummy for those children who do not have elder brother. Son Desire is a dummy if the family desires 
more sons. ∆Ideal represents distance from ideal fertility size, i.e., (birth order – desired fertility size), 
and, 1 (∆Ideal ≥ 0) is a dummy if the family has already reached the desired family size. ***p < 0.01; 
**p < 0.05; *p < 0.10. 
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Column 1 of Table 2.5 presents estimates of specification 2.3. The coefficient of no elder 
brother dummy (1) is the main coefficient of interest, capturing differential treatment by 
families in the presence of elder sons. The coefficient of no elder brother dummy is positive. 
To be specific, boys without an elder brother benefit from an average 0.033 SD more in 
yearly expenditure. The joint effect No Elder Brother + Girl × No Elder Brother (i.e., 1 + 
2 in specification 2.3) captures the net effect of 0.006 SD on girls lacking an elder brother. It 
is positive but statistically insignificant. Girls without elder brothers are at least qualitatively 
in a better position compared to their peers with an elder brother.33 Thus the effect of no-
elder-brother is concentrated on boys. For girls, two mechanisms may have counterbalanced 
each other. As I will show in the next prediction, those families that want the next child to be 
a son keep away resources from their existing children. The data further exhibits that girls 
with an elder brother receive fewer resources compared to boys with an elder brother: the net 
effect Girl + Girl × No Elder Brother is significantly negative and amounts to 0.075 SD. 
Elder son preference elucidates that there is a within household hierarchy with elder sons are 
positioned at the highest level followed with other sons and then girls.  
 
Prediction 2: Children in families that still desire a son spend less on shadow education 
compared to their counterparts in families with no such gender preference. 
 
Families may reveal that they desire a son for for two potential reasons.34 One possibility is 
that they are yet to reach their desired sex ratio. Another possibility could be that they have a 
preference for sons. If the choice is due to son preference, then son preference predicts that 
would keep more resources for their unborn son compared to what they would have kept for 
daughters. In turn, children in these families may have less shadow education expenditures 
compared to families with no such gender preference. On the other hand, if a family prefers a 
son to fulfill its desired sex ratio, they may keep resources for the extra child irrespective of 
the gender of the child. Consequently, I may not observe different (gendered) expenditure 
pattern in these families.    
 

33 This pattern is in contrast to Jayachandran and Pande (2017) who found a net negative effect for girls without 
elder brothers on health outcomes. 
 
34 The survey instrument asked women to state their sex preference for a future child. In our data, around 28% 
of the women wanted their next child to be a son, compared to just 6% who wanted the next child to be a 
daughter.  
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Column 2 of Table 2.5 reports estimate of the baseline specification with an additional 
dummy for son desire, but without a birth order - girl interaction. The coefficient is negative 
and statistically significant. Families that prefer their next child to be a son spend 5% of a 
standard deviation less on each existing child. In other words, children living in households 
where parents desire a son as opposed to those families where parents prefer daughters or are 
gender neutral, are likely to experience lower annual expenditure on shadow education.  
 
Prediction 3: Sons and older children are sent to more expensive tutors. 
 
In other words, on average parents not only spend less on girls as compared to boys, but girls 
are sent to less expensive tutors. In contrast, sons have more parental resources in general, 
but additionally they are sent to more expensive tutors, and consequently I can assume to 
better quality tutors. Put differently, boys and girls face different unit prices, and these unit 
prices may reflect quality of such private tutors. 
 
The shadow education market has a wide range of service providers.35 Some providers are 
more expensive than others. Parents not only choose how much to spend on shadow 
education, but also choose the quality of the providers as measured by hourly tuition rates. 
Even if both boys and girls take similar duration of shadow education, parents can provide 
sons with more expensive tuition.36    
 
I estimate private tuition expenditures for 100 hours37 in the pooled sample, and additionally 
in rural and urban areas separately. Figure A1 in Appendix A plots the cost of 100 hours of 
tuition expenditures segregated by gender and birth order in pooled, rural and urban sub-
samples respectively. I observe a sharp gender disparity in unit prices. Table 6 reports the 
estimates. Column 1 shows that parents spend INR 24.40 less on girls for 100 hours of tuition 

35 In June 2018, I conducted ten key informant interviews with private tutors and several interviews with 
students and parents in a district town in West Bengal. I found a vibrant shadow education market with multiple 
providers. I found providers who gave tuition in multiple subjects, providers who specialized in a single subject, 
providers who took only primary schools students to those who only teach to college students. The perceived 
quality of the tutors differs widely as do their fees.  
 
36 These private tutors can also provide intensive in-home tuition at higher fees. In general, in most cases I find 
that these intensive trainings are given in student’s home, however, tutors can also give tuition in their own 
places but with limited and exclusive students. In general, this is often the case that parents provide their ‘good’ 
children with these intensive tutoring.  
 
37 For ease of interpretation, I scaled-up the unit of analysis to 100 hours. 
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as compared to boys. Disparities are more prominent in the urban sample, perhaps due to the 
availability of a wider range of service providers in urban areas. Column 3 in Table 2.6 
reports that in the urban sample the tuition rates per 100 hours in the case of girls are INR 
33.68 lower than those for boys, though the magnitude drops after controlling for background 
variables (as presented in column 4). I further observe negative birth order effects, indicating 
that later born children are sent to less expensive tutors.  
 
Table 2.6: Shadow Education Expenditures in 100 Hours (in INR) 
Expenditures in 100 
hours (INR) 
Pooled Sample Urban Sample Rural Sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Girl -24.40** 
(9.90) 
-10.52 
(11.92) 
-33.68** 
(15.85) 
-24.97* 
(17.63) 
-20.07* 
(12.16) 
-6.69 
(15.43) 
Birth Order -29.10*** 
(3.96) 
-4.56 
(5.69) 
-38.31*** 
(8.89) 
-13.67 
(10.53) 
-20.98*** 
(4.33) 
-3.98 
(6.72) 
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 52360 45558 18284 15932 34076 29626 
Notes: Every column reports a separate linear regression. Standard errors reported in parenthesis are 
robust to within primary sampling unit (PSU) clustering. The depended variable is in monetary term, 
Indian Rupee. All estimates include controls for child’s age and its square, current standard of study, 
mother age and its square, maternal education, household income, household head’s education, family 
size and dummies for private school, teacher attendance at school, Hindu, forward caste and urban 
residence. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10. 
 
Desired fertility size plays a crucial role in strengthening son preference. For instance, 
prediction 2 presents a case for an interaction between the desired sex ratio and desired 
family size so I expect: 
 
Prediction 4: Parental expenditure on shadow education declines after the family achieves 
the ideal family size.  
 
Parents have a desired family size, and any forward-looking parent would keep resources for 
their unborn children till they reach that ideal. After the family has reached its target, they 
may need to cut the resources, simply because they may have exhausted all their planned 
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resources.38 To examine the behavior at the margin of ideal family size, I built on 
Chakravarty (2015) and Jayachandran and Kuziemko (2011) to estimate the following 
specification: 
 
(2.4)    	  	 !"  	#$ !" % &' 	#$ !" % &' 
 !"     ( 
 
where, Yi is the within-household shadow education expenditure on child i, ∆Ideali is defined 
as (birth orderi – ideal fertility size), measuring distance from the ideal family size, and 
1(∆Ideali ≥ 0) is a dummy which takes a value 1 if ∆Ideal is non-negative and zero otherwise. 
I am interested in the vector of  coefficients: 2 captures the effect on shadow education 
expenditures as the family approaches ideal fertility rate, 3 captures the effect once a family 
reaches the ideal fertility rate, and, 4 identifies the effect of distance between birth order and 
ideal fertility once the family has exceeded the ideal family size.  
 
Column 5 of Table 2.5 presents the estimates. I find parents spend additionally 0.007 SD per 
child that brings the family closer to the ideal fertility size. Once the family reaches the ideal 
fertility size, there is a gain of 0.009 SD yearly expenditure but, the expenditure declines by 
0.010 SD per child after the family exceeds the ideal fertility size. The estimates are 
statistically insignificant. 
 
Taken together, it appears that the observed elder son advantage may plausibly be attributed 
to elder son preference.39 Next I explore the consequences of elder son preference on 
children’s educational achievements. 
 
 
 

38 Jayachandran and Kuziemko (2011) observed similar maternal behaviour in breastfeeding practices in India. 
 
39 The gendered pattern may also potentially be due to parental safety concerns. Specifically, parents may be 
reluctant to send their daughters and younger children to private tutors late in the evening. While this could be a 
plausible explanation, expenditure patterns such as predictions in this section cannot be explained by safety 
concerns. 
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2.6 Shadow Education and Educational 
Achievements 
The previous sections have shown substantial gender disparity in parental allocation of 
shadow education expenditures. Having uncovered this, a question that follows is – what is 
the extent to which unequal distribution in shadow education resources affects children’s 
educational attainments? IHDS II randomly tested around 10,000 children on mathematics, 
reading and writing abilities. The math test consists of three modules.A child gets one point 
each if he/she can recognize numbers, subtract and divide. Thus, a child can score between 
zero and three. In contrast, the reading test consists of four modules, and the writing test has 
two. Because of this variation in testing patterns, I standardize test scores to have zero mean 
and a standard deviation of one. 
 
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics. I observe sharp gender differences in test scores. For 
instance, girls on average score 12% of a standard deviation less in math compared to boys, 
although smaller in magnitude, I also observe gender gaps in reading and writing test scores. 
These patterns raise the natural question, that is, to what extent do intra-household allocation 
of educational resources (proxied by shadow education expenditures) influence differences in 
test scores. In Table A5 in the Appendix, I show that shadow education is positively related 
to test scores.  
 
Shadow Education and Gender Gap in Test Scores 
 
To what extent may differences in test scores be attributed to disparity in shadow education 
expenditures? To that end, I implement an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition analysis. I perform 
a twofold decomposition analysis which separates the test score differentials into an 
explained part that is explained by group differences in the covariates (composition effect), 
and an unexplained part (structure effect). The counterfactual parameter is estimated from 
pooled regressions for both groups. The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition results are shown in 
Table 1.7. Panel A reports the decompositions into explained and unexplained parts, and, 
panel B and C further reports the contributions of some of the covariates to the explained and 
unexplained variations, respectively. The differences in test scores by gender are sizeable. 
Girls score 12.5% of a standard deviation less in math, and 4.6% and 6.7% of a standard 
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deviation less in writing and reading scores than their male counterparts. Column 1 of panel 
B further show that only 32.8% of the gender differences in math test scores can be explained 
by covariates. The explained part may look small, but this is consistent with the existing 
literature on gender differences in math test scores (Bharadwaj et al., 2016; Fryer and Levitt, 
2010). By contrast, a substantial proportion of the variation in writing and reading test scores 
may be explained by covariates. For instance, a substantial 82.61% and 59.70% of variation 
in writing and reading test scores may be explained by covariates.  
 
Table 2.7: Oaxaca- Blinder Decomposition of Test Scores 
 
 Math Scores Writing Scores Reading Scores 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Decomposition   
Gender Difference 0.125*** 
(0.020) 
0.046*** 
(0.020) 
0.067*** 
(0.020) 
Explained 0.041*** 
(0.011) 
0.038*** 
(0.009) 
0.040*** 
(0.010) 
Unexplained 0.083*** 
(0.017) 
0.007 
(0.018) 
0.027 
(0.017) 
Panel B: Percentage contributions to explained variation 
Shadow Education 13.53 11.15 7.98 
Mother Education 15.45 13.34 8.72 
Caste 2.52 3.87 2.18 
Panel C: Percentage contributions to unexplained variation 
Shadow Education 14.31 131.68 27.37 
Observations 10185 10132 10222 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Oaxaca – Blinder decomposition. Controls include child’s age and its square, current standard 
of study, mother age and its square, maternal education, household income, household head’s 
education, family size and dummies for private school, teacher attendance at school, Hindu, forward 
caste and urban residence.  ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10. 
 
How much of the explained variation in test scores may be attributed to disparities in shadow 
education expenditures? Panel B of Table 2.7 shows that shadow education can explain 
around 14% of the explained gender differences in math test results. The corresponding 
contributions in writing and reading test scores are 11% and 8% respectively. In fact, shadow 
education has most explanatory power in test scores relative to other parental and household 
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level variables. For instance, caste explains only a miniscule part of the explained gender gap, 
whereas, only maternal education has a relatively higher weight as compared to shadow 
education expenditures. The findings suggest that the gender gap in math, compared to 
writing and reading scores, can more assertively be attributed to disparities in intra-household 
resource allocations compared to other subjects.40  
 
Shadow education also accounts for a substantial proportion of unexplained gaps in test 
scores. In other words, shadow education has a higher return for boys as compared to girls. 
Specifically, around 14.31% of the unexplained variation in math test scores may be 
explained by gender gap in returns to shadow education expenditures (Panel C of Table 
2.7).41 
 
In Appendix B, I show that decomposing the gender gap using a Recentered Influence 
Function regression method (Firpo et al., 2009), and re-weighting function (Firpo et al., 
2018) to estimate the counterfactual scenarios yield fairly similar results. 
 
Table 2.8: Oaxaca- Blinder Decomposition by Birth Order 
 Math Scores  Writing Scores Reading Scores 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Percentage contribution of shadow education to explained variations in gender gap 
1st Child 30.75 27.84 16.49 
2nd Child 10.71 7.36 8.56 
3rd Child 11.29 3.37 2.25 
Notes: Oaxaca – Blinder decomposition by birth order. Controls include child’s age and its square, 
current standard of study, mother age and its square, maternal education, household income, 
household head’s education, family size and dummies for private school, teacher attendance at school, 
Hindu, forward caste and urban residence.  ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10. 
 
Table 2.8 reports decomposition results by birth orders. The contribution of shadow 
education is highest among the firstborns. Column 1 suggests that around one-third of the 

40 This should be interpreted in parallel to the literature on gender gaps in math, which suggests that gender 
differences in math test scores are most persistent compared to other tests (Bharadwaj et al., 2016; Fryer and 
Levitt, 2010). Thus, unequal shadow education allocation may be an important causal mechanism behind the 
well-documented gender gaps in math. In chapter 4, I show that elder son preference coupled with family size 
effects can plausibly explain gender gaps in math test scores in Pakistan. 
 
41 This is perhaps due to the fact that boys are sent to better quality tutors as we observe in Table 2.6. 
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explained variation in the gender gap in math among the firstborns may be attributed to  
disparities in the shadow education expenditures. As one moves down the birth orders, the 
relative importance of shadow education declines, but nonetheless remain substantial. Family 
backgrounds matter relatively more among the later-borns. One can observe similar birth 
order patterns in writing and reading test scores.    
  
In sum, disparities in shadow education expenditures may play an important role in driving 
gender gaps in test scores. However, in understanding the decomposition results, it is 
important to keep in mind the descriptive approach of the analysis. This is essentially a 
partial equilibrium exercise that abstracts from several general equilibrium considerations.42 
Most importantly, although I show that shadow education and test scores are positively 
related, I cannot rule out the simultaneous determination of shadow education expenditures 
and test scores. Hence, the analysis should not be imbued with a causal interpretation, and 
should be understood as an accounting exercise.  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 This chapter examined the unequal distribution of parental educational investments across 
children within households. One of the major limitations of the literature has been that few 
studies actually measure direct parental monetary expenditures on individual children. I 
overcome this restriction by examining direct parental expenditure on shadow education. The 
analysis reveals four key findings. First, there is a birth order disadvantage for later-born 
children in shadow education expenditures. Second, girls are disadvantaged within families. 
Shadow education expenditures on them are relatively lower at every birth order. Third, intra-
household resource allocation favours the oldest son, followed by other sons and then girls. 
Fourth, based on a decomposition analysis, I found that disparities in shadow education 
expenditures account for a substantial proportion of the gender gaps in test scores. The 
contribution is highest among the firstborns, and declines for lower birth orders.  
 
These results motivate policies promoting gender equality at the micro level. Parents need to 
be incentivized to treat their children equally. In modern economies, the quality of human 

42 Although I show that shadow education and test scores are positively related, I cannot rule out the 
simultaneous determination of shadow education expenditures and test scores. See Fortin et al. (2011) for a 
review of decomposition methods in Economics.  
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capital is the backbone of economic growth and development. Such disparities already have 
and will continue to have a severe impact on India’s long run growth and development.  
 
 
 
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Chapter 3: Son Preference, Family Size and the 
Gender Gap in Mathematics in Pakistan
 
3.1 Introduction 
While extensive empirical evidence suggests that boys outperform girls in standardized math 
tests, the underlying reasons remain unclear. The literature fails to identify convincing 
individual-level determinants, though cross-country studies tend to put forward social and 
cultural factors (Fryer and Levitt, 2010). A few studies also point to underlying biological 
differences (Nollenberger et al., 2016). In spite of a long standing debate, the literature is yet 
to reach a consensus. In this chapter I show that elder son preference together with family 
size can plausibly explain the gender gap in math in Pakistan. The evidence assembled in this 
chapter supports the idea that within-country social and cultural conditionings are the primary 
factors underlying the gender gap.   
 
Math test scores have received much attention for their ability to predict labor and 
educational attainments in important ways. For instance, math test scores and math based 
curricula are a good predictor of future income and likelihood of a college degree in the 
rewarding science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) fields (Card and Pyne, 2017). 
Although, the gender gap in educational achievements has narrowed, and has been reversed 
in countries like the United States (Goldin et al., 2006), it persists in lower and middle 
income countries. Gender gap in math tests may be more important in developing countries, 
where girls suffer from limited resources in addition to adverse stereotyping.  The current 
study context, Pakistan, suffers from a sharp gender division in educational and labor market 
achievements.43 Given the strong correlation of math-based test scores and future labor 
market and educational achievements, Pakistan provides an interesting context to study.   
 
A growing literature has documented a widening gender gap in math test scores in many 
contexts. The empirical findings are remarkably consistent in that the gender gap 
monotonically increases with years of schooling (Contini et al., 2017; Bharadwaj et al., 2016; 
Fryer and Levitt, 2010). In fact, the literature suggests that the gender gap does not exist 

43 Using the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey 2002 data, Aslam (2009) calculated that around 26% of 
women participate in the labor force as compared to 88% for men  
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before children enter schools. Several explanations are put forward e.g., social, biological and 
cultural factors, with no conclusive determinants. For instance, Fryer and Levitt (2010) find 
that observable explanatory variables are unable to explain the gap, instead gender-biased 
environments appear to be relevant in a cross-country comparison. Nollenberger et al. (2016) 
in a related cross-country analysis further emphasize the role of cultural beliefs about the role 
of women in society as a potential explanation. Few studies attempt to uncover micro-level 
determinants. Carlana (2019) finds that gender gap in math performance is associated with 
teachers’ gender stereotype in Italy – the stronger the gender stereotypes the sharper the 
gender gap. Conversely, Bharadwaj et al. (2016) conclude that only self-assessed ability 
appears to explain the gender gap in Chilean data. Their study further indicates that 
differential parental investments may play a role. Another study by Dossi et al. (2019) shows 
that socialization processes at home and gender-biased environments can explain a 
substantial part of the observed gender gap in math tests in the US. Similar gender-biased 
environments, specifically parental gender preferences, which affect educational and health 
outcomes, has been widely documented in many developing countries.44 Though evidence in 
chapter 2 indicates that within-household parental preferences may contribute to the gender 
gap in math, establishing the causal link remains an open question.  
 
Based on data from 200,000 children, my primary findings are in line with the existing 
evidence. I find a sharp gender gap in math test scores. The gap does not exist at the age of 
five, but monotonically increases with age. For instance, the gender gap amounts to around 
0.009 to 0.024 standard deviations for children aged below ten, but increases to 0.088-0.136 
SD for older children. Moreover, consistent with earlier findings, socio-economic and school 
level variables do little to explain the gender gap. Unlike previous literature, however, I also 
observe a similar pattern in reading test scores.   
 
In what follows, I investigate how differential parental preferences and resource allocation 
explain the gender gap in math test scores. To that end, I explore if son preference, 
particularly a preference for elder sons, is one of the drivers of the gender gap. In many Asian 
countries parents tend to prefer boys (Jayachandran and Pande, 2017). In chapter 2, I have 
shown an elder son preference in parental within-household allocation of educational 

44 See Jayachandran and Pande (2017); Bhalotra et al. (2010); Tarozzi and Mahajan (2007). 
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resources in India.45 Using a similar approach, I show several features in test scores in the 
data that may be traced back to elder son preference.  First, the data exhibits a birth order 
gradient in math test scores. In other words, test scores monotonically decrease down the 
birth order, indicating birth-order advantages for elder children. Second, girls score less than 
boys in every birth order. Moreover, the gender gap tends to weaken down the birth order, 
implying an advantage for elder sons. These conclusions are robust to the inclusion of parent, 
household and school fixed effects. Third, I observe a qualitatively similar pattern in test 
score distribution. For example, older firstborn girls are 3%-points less likely to achieve the 
maximum test score compared to firstborn boys.46 Fourth, girls without older brothers appear 
to score better compared to their peers with older brothers. These features are in fact 
consistent to the observed patterns in child height in India (Chapter, 2; Jayachandran and 
Pande, 2017).  
 
Furthermore, test scores appear to be negatively related to family size, suggesting a quantity-
quality tradeoff (QQ). The gender gap is less likely to be observed in single-child families. 
The gap is more pronounced in multi-child families. Moreover, gender gaps tend to exist only 
for children at early birth orders in larger families, indicating a combined effect of elder son 
preference and family size.  
 
The evidence also shows differential parental investment in direct monetary expenditure on 
private tuition. I find that parents tend to prefer boys in monthly private tuition expenditure, 
in addition the gender gap in private tuition expenditure appears to be higher for older 
children. This significantly strengthens the argument of differential parental investment as the 
underlying driver of gender gap. 
 
I discuss and rule out several potential alternative mechanisms, most notably inherent 
biological differences by gender or birth order and biased testing environments that can 
disproportionately affect children.  
 

45 Chapter 2 further show that a substantial proportion of disparity in private tuition expenditures may translate 
into a gender gap in test scores.  
 
46 In addition, among top scorers, 63.44% are boys. 
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This chapter relates to a number of strands in the literature. First, this study is primarily 
related to the literature that explains gender gaps in math test scores (Carlana, 2019; Dossi et 
al, 2019; Contini et al, 2017; Bharadwaj et al, 2016; Nollenberger et al., 2016; Fryer and 
Levitt, 2010). Most previous studies have not provided clear and causal within-country 
evidence. Standard individual-level variables often fail to fully explain the gender gap. Dossi 
et al. (2019) is closest to my study. The authors show that girls raised in a male-biased family 
in the US score on average 3%-points less on math tests compared to their peers in other 
families. I attempt to associate a similar socio-cultural underpinning typical to the study 
context with the gender gap in math. Thus, this study fills a gap by offering a plausible 
mechanism at the micro-level.  
 
Second, this work adds and complements a growing literature that documents son preference 
and its consequences, primarily in Asian countries. Son preference governs diverse parental 
behaviors including breastfeeding practices (Jayachandran and Kuziemko, 2011), allocation 
of educational resources (see chapter 2), and unequal child outcomes such as anthropometric 
status (Jayachandran and Pande, 2017; Bhalotra et al., 2010; Tarozzi and Mahajan, 2007). 
This study identifies and explores an additional consequence of son preference.  
 
Third, this chapter feeds into the literature on the QQ tradeoff (Angrist and Levy, 2010; 
Black et al., 2005; Becker and Lewis, 1973). Although, I do not test for a QQ tradeoff per se 
but rather examine the indirect effect of the QQ tradeoff in explaining gender gaps in math 
test scores. I find a substantial role for family size in explaining test scores. The fact that the 
gender gap diminishes in small families suggests that parental resource allocation tends to 
discriminate against girls relatively more in larger families. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the data and presents summary 
statistics. Section 4.3 models gender gaps in math test scores. Section 4.4 attempts to test for 
elder son preference. Section 4.5 explores the role of family size. Section 4.6 documents an 
unequal distribution of parental education expenditures. Section 4.7 discusses potential 
alternative explanations, and section 4.8 concludes the chapter.     
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3.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The empirical analysis in this chapter is based on the Annual Status of Education Report 
(ASER), 2016 data. The survey was conducted by Pratham, a nongovernmental organization. 
ASER is primarily a survey of educational achievements of children between 5 and 16 years 
of age. ASER is unique in the sense that the survey is conducted in children’s home and 
enrolls all the eligible children in home irrespective of their current school enrollment status. 
I have data on children currently enrolled in schools, dropped out, and including those who 
never enrolled in schools. Furthermore, ASER collets a whole spectrum of individual, 
parental, household and school level data. I have data on more than 200,000 children. 
 
The ASER math test consists of four questions. If a child is a beginner or could not answer 
any question she gets a score of 1. The four questions deal with number recognition between 
0-9, 10-99, subtraction and division. The scores are coded as 1 if a child answers correctly, 
otherwise coded as 0. A child can have a maximum score of 5 and a minimum 1. In addition, 
ASER also conducts a reading test. In case of the reading test, ASER asks 4 questions47 
which are coded like the math score. That is, a child can have a maximum reading score of 5 
and a minimum of 1. 
 
  

47 These are whether the child can read letters, words, sentences and story. 
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variables Pooled Sample Boys Girls 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Math Test Scores 3.00 
(1.55) 
3.14 
(1.52) 
2.80 
(1.57) 
Reading Test Scores 2.95 
(1.59) 
3.09 
(1.56) 
2.75 
(1.61) 
Age 8.78 
(3.83) 
8.92 
(3.82) 
8.59 
(3.83) 
Standard  3.02 
(2.67) 
3.24 
(2.73) 
2.73 
(2.55) 
Proportion of School Enrolment 0.70 
(0.46) 
0.75 
(0.43) 
0.63 
(0.48) 
Family Size 3.67 
(1.46) 
3.63 
(1.45) 
3.74 
(1.46) 
Mother Age 36.26 
(7.30) 
36.31 
(7.33) 
36.19 
(7.26) 
Mother Education 2.09 
(3.73) 
2.00 
(3.67) 
2.20 
(3.80) 
Father Age  40.88 
(7.85) 
40.92 
(7.88) 
40.83 
(7.81) 
Father Education 4.02 
(4.80) 
3.94 
(4.78) 
4.13 
(4.83) 
Pacca House 0.22 
(0.42) 
0.22 
(0.42) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
Own Home 0.90 
(0.30) 
0.90 
(0.30) 
0.90 
(0.30) 
Electricity at Home 0.84 
(0.36) 
0.84 
(0.37) 
0.85 
(0.36) 
Own Computer 0.15 
(0.36) 
0.15 
(0.36) 
0.16 
(0.36) 
Receiver of Social Safety Scheme 0.16 
(0.40) 
0.16 
(0.37) 
0.16 
(0.37) 
Private School 0.25 
(0.43) 
0.24 
(0.43) 
0.26 
(0.44) 
Mixed Gender School 0.14 
(0.35) 
0.13 
(0.34) 
0.16 
(0.37) 
English Medium School 0.25 
(0.44) 
0.24 
(0.43) 
0.28 
(0.45) 
Toilet in School 0.66 
(0.47) 
0.64 
(0.48) 
0.69 
(0.46) 
Library in School 0.17 
(0.37) 
0.16 
(0.36) 
0.18 
(0.38) 
Electricity in School 0.64 
(0.37) 
0.62 
(0.48) 
0.67 
(0.47) 
Number of Students in School 193.40 
(192.56) 
190.28 
(189.88) 
198.28 
(196.61) 
Number of Teachers in School 7.34 
(7.04) 
7.19 
(6.95) 
7.58 
(7.18) 
Notes: This table reports means of the dependent variables and covariates. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. Around 43% of the pooled sample consists of girls. Average sample sizes: 
Pooled 248,760, Boys 141,601, and Girls 107,159. 
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Table 3.1 presents summary statistics. Column 1 shows that the average raw math test score 
is 3.00. Column 2 and 3 report a sharp gender division in test scores. For instance, on average 
in math, girls score 0.35 points less than boys, which amounts to 0.216 SD.48 Unlike other 
study contexts, gender gap is also evident in reading test score. The gender gap in reading test 
scores amounts to 0.34 points or 0.212 SD.  
 
The remainder of Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for background variables. Around 
43% of the children are girls, reflecting skewed sex ratios in the Pakistani population. 70 % 
of the children are currently enrolled in schools. The ASER data is particularly useful as 
nearly 30% of children have either dropped-out or never enrolled in schools. Nearly 25% of 
children go to private schools and a similar proportion is enrolled in English-medium 
schools. Average family size is 3.67. Fathers tend to be older and more educated than 
mothers.  I observe gender gaps in most background variables. Girl children are more likely 
to come from families with better educated parents with better household conditions, 
although the differences are small. Consistent with this, girls have advantages in most school 
level variables. For instance, girls are more likely to be enrolled in private, English medium 
schools, and, in girl sample, schools have more toilets, libraries and electricity, and 
importantly, on average more teachers. Interestingly, girls are 3%-points more likely to be 
enrolled in mixed-gender schools, although in general, enrolment in mixed-gender school is 
low with only 14% of the children enrolled in mixed-gender schools. Prima facie, it is 
puzzling that in spite of better family and school conditions, girls have lower math and 
reading scores. In the next section, I examine this pattern in more detail. 
 
3.3 The Gender Gap in Math Test Scores 
First, I graphically present the dynamics of the male-female gap in mathematics test scores as 
a function of child age. Following the previous literature, I standardize test scores to have 
zero mean and standard deviation one. In Panel A of Figure 3.1, I plot mean test scores by 
age in years and gender, and, panel B plots the corresponding gender gap. Two facts are 
immediate; first the math test score monotonically increases till the age of 13 and then falls 
marginally, and, second, the gender gap in math test scores also monotonically increases till 
the age of 14, falls marginally at the age of 15 and increases again at the age of 16. The 

48 Compared to other study contexts, the gender gap is on the higher side here. 
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gender gap rises from a small gap at the age of 5 to more than 0.4 SD at the age of 16,49 
which translates into an annual 0.037 SD increase in the gap. The pattern is consistent across 
schools: I do not find any significant differences in gender gaps by school type.50 I observe a 
similar pattern in reading scores in Figure F1 in the Appendix F. Both boys and girls start at 
fairly similar level at the age of 5, but similar to the math test, a monotonic pattern emerges 
with age. The ground lost by girls amounts to 0.44 SD at the age of 16, or an annual fall back 
of 0.038 SD.51  
Figure 3.1: Math Test Scores (SD) by Gender 
Panel A 
 
 
 
 
 

49 Raw math scores at age 5 are 1.63 for boys and 1.60 for girls. Raw scores increase at the age of 16 to 3.82 for 
boys and 3.13 for girls. 
 
50 Plots by school are available on request. 
 
51 Raw reading scores at age 5 are 1.55 for boys and 1.52 for girls. The reading scores increase at the age of 16 
to 3.81 for boys and 3.11 for girls. 
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Panel B 
 
Notes: This figure depicts mean gender gap (boy-girl) in normalized math test scores by age.  
 
Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of math achievement by gender. Girls are 26.88%-points 
less likely to earn the highest score of 5 as compared to boys. The gap monotonically 
increases with test scores.52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

52 The exact distribution in percentage is shown in Table C1 in the Appendix C. 
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Figure 3.2: Math Score Distribution 
 
 
Notes: This figure depicts math score distribution (in percentage) by gender. Test scores are not 
standardized. 
 
Next, I present a series of estimates of the gender gap in math scores in Table 4.2. I estimate 
the following specification: 
 
(3.1)                  	      
 
where Yi is the standardized ASER math test score of child i, Girl is a dummy for girl 
children, X is a vector of individual, parental, household and school level covariates, and,  is 
the error term.  is the primary parameter of interest.  X includes child age and its quadratic, 
standard of current study and a dummy for school enrolment status. I also control for a few 
school level variables – student and teacher capacity, dummies for private, co-educational 
and English medium schooling, and, dummies for the availability of toilet, library and 
electivity in the school. I include maternal and paternal literacy, age, a quadratic in age and 
sibling size. Other covariates are household specific, e.g., dummies for home ownership, 
pacca house, electricity, computer and recipient of social safety schemes. For the sake of 
brevity and ease of interpretation, the analysis is segregated by two age groups:  5 to less than 
10 years (younger group), and 10 to 16 years (older group). If a student has uninterrupted 
study she is most likely to be in fourth grade or below in the younger group, and, tenth grade 
or below in the older group, respectively. 53 

53 In the data, 97% of the children in the younger group are in grade 4 or below. 
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Table 3.2: Gender Gap in Math Test Scores 
Dep. Var. Math 
Test Scores 
Younger Age Group ( 5 to less than 10 
Years) 
Older Age Group (10 to 16 years) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Girl -0.015*** 
(0.004) 
-0.024*** 
(0.005) 
-0.013** 
(0.005) 
-0.009* 
(0.004) 
-0.117*** 
(0.005) 
-0.136*** 
(0.006) 
-0.091*** 
(0.006) 
-0.088*** 
(0.005) 
Standard 0.319*** 
(0.002) 
0.282*** 
(0.003) 
0.309*** 
(0.003) 
0.274*** 
(0.003) 
0.134*** 
(0.001) 
0.101*** 
(0.002) 
0.139*** 
(0.002) 
0.110*** 
(0.002) 
Mother Age 0.012*** 
(0.003) 
- 0.016*** 
(0.004) 
0.008* 
(0.004) 
0.017*** 
(0.004) 
- 0.017*** 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
Mother 
Schooling 
0.059*** 
(0.007) 
- 0.066*** 
(0.009) 
0.013 
(0.009) 
0.058*** 
(0.010) 
- 0.060*** 
(0.011) 
-0.000 
(0.011) 
Father 
Schooling 
0.039*** 
(0.006) 
- 0.028*** 
(0.008) 
0.013 
(0.008) 
0.030*** 
(0.008) 
- 0.015 
(0.009) 
0.026** 
(0.009) 
Pacca House 0.030*** 
(0.005) 
- -0.007 
(0.006) 
0.00 
(0.007) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
- -0.014* 
(0.007) 
0.015 
(0.008) 
Private School   0.108*** 
(0.008) 
-   0.129*** 
(0.009) 
- 
Mixed- Gender 
School 
  -0.028*** 
(0.007) 
-   0.021** 
(0.008) 
- 
English School   0.077*** 
(0.007) 
-   0.029*** 
(0.008) 
- 
Family Size -0.012*** 
(0.001) 
- -0.010*** 
(0.002) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.024*** 
(0.002) 
- -0.021*** 
(0.002) 
-0.014*** 
(0.002) 
Child 
Covariates 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Parent 
Covariates 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other 
Covariates 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Currently 
Enrolled 
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Parent Fixed 
Effect
No Yes No No No Yes No No 
School Fixed 
Effect 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Observations 98660 95261 69920 69920 97035 94581 68592 68592 
Notes: Every column reports a separate linear regression. Standard errors reported in parentheses are 
robust to within village unit clustering. Controls include child, parent and household level covariates, 
and columns 4,5,9 and 10 additionally include school level variables. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 
0.10.
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Columns 1 – 4 of Table 3.2 present estimates for the younger age group, and columns 5 – 8 
for the older age group. A comparison of columns 1 and 5 confirms that gender gaps in the 
ASER math test scores increase with age. To be specific, younger girls on average score 
0.015 SD lower as compared to boys while the corresponding gender gap is 0.117 SD in the 
older group.  
 
Next, columns 2 and 6 report estimates with household and parent fixed effects. By doing so, 
I difference out unobserved parental and household confounding factors. The estimates 
remain fairly stable. The gender gap increases to 0.024 SD for younger children, and for the 
older children, the corresponding gap is 0.136 SD. The test scores may also differ depending 
on the schooling and school environments may disproportionality affect different school-
going children.  Columns 3 and 7 present estimates for a sub-sample of currently enrolled 
students after controlling for school level characteristics. The estimates are similar to the full 
sample, and are robust to the inclusion of school fixed effects in columns 4 and 8. I also 
estimate age-specific regressions for each age between 5 and 16 and find qualitatively similar 
results.54 
 
Overall, the estimates suggest that the gender gap remains substantial, despite the inclusion of 
individual, parental, household and school variables. This is remarkably consistent with 
previous evidence (Bharadwaj et al., 2016; Fryer and Levitt, 2010).  
 
3.4 Birth Order, Son Preference and the Gender Gap in 
Math Test Scores 
In this section, I explore if the well-documented elder son preference typically observed in 
the region explains the gender gap. Empirical evidence suggests that parents tend to favor 
elder sons in many South-Asian countries. Son preference has been documented in 
breastfeeding practices (Jayachandran and Kuziemko, 2011), intra-household allocation of 
educational resources (see chapter 2), and has been shown to cause gender gaps in child 
height (Jayachandran and Pande, 2017). Accordingly, parental resource allocation may be 
viewed as the product of elder child preference and preference for sons. Thus, if parents 
allocate resources according to elder son preference, the data should exhibit a birth order 

54 Results are available on request 
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gradient in test scores, and moreover, girls should be disadvantaged at every birth order. 
Additionally, I may expect the gender gaps to be stronger in the case of early birth orders.  
 
Figure 3.3: Math Test Scores by Birth Order and Gender 
 
Notes: This figure shows mean (normalized) math test scores by birth order and gender. 
 
In Figure 3.3, I show a birth order gradient in math test scores. Test scores monotonically 
decrease as birth order increases, and boys outperform girls at every birth order. In addition, 
the gender gap tends to decline as the birth order increases. Next I investigate the pattern in 
more detail. To that end, I estimate the baseline specification: 
 
(3.2)                


   	

  
     
    
Where, Yi is the individual ASER math test scores, and BOij is a dummy which takes the 
value 1 for birth order j. Here  captures coefficients of  birth orders and  captures 
coefficients of birth orders and girl interactions. Xi is a vector of background variables, and, i 
is an error term.  
 
The identification of (3.2) relies on the fact that birth order is a natural experiment, the 
genetic makeup remains constant in all biological children in the family. However, children 
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at later birth orders are more likely to be observed in larger families. To alleviate this concern 
to some extent, I control for family size in all estimates. Yet, it cannot control for unobserved 
associations between birth order and other confounding characteristics. In particular, fertility 
is highly correlated with family and household factors. I address such endogeneity concerns 
by including family and household fixed effects. By doing so, I difference out factors fixed 
within families and households, and also remove residual associations between birth orders 
and family or household factors.55 
 
  

55 A household may contain multiple nuclear families. 
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Table 3.3: Birth Order and Gender Gap 
 
Dep. Var. Math 
Test Scores 
Younger Age Group Older Age Group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
2nd Child -0.027*** 
(0.007) 
-0.039** 
(0.015) 
-0.033*** 
(0.009) 
-0.028*** 
(0.008) 
-0.032*** 
(0.008) 
-0.074*** 
(0.015) 
-0.036*** 
(0.009) 
-0.044*** 
(0.007) 
3rd Child -0.069*** 
(0.010) 
-0.098*** 
(0.023) 
-0.078*** 
(0.011) 
-0.068*** 
(0.010) 
-0.046*** 
(0.011) 
-0.102*** 
(0.024) 
-0.044*** 
(0.013) 
-0.045*** 
(0.011) 
4th+ Child -0.096*** 
(0.013) 
-0.107*** 
(0.031) 
-0.119*** 
(0.015) 
-0.082*** 
(0.012) 
-0.020 
(0.016) 
-0.110*** 
(0.036) 
-0.014 
(0.018) 
-0.011 
(0.016) 
Girl × 1st Child -0.024** 
(0.009) 
-0.044** 
(0.019) 
-0.027** 
(0.010) 
-0.021* 
(0.009) 
-0.128*** 
(0.010) 
-0.178*** 
(0.018) 
-0.105*** 
(0.012) 
-0.109*** 
(0.011) 
Girl × 2nd Child -0.015 
(0.008) 
-0.038*** 
(0.014) 
-0.015 
(0.009) 
-0.016 
(0.008) 
-0.109*** 
(0.011) 
-0.117*** 
(0.016) 
-0.075*** 
(0.013) 
-0.063*** 
(0.011) 
Girl × 3rd Child -0.004 
(0.008) 
-0.010 
(0.015) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
0.010 
(0.009) 
-0.090*** 
(0.013) 
-0.106*** 
(0.020) 
-0.066*** 
(0.016) 
-0.069*** 
(0.014) 
Girl × 4th+ Child -0.014 
(0.008) 
-0.012 
(0.014) 
-0.010 
(0.010) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.132*** 
(0.017) 
-0.138*** 
(0.027) 
-0.113*** 
(0.021) 
-0.104*** 
(0.019) 
Parent FE No Yes No No No Yes No No 
School FE No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Currently 
Enrolled 
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Observations 98660 95261 69920 69920 97035 94581 68592 68592 
Notes: Every column reports a separate linear regression. Standard errors reported in parentheses are 
robust to within village unit clustering. All estimations include controls for child, parent and 
household level variables, and columns 3,4,7 and 8 additionally include school level variables.  2nd 
and 3rd child are indicators for children whose birth orders are 2 and 3, and, 4th+ indicates children 
with birth order 4 or later. In columns 2 and 6 main effects are absorbed by parent fixed effects. In 
columns 4 and 8 main effects are absorbed by school fixed effect. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10. 
  
Table 3.3 presents estimates for equation (3.2). Column 1 shows a male birth-order gradient 
in math test scores. The coefficients associated with birth orders are negative and 
monotonically increase down the birth order. Second and third born boys in the younger age 
group score on average 0.027 SD and 0.069 SD less than firstborn boys. In the older age 
group, second born boys score 0.032 SD less than firstborn boys, and moving from firstborn 
to third and fourth+ born boys results in 0.046 SD and 0.020 SD drops in estimates for test 
scores. I find a fairly similar birth order gradient for girls. For instance, in column 1, I 
observe that second born girls from the younger age group score on average 0.018 SD lower 
compared to firstborn girls (calculated as 2nd Child + Girl × 2nd Child – Girl × 1st Child). The 
effects are 0.049 SD and 0.086 SD lower for third and fourth+ born girl children compared to 
firstborn girl children. Effects tend to be lower for older girls. 
 
The above evidence indicates a birth order gradient both for boys and girls, pointing to an 
advantage for elder children. Next I investigate gender gaps across birth orders. For the 
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younger age cohort, the coefficients on the gender and birth order interactions reported in 
Table 3.3 are negative, and the estimates for gender gap tend to decline with birth order. The 
gender gap is -0.024 SD among the younger firstborn children. The estimate tends to weaken 
for the second-borns, and, disappears for third-borns and fourth+ borns. However, the gender 
gap remains persistent and sizeable across birth orders among older children. The weakening 
of the gender gaps as one moves down the birth order emphasizes the advantageous position 
of elder sons. 
 
In columns 2 and 6 of Table 3.3, the main effects are absorbed by both parents and household 
fixed effects in the sample of younger and older children respectively. The estimated effects 
appear to be on the higher side as compared to their baseline estimates, although the patterns 
remain similar. For instance, firstborn younger girls score 0.044 SD less than their firstborn 
peers, while for the older children the gap is 0.178 SD. Moving from first to second borns the 
gender gap amounts to 0.038 SD and 0.117 SD for younger and older children. I also observe 
a sharper birth order gradient.   
 
In columns 3 and 7, I replicate the baseline estimates in a subsample of currently enrolled 
students. Afterward, in column 4 and 8 I add school fixed effects in the baseline specification 
(2), and thus difference out confounding factors fixed within schools. The estimates appear to 
be robust to the inclusion of school fixed effects.       
 
To supplement the evidence, Table C2 in the Appendix C shows that gender gaps in test 
score distribution are concentrated among older children. I find that firstborn girls from older 
age groups are 3%-points less likely to score 5 as compared to firstborn boys, the 
corresponding gap is 2%-points for second-borns. However, for younger children the gaps 
are not sizeable.        
 
The above evidence clearly indicates an elder son advantage. To further investigate the 
validity of elder son preference as a plausible explanation for the gender gap, I hypothesize 
that the gender gap ceases to exist or at least weakens if girls lack an elder brother. There is 
theoretical ambiguity on whether girl children without elder brothers have an advantage. 
Girls without elder brother should have an advantage. However if these girls have younger 
brothers, then by virtue of being the eldest son, the younger brother may attract more 
resources. In addition, if such families lack a son, they will try again for a son, and in turn 
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may save up resources for the unborn son.56 The net effect depends on the strength of one 
mechanism over another. To uncover the net effect, I estimate the following specification: 
 
(3.3)          	  	)*+ !+*,-!  	  )*+ !+*,-! 
  ,    
 
where, No_Elder_Brotheri is a dummy for whether the child lacks an elder brother. Estimates 
are presented in Table 3.4. The estimates suggest that boys without elder brothers have clear 
advantages in test scores (the coefficient of No Elder Brother). The net effect for girls 
without elder brother (No Elder Brother + Girl × No Elder Brother) tends to be positive. In 
other words, girls without elder brothers tend to score better as compared to girls with elder 
brothers. The effect is higher for older girls. The effect amounts to 0.016 and 0.020 SD 
respectively in pooled and currently enrolled sample for the older children. The effects are 
statistically significant for older children, but not for younger children. Comparatively, girls 
without elder brothers tend to score lower as compared to boys without elder brothers. The 
net effect, Girl + Girl × No Elder Brother which captures the difference, is negative and 
tends to be statistically significant only for the older age group.  
 
  

56 For instance, Jayachandran and Pande (2017) found a negative impact on girls of lacking an older brother on 
child height in India. By contrast, in chapter 2 I find a net positive effect on private tuition expenditure.  
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Table 3.4: Son Preference 
 
Dep. Var. Math Test Scores Younger Age Group Older Age Group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Girl -0.018** 
(0.006) 
-0.016* 
(0.008) 
-0.125*** 
(0.010) 
-0.102*** 
(0.012) 
No Elder Brother 0.004 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
Girl × No Elder Brother 0.006 
(0.008) 
0.007 
(0.010) 
0.017 
(0.010) 
0.024 
(0.013) 
p -values     
No Elder Brother + Girl × No 
Elder Brother = 0 
0.10 0.20 0.06 0.08 
Girl + Girl × No Elder 
Brother = 0 
0.04 0.21 0.00 0.00 
Currently Enrolled No Yes No Yes 
Observations 98660 69920 97035 68592 
Notes: Every column reports a separate linear regression. Standard errors reported in parentheses are 
robust to within village unit clustering. All estimations include controls for child, parent and 
household level variables, and column 2 and 4 additionally include school level variables. ***p < 0.01; 
**p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.  
 
In sum, elder son preference seems to partially explain the gender gap, and plausibly at least 
for the younger age group. In the older age group, the gender gap weakens down the birth 
order but remains negative and statistically strong for later-borns.  
 
3.5 Family Size and Gender Gap 
 
Section 3.3 provided some evidence that individual test scores are negatively related to 
family size, which may indicate a QQ tradeoff (Becker and Lewis, 1973). In this section, I 
examine the dynamics of the gender gap in math test scores by family size. Given the 
negative relationship between family size and test scores, an obvious natural progression is to 
estimate the birth-order, gender effects by family size, which also allow for heterogeneous 
effects by family size.  
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Table 3.5: Family Size and Gender Gap in Math 
 
Dep. Var. Math Test 
Scores 
Younger Age Group Older Age Group 
Family Size N=1 N=2 N=3 N=1 N=2 N=3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Girl × 1st Child -0.023 
(0.025) 
0.004 
(0.016) 
-0.053** 
(0.018) 
-0.032 
(0.035) 
-0.088*** 
(0.021) 
-0.078*** 
(0.018) 
Girl × 2nd Child  0.022 
(0.016) 
-0.015 
(0.014) 
 -0.058* 
(0.028) 
-0.041* 
(0.020) 
Girl × 3rd Child   0.006 
(0.015) 
  0.044 
(0.028) 
2nd Child  -0.064*** 
(0.015) 
-0.068*** 
(0.014) 
 -0.017 
(0.020) 
-0.043** 
(0.014) 
3rd Child   -0.124*** 
(0.018) 
  -0.085*** 
(0.024) 
Observations 2436 11363 20125 1821 7927 17400 
 
Notes: Every column reports a separate linear regression. Standard errors reported in parentheses are 
robust to within village unit clustering. All estimations include controls for child, parent, household 
and school level variables. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.  
 
Table 3.5 presents a series of estimates conditional on family size. Columns 1 and 4 show 
that the gender gap ceases to exist statistically in single child families for both younger and 
older age group. In other words, in a single-child family where parents need not allocate 
resources based on their gender preferences, and the girl children are not compelled to be in 
the sibling rivalry game, boys and girls tend to perform equally.  
 
By contrast, a gender gap emerges in two-child families in the older age group, and persists 
in three-child families. The effect sizes are lower compared to their baseline estimates 
though. The male-female gaps are 0.088 SD and 0.078 SD for older firstborns in two-child 
and three-child families respectively.  For younger children only firstborn girls from three-
child families tend to have a lower score than firstborn boys.  
 
In a strong multi-child society like Pakistan, the observed single-child families are most 
likely to have additional children, which may drive our result. However, what does remain 
clear is that the gender gap tends to be small to non-existent in small families. In multi-child 
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families, an additional child increases competition for resources, and may induces parents to 
allocate resources according to their preferences. I observe that the girl disadvantage is more 
prevalent in bigger families. Together with the birth order gradient, the evidence suggests that 
elder son preference coupled with QQ tradeoff plausibly explain the observed gender gap. 
However, the adverse effect of family size on gender gap is more prevalent for older children 
compared to their younger peers. 
 
3.6 Unequal Distribution of Direct Parental Resources  
So far I have indirectly shown the potential effect of parental resource allocation manifested 
in child test scores. A number of studies, however, have looked into the gendered allocation 
of direct parental monetary resources. In chapter 2, I show a similar birth order-gender 
pattern in parental allocation of private tuition expenditure as observed in the case of math 
tests in this chapter.  
 
In what follows, I investigate whether the particular patterns can be observed in direct 
parental educational expenditure on private supplementary tuition. My investigation on 
private tuition expenditures further allows me to examine the increasing gender gap by age. 
Although private tuition has become a norm in many Asian countries,57 in the current context 
only 8% of children attend private tuition.58  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

57 For instance, around 23% of Indian students were taking private tuition in 2012 (see Chapter 2). The 
phenomenon is rapidly expanding and reaching new continents where private tuition was relatively unknown. In 
Hong Kong, for example, around 72% of 12th grade students engage in private tuition (Zhan et al, 2014).  
 
58 Private tuition expenditure also seems to be highly effective in this context. For instance, 62.34% of students 
at the 90th quantile of private tuition expenditure score 5, and 87.3% of them score 3 or more. Even 67.74% of 
students at the 10th quantile score 3 or more, although, only 28.04% of them earn the top score of 5. 
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Figure 3.4: Yearly Private Tuition Expenditures 
 
 
Notes: This figure depicts mean yearly private education expenditures in Pakistan Rupees. 
 
First, I plot monthly private tuition expenditures by gender varying with age of the children 
in Figure 3.4. Parents tend to prefer boys over girls, and the gap tends to be higher for older 
children with occasional dips.59 For instance, the gender gap does not exist at the age of ten 
and thirteen.  In Table C3 in Appendix C, I show a fairly similar birth order-gender pattern 
that I observe for math test scores in private tuition expenditure. Next, I plot private tuition 
attendance by age in Figure 3.5. I find a clear gender gap in private tuition attendance, and 
the gap is clearly evident for older children, specifically for children aged 10 years or older. 
Together, differential parental resource allocation by gender appears to worsen with age of 
the children strengthen the argument of differences in intra-household resource allocation on 
private educational expenditures as one of the drivers of the gender gap in math, and may 
well be a potential explanation for the increasing gender gap.60  
 
 
 
 

59 This is in fact surprising considering the fact that returns to an additional year of schooling in Pakistan is 
substantially higher for women compared to men (Aslam, 2009). To be precise, Aslam (2009) finds that labor 
market returns of an additional year of schooling ranges between 7% - 11%, and 13% - 18% for men, and 
women respectively. Together, if educational attainments are positively related to private tuition expenditures, 
parental within-household resource allocation could be irrational. 
 
60 Private tuition is a choice variable and considering that very few parents invest in private tuition indicates that 
these families may be qualitatively different from the rest of the population.  
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Figure 3.5: Probability of Taking Private Tuition 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure depicts the probability of taking private tuition by gender. 
 
3.7 Alternative Explanations 
 
So far I have argued that elder son preference together with the adverse effect of family size 
may plausibly explain the gender gap. There are, however, some alternative mechanisms that 
could explain the gender gap. In this section, I discuss a set of competing explanations for the 
gender gap and show that these explanations may be ruled out.  
 
A number of lab and field experiments highlight that women shy away from competition 
(Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011), and that such underlying preferences could explain the 
gender gap in math test scores. In other words, the gender gap may be the outcome of 
inherent gaps between boys and girls. However, in our data there is no gender gap in single 
child families, indicating that inherent gender differences in competitiveness is unlikely to be 
a plausible determinant. In fact, another strand of the literature argues that underlying 
differences in competitive preferences are not inherent, rather an outcome of socialization 
processes. For instance, women from matrilineal communities are found to be as competitive 
as men from patrilineal communities, pointing at the role of gender norms (Gneezy et al., 
2009). In our data, disparity in parental resource allocation seems more plausible and appears 
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to be much more consistent than any explanations attributed to the differences in inherent 
differences in economic preferences.  
 
Likewise, another competing explanation is that ability itself may be unequally distributed 
across birth orders, which may drive the observed results. In fact, several studies have 
documented that firstborns are healthier, have higher IQs, higher earnings and higher 
educational achievements (Black et al., 2018; Kristensen and Bjerkedal, 2007; Kantarevic 
and Mechoulan, 2006). Associated with the personality theory of Alfred Adler, the 
hypothesis is that elder children are more responsible and have a taste for power, in 
comparison, later borns are more open and sociable, and the middle children are more 
competitive and ambitious (Black et al., 2018). However, these firstborn premiums are itself 
a product of sibling rivalry. For instance, the first few years of life are very important for 
overall development. Being the only child during early years, firstborns get the full attention 
of their parents. So, the birth order gradient that can be potentially attributed to the Adlerian 
personality hypothesis, itself may be attributed to sibling rivalry. Another strand of the 
literature examines the link between birth order pattern and inherent biological differences in 
ability. Although, our data do not allow us to formally test for the existence of any inherent 
gap in ability by birth order that can be attributed to biology, existing evidence suggest that 
biological factors in fact tend to favor later borns (Black et al., 2018).61 For instance, 
exploiting the fact that some families adopt children in Sweden, the paper by Black et al. 
(2018) found that the negative birth order effect in non-cognitive ability is entirely driven by 
social birth order, and, biological birth order favors later-born children. Consistent with my 
hypothesis, the authors suggest uneven parental treatment as the underlying mechanism 
behind differential birth order development in non-cognitive abilities. In support, they found 
that parents are less likely to discuss schoolwork with later-born children. Nevertheless, even 
if ability is unequally distributed across birth orders, our argument of intra-household 
gendered resource allocation holds.  
 
One criticism in the literature pertains to sample selection (Muñoz, 2018). To be precise, 
previous work tends to examine the gender gap in children enrolled in schools, however in 

61 Recall, I show that the empirical pattern is robust to the inclusion of parent fixed effects. In other words, the 
within-family comparison is driven by birth order effects as all the siblings are not systematically genetically 
different. 
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many contexts, boys in particular are more likely to drop out of schools early.62 The selection 
problem is not likely to drive our results. The ASER data in principle do not suffer from 
selection issues as the ASER data is based on all the children in a family irrespective of 
whether a child is enrolled in school or not. Moreover, ASER conducts tests at the home of 
the children, so the testing environment is unlikely to disadvantage dropped-out children.   
 
3.8 Discussion and Conclusion 
The gender gap in mathematics has been observed across many contexts, and the gap appears 
to monotonically increase with age. However, there is very little evidence on micro-level 
causal mechanisms underlying these gender patterns. Using a large representative survey 
from Pakistan, I argue that elder son preference coupled with family size can be a plausible 
and important mechanism to explain the gender gap.  
 
I uncovered several facts. First I documented substantial gender gaps in math test scores, 
which rose with age. Consistent with previous evidence, individual and socio-economic 
covariates failed to explain the gap. I observed a birth order gradient in math test scores, and 
girls underperformed in every birth order compared to boys. These patterns are concordant 
with the well-documented elder son preference particularly in South Asia. Girls without elder 
brothers tend to score better than girls with elder brothers, suggesting elder son preference. 
Furthermore, I observed that the gender gap does not emerge in single-child families but in 
multi-child families, indicating the negative effect of family size. The evidence showed that 
parents allocate educational resources differentially according to birth order and gender. 
Furthermore, parents spent less on private supplementary tuition for daughters, and the 
gender gap in private tuition expenditure was higher among older children. Taken together, 
the results point at the micro-level social and cultural conditioning behind such gender gaps.  
 
While the interactions between son preference and family size do seem to account for gender 
gaps in math, there are other potential channels which may be driving the observed patterns. 
Most pertinently, my arguments are unlikely to fully explain the increasing gender gap by 
child age. This opens up avenue for further research in this area. Here I lay out two potential 
mechanisms that may be tested. 
 

62 Muñoz (2018) estimates that sample selection explains between 50% - 60% of the gender gap.  
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One potential mechanism may be the phenomenon of early girl marriage in Pakistan. 
Although the mean female marital age has increased over time, in 2012-13 almost 48% of 
currently married women between 15-24 were married before the age of 18 (Nasrullah et al., 
2014b). The prevalence was 50.1% in 2006-07 with around 24% of women entering marriage 
before the age of 16 (Nasrullah et al., 2014a). In many Asian countries, marriage market 
matching places greater emphasis on physical attributes of girls rather than their cognitive 
and potential labor market opportunities (Bovet et al., 2018). If the marriage market puts little 
to no or even negative weight on educational achievements and attainment, girls close to 
marital age may tend to reduce the effort they put into studying. By contrast, marriage market 
puts substantial weight on male labor market potential (Bhatti and Jeffery, 2012). Although, I 
cannot test this with the data at hand, one potential indirect outcome is that girls are more 
likely to drop-out of school once they reach near-marital age. We may expect a gradual 
increase in girls-boys gap in school drop-out. In Figure 4.6, I show an increasing boys-girls 
gap in school enrollment. There is a 17%-points gender gap in school enrolment at the age of 
16 as compared to a smaller 7% gap at the age of 5. I also show a similar gradually increasing 
girls-boys gap in school drop-out in Figure 3.7.63 Unlike in many other contexts where boys 
drop-out of schools early, our data reveal a reverse pattern.64  
 
 
  

63 The gender gap in drop-out is small compared to gaps in school enrollments. Thus, most of the gender gap in 
current enrolment could be driven by never enrolled students. 
 
64 Both boys and girls start at a similar level at the age of five, but there is a gap of 4%-points at the age of 16. 
However, girls and boys drop-out of school for different reasons. Boys primarily drop-out to engage in 
economic activities, girls in South-Asia leave school primarily because of early marriage. The argument thus 
can be plagued by the extent of economic opportunities for boys, and thus it would also be interesting to isolate 
natural trends. 
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Figure 3.6: Gender Gap in School Enrollment 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows boys-girls gap in school enrollment. 
 
Figure 3.7: Gender Gap in School Dropout 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows girls-boys gap in school dropout. 
 
Another promising avenue is to explore the role of self-assessed ability. Bharadwaj et al. 
(2016) for example found that self-assessed ability is the primary determinant of the observed 
gender gap in Chile. In our data the gender gap tends to be higher for older children – 
suggesting acquired skills may be important. In other words, in a dynamic environment, once 
the gender gap starts to emerge boys may put more effort in skill acquisition. Thus, any initial 
gender gap can be self-sustaining and in fact deteriorate if it affects self-esteem. 
Discriminatory societal norms may be fully internalized and acted upon once girls observe 
the gender gap, which perhaps leads to a vicious cycle. 
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	
	
Gender Norms and the Motherhood Penalty:  
Experimental Evidence from India

(with Arjun Bedi and Matthias Rieger) 
4.1 Introduction 
Around the world, a substantial proportion of women do not participate in labor markets. If 
women do work, they tend to earn less than men, and face entry barriers in certain jobs or 
challenges in terms of climbing the career ladder. While gender gaps have narrowed, they 
remain large in some regions of the world and are often attributed to motherhood 
(Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer, 2005; Goldin, 1994, 2014; Goldin et al., 2017; Klasen 
and Pieters, 2015; Verick, 2014; Das and Zumbyte, 2017).   
 
Another strand of the literature has examined if differences in underlying preferences may 
explain gender gaps. For instance, if appetite for competition varies between men and women 
(Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011; Charness and Gneezy, 2012; 
Geraldes, 2018), or between women with and without children, this could in turn influence 
selection into certain types of jobs (Cassar et al., 2016). However, this raises a fundamental 
question as to what fashions these gender differences. A growing experimental literature has 
turned to the role of culture and society (Gneezy et al., 2009; Hoffman et al., 2011; Andersen 
et al., 2013; Cadsby et al., 2013; Jayachandran, 2015; Klonner et al., 2019). Some of these 
studies speak to the heated nature versus nurture debate using cross-cultural experiments. For 
instance, Gneezy et al., (2009) compare competitive preferences of men and women living in 
a patrilineal (the Maasai in Tanzania) and a matrilineal (the Khasi in India) community. In 
matrilineal cultures such as the Khasi, maternal grandmothers head households, and 
eventually transmit (ancestral) wealth and power to their youngest daughters. After marriage, 
Khasi women do not move to their husbands’ families while Khasi men frequently join their 
wives’ households.65  

65 The youngest daughter of a Khasi family inherits ancestral property, is the head of the family and after 
marriage her husband joins her natal family. In the case of older daughters, they may form separate households 
with their husbands. 
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Husbands tend to have limited say over resources and it is not unusual for men to take on 
stereotypically “female” tasks such as childcare.66 Intriguingly, women are as competitive in 
experiments as men if they live in such a matrilineal society (see Gneezy et al., 2009). These 
results have been corroborated and extended by Andersen et al. (2013) and Klonner et al. 
(2019).  Based on the same experiments as used by Gneezy et al. (2009), Klonner et al. 
(2019) report a monotonic relationship between patriarchy and gender differences in 
competitiveness in India’s Northeast.67 They conclude that “patriarchal norms suppress 
women's economic potential by making them compete too little” (Klonner et al. 2019, p.3). 
However, it is unclear if such culturally induced gender differences are recognized in the 
labor market and have a bearing on labor market outcomes. 
 
In order to carve out the potential links between gender, culture and actual labor market 
outcomes, we focus on a key event in many women’s lives, motherhood. As mentioned 
above, labor markets tend to penalize mothers in terms of wages and job opportunities (Budig 
and England, 2001; Anderson et al., 2002; Gangl and Ziefle, 2009; Benard and Correll, 2010; 
Budig and Hodges, 2010; Budig et al., 2012; Goldin et al., 2017). Notably, Correll et al. 
(2007, p.1298) hypothesize that mothers are often discriminated against as compared to non-
mothers, as employers may consider them “less competent and less committed to their jobs.” 
The authors find that, in the United States, (exogenously) reporting motherhood on CVs 
halved callback rates to actual job applications.68 Perceptions of working mothers tend to 
reflect “patriarchal” stereotypes. Benard and Correll (2010, p.1) write that “highly successful 
mothers” are seen as “less warm, less likable, and more interpersonally hostile.” Put 
differently, patriarchal norms shape the image of the “ideal” mother. Culture determines if 
mothers should or even may participate in labor markets (Budig et al., 2012).  
 

66 See for instance a report in the Guardian, January 2011: “Where women of India rule the roost and men 
demand gender equality”, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/18/india-khasi-women-
politics-bouissou [Accessed 28 August 2018]. Roy (2018, p.283) writes, “Unlike the other patriarchal societies, 
the father has little authority in a Khasi family”.  
 
67 Klonner et al. (2019) report that men from the patriarchal/patrilineal Karbi tribe compete 50 percent more 
often than women, while amongst the Dimasa tribe which is duo- or bilineal, men compete about 18 percent 
more often than women, while in the case of the Khasi tribe, which is matrilineal, men are 15 percent less likely 
to compete as compared to women. 
 
68 In fact, controlling for qualifications, women without children did better than men without children. A more 
recent CV experiment in Sweden found no differences in callback rates across gender and/or parenthood 
(Bygren et al., 2017). 
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Bringing together the literature on the motherhood penalty and the effect of culture on gender 
competitiveness, we hypothesize that mothers from more empowered communities, and even 
more so from matrilineal societies are less likely to face a motherhood penalty. With respect 
to the former, employers are likely to value their competiveness, cultural background and 
supportive household arrangements, for instance, when it comes to childcare and are likely to 
view them as “more competent and more committed to their jobs.”69 In subsequent sections, 
based on key informant interviews, we comment on whether employers indeed have such 
perceptions (even if they do not know the explicit cultural/organizational underpinnings of 
these communities). 
 
This chapter examines the labor market success, as measured by interview callback rates of 
mothers and non-mothers as a function of two community origins: (i) We hypothesize that 
women from Northeast India are less vulnerable to a motherhood penalty as it is well-known 
that they are more empowered compared to women from the rest of India (Ladusingh and 
Singh, 2006; Jayachandran and Pande, 2017).  For instance, Ladusingh and Singh (2006, 
p.67) state: “The social status of women in the Northeast India is high relative to that of 
women in many parts of the country where purdah and caste based rules restrict their 
activities.”  Additional information to support the idea of greater empowerment of women 
from the Northeast is provided in Table 4.1. (ii) We differentiate between women from 
matrilineal (Khasi) and patrilineal (Naga, Bengali) societies located in Northeast and East 
India (see Figure 4.1) and hypothesize that women from matrilineal communities are less 
likely to experience a motherhood penalty.  
 
  

69 Reversing the earlier quote from Correll et al. (2007, p.1298). 
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Figure 4.1: Map of India –Location of communities 
 
 
 
 
Similar to Correll et al. (2007), the chapter is based on a CV experiment and building on 
Gneezy et al. (2009), proposes a cross-cultural identification strategy. We quantify if 
employers (regardless of their own societal origin) differentiate between applications sent by 
mothers and non-mothers within origin societies. Our fictitious applicants are mothers or non-
mothers of Khasi (Northeast India, matrilineal), Naga (Northeast, patrilineal) or Bengali (East 
India, patrilineal) origin. This allow us to examine the effect of empowerment by comparing 
interview callback rates for mothers from Northeast India with mothers from East India, as 
well as the implicit effect of culture by comparing Khasi to Bengali and Naga mothers.   
	

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To execute the experiment, which was conducted in two rounds, we searched for entry-level 
jobs in call centers or business process outsourcing (BPO) and in the financial sector, across 
three Indian cities.70 In the first round we sent three female CVs, with no prior work 
experience, to each job posting. In a second round, to examine the potentially moderating 
effect of experience, CVs did indicate experience. Furthermore, in both rounds, to net out 
overall effects of gender and community we also sent male CVs from each of the three 
communities. In total, we sent 1,276 CVs (957 female, 319 male) to 319 job openings. To 
complement the experiments and to enhance our understanding of the findings we conducted 
12 key informant interviews with current or former (human resource) managers (six), with 
head hunters (five) and one academic.   
 
Our chapter makes three contributions to the literature. First, we provide causal evidence on 
the societal origin and labor market success of women with and without children. We build 
on previous gender experiments across cultures (Gneezy et al., 2009; Hoffman et al., 2011; 
Andersen et al., 2013; Cassar et al., 2016). Rather than focusing on preferences, we examine 
the downstream effects of culture on labor market success in the context of one of the most 
important dimensions of gender and labor markets, namely motherhood.71   
 
Second, we add to the broader literature on female labor market participation in developing 
countries. Many factors influence whether women work or not in developing countries, 
including changes in income per capita, the structure of the economy, fertility trends, 
education levels, and social policies (Verick, 2014; Gaddis and Klasen, 2014; Bloom et al., 
2009; Mammen and Paxon, 2000; Goldin, 1994). In some countries, most notably India, 
female labor force participation is lagging behind favorable economic and demographic 
dynamics (Klasen and Pieters, 2015). To the best of our knowledge, there is no experimental 
evidence on the labor market consequences of motherhood and gender norms in a developing 

70 We focused on entry-level jobs and these sectors for two main reasons. First, these sectors offer a steady and 
relatively large volume of job advertisements. Related literature also underlines the importance of the chosen 
sectors. For instance, Jensen (2012, p.754) notes that the BPO field “…has grown rapidly in India over the past 
decade, creating a significant number of new, high-paying job opportunities, particularly for women.” Second, 
focusing on entry level jobs allowed us to examine whether work experience translated into an advantage for 
mothers. 
  
71 In this chapter we focus on the motherhood penalty. It is also possible that firms’ treatment of fathers and 
non-fathers varies across origin communities. 
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country setting. Such evidence is likely to be useful in motivating and designing childcare 
and maternity policies. 
 
Third, in addition to identifying the labor market effects of gender, culture and motherhood, 
our rich setting allows us to examine the effect of ethnicity. At the outset, it is important to 
emphasize the potentially differential effect of two aspects – ethnicity and gender. Both the 
Khasi and Naga are from Northeastern India and while women from this part of the country 
are considered to be more empowered and have a better status as compared to women from 
the rest of the country (Ladusingh and Singh, 2006) at the same time, both men and women 
from the Northeast are likely to be discriminated in the labor market as compared to 
“mainland” Indians. While there have been changes in recent years, there remains a 
perception that people from the Northeast are not part of mainstream India.72 Consistent with 
this notion, there are regular reports of discrimination in the housing market against 
Northeasterners in cities such as Delhi (McDuie-Ra, 2013; Irfan, 2011). This is also 
supported by one of our key informants (female, 40 years), who articulated, that women from 
the Northeast who migrate to Delhi or Bangalore face discrimination in the housing market as 
they are thought to be morally questionable and don’t have the same moral values as 
mainstream Indians so there is xenophobia [interviewed on May 26, 2018]. However, there is 
no credible evidence on the extent of such ethnic-based discrimination in the labor market. 
Thus, our chapter feeds into a growing experimental literature on labor market discrimination 
in emerging and developing countries (Banerjee et al., 2009; Siddique, 2011; Galarza and 
Yamada, 2014, 2017; Beam et al., 2017).  
 
To preview our results, we find that mothers are substantially less likely to receive callbacks 
(14%-points). This effect varies considerably across communities. Relatively more 
empowered Northeastern women average a smaller motherhood penalty (5.68%-points; p-
value=0.10). Mothers from patrilineal East India and Northeast India are affected strongly (-
29.48%-points; p-value=0.00) and mildly (-9.12%-points; p-value=0.08), respectively. 

72 There are various reasons for this including geographical distance, differences in physical features, language 
and religion among others.  The seven Northeastern states are connected to the rest of India through a narrow 
corridor. A number of them have a long history of insurgency and have demanded independence from the Indian 
state. In term of their physical features, Northeasterners have a greater affinity to East Asians and it is not 
uncommon that they are racially labelled as such. Furthermore, according to data from Census 2011, 
Christianity is the dominant religion in a number of the Northeastern states (74.6% in Meghalaya and 88% in 
Nagaland). While some of these aspects, may enhance xenophobic attitudes to people from the Northeast these 
features - missionary education, English language skills - are also held responsible for the greater freedom and 
mobility of women from the Northeast as compared to women from “mainland” India.    
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Mothers from matrilineal Northeast India face no discernible penalty (-2.27%-points; p-
value=0.67). Interestingly, we do not find gender differences in callback rates for male and 
female applicants without children.  Consistent with findings from the US (Correll et al., 
2007), gender differences materialize only due to motherhood. In the second round of the 
experiment where we added experience to all CVs, qualitatively similar patterns emerge, 
although, the magnitude of the adverse motherhood effect is smaller. With regard to ethnicity 
we find that women from the Northeast receive substantially fewer callbacks as compared to 
Bengalis. This gap arises mainly due to differences in callback rates in the financial sector.  
 
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 provides contextual information which 
draws on the existing literature as well as on key informant interviews and outlines the 
empirical strategy. Section 4.3 presents the main results and related robustness checks. 
Section 4.4 discusses the findings in relation to theories of discrimination, as well as with 
respect to recent Indian policy changes including the 2016 amendments to the maternity 
benefits act. 
 
4.2 Context and Empirical Strategy 
 
We implemented a field experiment to test for the effect of reporting motherhood on callback 
rates to job applications in three Indian cities and two industry sectors. Our aim was to 
examine motherhood effects conditional on community origin and ethnicity. To underpin the 
empirical approach, this section provides details on the context, the choice of communities, 
the selection of jobs, the design of applicant profiles as well as treatments, experimental 
procedures and the econometric model. 
 
Context and Selection of Communities 
We first picked matrilineal and patrilineal societies from Northeast and East India, 
respectively.  For the matrilineal treatment we chose the Khasi community. The Khasi 
community which is based in and around the city of Shillong and in the Khasi hills in the 
Northeastern Indian state of Meghalya was chosen for two reasons. First, it is well-
documented that Khasi women enjoy greater privileges as compared to women from 
patrilineal communities. For instance, according to Nongbri (2006, p. 168): “Throughout the 
ages, the Khasis have lived in a casteless and classless society where every kind of labour is 
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respected. Men and women work and talk together freely. Everyone knows that he or she is 
equal with others in the society.”73 More recently, experimental evidence has shown that 
women from the Khasi community are as competitive as men from other patrilineal societies 
(Gneezy et al., 2009; Andersen et al., 2013; Klonner et al., 2019). We thus expect that 
gender-related treatments such as motherhood are likely to have a lower effect on callback 
rates. Second, amongst the handful of matrilineal societies in India, the Khasi community is 
one of the largest and perhaps most well-known across India (the first row of Table 4.1 
provides female population sizes).74  
 
For the patrilineal treatment, as well as to identify the effect of ethnicity, we selected the 
Bengali community from the Eastern Indian state of West Bengal. Although there have been 
changes, Bengali society may be characterized as patriarchal, patrilineal and patrilocal. 
However, simply comparing Bengali women and Khasi women is not straightforward as 
there may be discrimination against people from Northeastern India which may confound or 
drive the heterogeneous impacts of motherhood across Bengali and Khasi CVs. We address 
this issue in two ways. First, we selected an additional patriarchal, patrilineal, and patrilocal 
community, the Naga, who are also from Northeast India, and are physically similar to the 
Khasi, both groups are predominantly Christian and English is the official language and 
medium of instruction in educational institutions in both Meghalaya and Nagaland. To 
emphasize, although Naga society is characterized as patriarchal, patrilineal and patrilocal, 
women tend to enjoy a higher social position and are more independent than women from 
patriarchal societies located in “mainland” India (Naga Women’s Union et al., 2018) but 
enjoy less freedom and experience greater restrictions as compared to Khasi women (Ellena 
and Nongkynrih, 2017).75 Thus, we expect that the motherhood penalty for Naga women to 
be lower than that for Bengali women but higher than that for Khasi women. Second, we sent 
out male CVs from all three communities to document overall callback rates. Figure 1 shows 
the location of the three communities on a map of India. 

73 Nongbri (2006, p.168) goes on to write, “The Khasi woman is no mere chattel of the family of men. No 
feminist movement is required to free her from bondage. She is the glorified person, free to act.” 
 
74 The Khasis in particular are well-known for their matrilineal traditions and there are numerous media reports 
in both the national and the international press about their cultural practices. See for instance the reference in 
footnote 2. There are other matrilineal groups in Meghalaya such as the Garo and the Jaintia but they are not as 
large in number as the Khasis (Roy, 2018). 
  
75 The Naga community has a strong warrior heritage and traditionally boys were more highly valued than girls. 
According to Ellena and Nongkynrih (2017), even up to the late ‘60s, some Naga groups practiced headhunting. 
546567-L-bw-Majilla
Processed on: 6-8-2020 PDF page: 87
 87 
 
With this set-up at hand, we can decompose callback rates by gender, motherhood and 
community origin. The implicit expectation is of course that community characteristics and 
signals carry over when people migrate domestically for work. Indeed, the reasons to hire 
women from the Northeast may well be due to their community traits and signals. For 
instance, amongst other reasons, one of our key informants (female, 50 years) argued that for 
service-sector positions there was a bias towards hiring women from the Northeast, because 
women from the Northeast are not fazed by challenges, they are able to deal with long 
working hours, they have a calmer temperament, they are non-confrontational” [Interview 
conducted on January 10, 2018].  
 
Table 4.1: Female status in applicant communities 
Region  East India Northeast India 
 India West Bengal 
(Bengali, 
Patrilineal) 
Nagaland 
(Naga, 
Patrilineal) 
Meghalaya 
(Khasi, 
Matrilineal) 
Nr. of women (in millions, 2011 Census) 587.58 44.47 0.95 1.48 
Women ever worked  0.42 0.30 0.24 0.81 
Willing to work 0.61 0.64 0.75 0.95 
Husband decided number of children 0.92 0.92 0.36 0.75 
Husband beats if wife leaves without 
permission 
0.51 0.47 0.12 0.15 
Note: Data are from the women questionnaires in the Indian Human Development Survey II 2011-12. Average 
sample sizes (sample sizes vary slightly across outcomes): India 39291, West Bengal 2385, Nagaland 48, 
Meghalaya 67. 
 
Evidence from survey data and key informant interviews supports the idea of differences in 
the status of women across the three communities. Table 4.1 shows the non-negligible 
population sizes of the three communities and contains information on some pertinent 
statistics. Only about 30% of Bengali women (state of West Bengal) have some work 
experience, which is well below the national average of 42% and much below the Khasi 
average of 81%. More importantly, in terms of attitudes, both Naga and Khasi women are 
more willing to work (75% and 95%, respectively) than Bengali women (64%).76 Women 
from the Northeast have more say over the number of children. Finally, about half of the 
Bengali women report a community norm of violence against women if they leave the house 
without the permission of their husband compared to less than 15% for Naga and Khasi 
women. Thus, in terms of a number of proxies for women’s empowerment such as mobility, 

76 The exact question in the survey is, "If you found a suitable job, would you be willing to work?” 
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say in decision making and potential attachment to the labor market, there is a clear 
difference between women from the Northeast and women from Bengal. Key informant 
interviews also highlighted differences between Bengali women and women from the 
Northeast.  According to a former (male, 70 years) human resource manager who had worked 
in Bengal and in the Northeast, “these people [from the Northeast] are the products of 
missionary education, they have a stronger work ethic, they will find a way to work, they 
have stronger family support; whereas, Bengali women will expect sympathy; gender 
equality is higher in the Northeast …. their [Northeast women] attitude is better” [interview 
conducted on January 6, 2018]. Another key informant, a former (male, 48 years) recruiter 
for an international BPO firm mentioned that unlike women from other regions of the 
country, women from the Northeast were flexible and happy to work, day or night [interview 
conducted on January 8, 2018]. 
      
Selection of Job Market and Postings 
We focused on job markets in three of India’s most cosmopolitan cities, that is, Delhi, 
Mumbai and Chennai. All three cities have residents from the three communities. There is 
survey evidence which suggests that 48% of all Northeast people residing in Indian cities live 
in Delhi (NESCH, 2011 as quoted by McDuie-Ra, 2013, p.1629 and Irfan, 2011).  
 
We used the most popular Indian job website to search and apply for openings in these three 
locations. Women in urban India are most likely to work in the service sector and the job 
website features a steady volume of service-sector positions. We focused on low- to medium 
skilled jobs in two broad sectors: (i) Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) and call center 
jobs, (ii) Banking/Finance/Insurance. Both sectors feature a steady and large volume of job 
ads required for the experiment. We selected jobs that were open to both experienced and 
inexperienced applicants.77 In terms of sector-specific characteristics, as compared to jobs in 
the financial sector, BPO and call center jobs require greater flexibility in working hours, 
customer contact is not face-to-face and spoken English language skills/accents are more 
highly valued.   
 
 
 

77 We have saved screenshots of all the positions to which resumes were sent. These are available on request. 
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Design of Applicant Profiles 
Based on input from a human resource consultancy firm, we designed several fictitious 
resumes. Our aim was to build comparable CVs across applicants and most importantly 
clearly signal community origins. All CVs provided a current address in the respective job 
market city, and also a permanent address in the home community. For the latter, we picked 
thee cities from each community – Siliguri, Shillong and Kohima for Bengali, Khasi and 
Naga applicants, respectively.78 We also used names which are typical for each of the three 
communities. All fictitious participants had the same education level, graduated from 
comparable colleges and acquired their high school education in English medium schools in 
their native places. In India, there is a strict hierarchy of academic disciplines with the hard 
sciences situated at the top. We assigned three comparable, relatively less prestigious 
academic subjects to our applicants – Political Science, Sociology and History. All our 
applicants were legally married and aged 25 to 28. Given that we sent three female CVs to 
each job posting, profile details and CV format could not be “identical.” This should not be a 
concern, given that we estimate the within community impact of motherhood. And while 
some characteristics such as age may be related to labor market outcomes, these differences 
are limited. An alternative would have been to vary some CV characteristics (e.g. age, type of 
degree) across jobs and within applicants, however this would have further increased the 
already large number of CVs (27) and the complexity of data collection. In the first round of 
data collection, the applicants had no prior job experience while in the second round of data 
collection we sent out the same CVs with about two years of relevant job experience. 
 
Community Signaling 
We signaled community origins in five ways. First, we used typical Khasi, Naga or Bengali 
names and provided a permanent address, and details on schooling and college which 
indicated their respective home states. Second, current addresses on all the CVs indicated 
C/O (care of). In the case of Khasi CVs, it was the applicant herself while the Bengali and 
Naga CVs featured the names of husbands. Third, the permanent addresses of the applicants 
mention the names of parents, which is not uncommon in India. In the case of Khasi CVs, we 
used D/O (daughter of) and used a female (mother’s) name and in the case of Naga and 
Bengali CVs, we used C/O and used a male (father’s) name. Fourth, Khasi applicants had the 
same surname as their mother, while the patrilineal applicants had the same surnames as their 

78 The main Bengali city is Kolkata. However we picked Siliguri to better match the size and status of the other 
cities. 
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husbands. Finally, in the case of Khasi CVs, we also mentioned that Khasi was the native 
language. 
 
Motherhood Treatment and Procedure 
We reported motherhood (1 child between 2-2.5 years of age) allowing for within job posting 
variation (at least one mother and non-mother per job posting). We focused on mothers with 
just one child given the potentially large changes associated with first motherhood and more 
practically not to encumber the experiment with additional complexity. Varying the number 
of children is likely to trigger interesting but equivocal considerations among employers.79 
Thus, there were six possible combinations to assign the motherhood treatment to the three 
female CVs. Before searching for jobs and sending out the CVs, we randomly determined the 
sequence in which these six combinations were applied throughout the ensuing experiment. 
To each job posting, we also randomly sent out one of three additional male CVs (without 
reporting fatherhood).  This allows us to examine overall differences in callback rates 
amongst the different communities.  
 
In total, we used twenty seven CVs – nine (three mother, three non-mother and three male) in 
each of the three cities. Each CV was assigned a unique email id and phone number to record 
callbacks. All CVs are available on request from the authors for bona fide researchers and 
purposes.80  
 
Data collection, that is, sending out CVs and recording outcomes, took place between July 
and September of 2017. The experiment was conducted in two rounds and our overall sample 
consists of 1276 applications (male, female) sent to 319 job openings. In the first round, our 
target sample size was at least 200 female applications per community.81 In a smaller, second 
round, we sent out CVs with job experience for a total of 90 applications per community. 
Table 4.2 summarizes realized sample sizes by communities, and mother and non-mother 
treatments. In total, we sent out 957 female applications across 258 firms. In addition, we 

79 When evaluating CVs of mothers, an employer may among other things place a lower probability on another 
pregnancy for a mother with two or more children compared to a mother with just one child. Future work could 
investigate the potential effects of reporting more than one child.  
 
80 We do not present the CVs in the appendix as real addresses and schools were used. 
 
81 We carried out power calculations for a test of two proportions using the “pwr” package in R. Setting Cohen's 
h to 0.4 (small to medium effect), power to 80% and significance level to 5%, the proposed sample size was 200 
for each community. In practice, we slightly exceeded this target.  
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sent out 229 (1st round) and 90 (2nd round) male applications well-balanced across sectors, 
communities and cities.  
Table 4.2: Sample sizes for female sample 
  
No prior job 
experience 
(1st round experiment) 
Experienced  
(2nd round experiment)   
  Non-mother Mother 
Non-
mother Mother Total 
Bengali 115 114 44 46 319 
Khasi 113 116 46 44 319 
Naga 116 113 44 46 319 
Total applications (job openings) 344 343 134 136 
957 
(258) 
… broken down by place and sector: 
Chennai 117 111 44 46 318 
Delhi 112 116 45 45 318 
Mumbai 115 116 45 45 321 
Call center, Business Process Outsourcing 
(BPO) 182 178 63 72 495 
Finance, banking, insurance 162 165 71 64 462 
 
Econometric Model 
We first visualize results based on unconditional means and then estimate corresponding 
econometric models of the form: 
.
    	/*,-!
  	)"0"
 	1-"2
 	3!-
 	4/567"
 
	89
  )"0"
  /*,-!
  1-"2
  /*,-!
  :
 ,    
 
where, .
  is a binary callback variable for applicant i and job opening j. /*,-!
, )"0"
, 
1-"2
 are binary variables indicating whether an applicant is a mother or not, whether an 
applicant is Khasi or Naga, respectively. The excluded categories are non-mothers and 
Bengalis. 3!-
, /567"
, and 9
 are indicators for Delhi, Mumbai and the BPO/Call 
Center sector. Excluded categories are Chennai and Finance/Banking. We include 
interactions between Naga (Khasi) and motherhood (… /*,-!
). The usual error term is 
denoted :
 . Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the job posting level.  
 
4.3 Results 
We first present simple differences in mean callback rates across communities, then 
regression-based estimates and finally sector and city-specific estimates. 
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Baseline Results 
Figure 4.2 shows callback rates for non-mothers and mothers without prior work experience. 
The average callback rate is 21%. However, mothers receive substantially fewer callbacks 
(14%) than non-mothers (28%). In other words, reporting motherhood on CVs halves 
callback rates. The motherhood treatment effect amounts to -14%-points and is precisely 
estimated (p-value=0.00).  
 
Figure 4.2: The impact of motherhood on callback rates for women without prior job 
experience (Δ -13.62%-points, p-value=0.00, n=687) 
 


Note: P-value stems from linear regression-based t-tests adjusted for clustering at the job posting level (229 
jobs). 
 
Motherhood treatment effects vary considerably between Northeast and East India, as well as 
across patrilineal and matrilineal applicants. However, before discussing these effects, it is 
useful to consider baseline callback rates across communities, that is, callback rates for 
applicants without children and no prior work experience. Figure 4.3, Panel A reports results 
for women and Panel B for men. This exercise allows us to net out community-specific and 
gender effects from the motherhood penalty. There is a clear hierarchy. Bengali applicants 
receive about twice the number of callbacks as compared to Naga and Khasi applicants. This 
is consistent with the expectation, as discussed in the introduction, that individuals from the 
Northeast experience discrimination. At the same time there is no statistically significant 
difference in callback rates between Nagas and Khasis. Furthermore, callback rates for 
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female and male applicants are similar (compare Panels A and B). These “baseline” patterns 
which show no gender differences but sharp community-based differences lend credibility to 
our strategy of comparing motherhood effects between Naga and Khasi women to identify 
the effect of patrilineal versus matrilineal culture on labor market outcomes.  
 
Figure 4.3: Baseline callback rates for Bengali (East India, patrilineal), Naga (Northeast 
India, patrilineal) and Khasi (Northeast India, matrilineal) women and men (without children/ 
without prior job experience) 
Panel A: Women (non-mothers) 
 
Δ p-values (N=344) 
Bengali vs. Naga: 0.00 
Bengali vs. Khasi: 0.00 
Naga vs. Khasi: 0.68  
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Panel B: Men (non-fathers) 
 
Δ p-values (N=229) 
Bengali vs. Naga: 0.10 
Bengali vs. Khasi: 0.09 
Naga vs. Khasi: 1.00 
Note: P-values stem from linear regression-based t-tests adjusted for clustering at the job posting level (229 
jobs, Panel A) or heteroscedasticity (Panel B).   
 
Figure 4.4 illustrates that the motherhood penalty decreases as empowerment of women 
increases (moving from Panel A, B to C). Panel A shows that amongst Bengali women, the 
treatment effect associated with motherhood is almost -30%-points (p-value=0.00). This is a 
very large effect with Bengali mothers experiencing a low 10% callback rate. In fact, this is 
the lowest callback rate in our experiment across communities and applicants (both male and 
female). Panel B shows qualitatively similar but smaller effects for Naga women. This 
smaller effect may be attributed to the general perception that women from Northeast India 
are more empowered compared to the rest of India (Ladusingh and Singh, 2006; 
Jayachandran and Pande, 2017). The motherhood penalty amounts to 9%-points (p-
value=0.08). This is still a sizeable reduction of about 40%. Panel C shows no motherhood 
penalty for Khasi women. Note that we obtain qualitatively similar conclusions on the overall 
motherhood penalty as well as the three community-specific ones if p-values are based on 
randomization inference (see Alwyn, 2019).82 Additionally, combining the estimates for 

82 We calculated p-values with randomization inference using the command ritest by Heß (2017) in STATA. 
The randomization inference p-value associated with the overall motherhood penalty taking into account firm 
strata is 0.00 (in line with the standard p-value in Figure 2).  We further ran regressions in split samples 
corresponding to the three panels in Figure 4. These randomization inference p-values are close to ones reported 
in the main text and figure. They are 0.00, 0.097 and 0.745 among the Bengali, Naga and Khasi samples, 
respectively. These patterns alleviate statistical inference concerns related to small samples in an experimental 
setting (see Alwyn, 2019).   
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women from the Northeast yields a motherhood penalty of 5.68%-points (p-value=0.10). In 
sum, motherhood penalties are lower for women from the Northeast and only affect women 
from patrilineal communities.  
 
Figure 4.4: The impact of motherhood on callback rates for Bengali (East India, patrilineal), 
Naga (Northeast India, patrilineal) and Khasi (Northeast India, matrilineal) women (without 
prior job experience) 
Panel A: Bengali – East India, Patrilineal (Δ -29.48%-points, p-value=0.00, n=229) 
 
Panel B: Naga – Northeast India, Patrilineal (Δ -9.12%-points, p-value=0.08, n=229) 
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Panel C: Khasi – Northeast India, Matrilineal (Δ -2.27%-points, p-value=0.67, n=229) 
Note: P-values stem from linear regression-based t-tests adjusted for heteroscedasticity. 
 
Regression Results 
Table 4.3 reports results from a linear probability model. Column 1 reports estimates 
adjusting only for community effects (Naga and Khasi). The coefficient associated with the 
motherhood treatment is -14%-points. In column 2, we add dummies for cities and sector of 
employment. The motherhood effect is unaffected by these additional covariates, which is 
unsurprising given experimental balancing. In column 3, we further include interaction terms 
between motherhood and communities. The excluded category is a Bengali mother. 
Consistent with Figure 4.4, we document large negative motherhood effects for Bengali 
women (30 %-points) and to a lesser extent for Nagas (9%-points), but there are no negative 
motherhood effects for Khasi women. The interaction term between Khasi applicants and 
motherhood (27%-points) statistically offsets the negative main effect of motherhood.  
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Table 4.3: Linear probability model 
 Dep. var. Callback (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Mother -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.30*** -0.08* -0.18* 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09) 
Group (Bengali is excl.)      
Naga -0.06** -0.06** -0.16*** -0.07 -0.12    
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09)    
Khasi -0.04 -0.04 -0.18*** -0.11** -0.21**  
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08)    
Mother x Naga 0.21*** 0.11    
(0.08) (0.14)    
Mother x Khasi 0.27*** 0.19    
(0.08) (0.13)    
City (Chennai is excl.)      
Delhi 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.06    
(0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08)    
Mumbai 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.09    
(0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09)    
Sector (Finance is excl.)      
Call center/BPO jobs 0.03 0.02 0.11 0.11    
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07)    
Constant 0.31*** 0.26*** 0.34*** 0.23*** 0.28*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) 
P-values:      
Mother = - Mother x Naga   0.09  0.40 
Mother = - Mother x Khasi   0.61  0.94 
N 687 687 687 270 270 
Prior job experience No Yes 
Note: Linear probability model. Standard errors in brackets below point estimates are clustered at the job 
posting level (229 jobs in columns 1-3; 90 jobs in columns 4 and 5). Significance levels are denoted  *p<0.1, 
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
So far, we have analyzed motherhood effects for women with no prior job experience. In the 
second round we sent out a smaller set of applications with the same CVs but with two years 
of job experience.83  As shown in column 4, it does seem that experience weakens the 
motherhood penalty. However, we still find a motherhood penalty of 8%-points which is 
statistically significant at the 10% level and while the effect is smaller in magnitude (by 6%-
points) as compared to CVs with no experience, the difference is not statistically significant 

83 In the case of male CVs reporting prior experience, callback rates amount to 43% for Bengali, 21% for Naga 
and 19% for Khasi applicants. In other words, male community patterns are qualitatively similar to those 
stemming from the first experiment without job experience. 
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(p-value=0.31). In column 5, we find very similar qualitative patterns across communities but 
the estimates are not precise. Across the two samples, tests for equality of the main effect as 
well as the community interactions fail to reject the nulls at conventional levels.84 Similar to 
the results based on the sample without experience, Khasi applicants do not experience a 
motherhood penalty. The main effect of motherhood (-18%-points) is completely offset by 
the corresponding interaction term (19%-points). The motherhood effect for Nagas amounts 
to -7%-points, but it is imprecisely estimated. 
 
Heterogeneity by Sector85 
Table 4.4 provides pooled estimates based on both rounds of data collection (column 1 and 
2), which display the same patterns as discussed above, and sector-specific estimates 
(columns 3 to 6). Column 3 shows that there is a motherhood penalty in the call center/BPO 
sector (17%-points) but there are no negative effects associated with belonging to the 
Northeast. The motherhood-community interaction specification (column 4) confirms the 
sizeable motherhood penalty while at the same there is a significant and positive interaction 
term for women from the Khasi community (column 4). In the finance sector the motherhood 
penalty is lower (7%-points) but women from the Northeast experience an additional penalty 
of -9 to -11%-points. The motherhood penalty varies across communities with Bengali 
mothers experiencing a substantial penalty, while there are no negative effects for mothers 
from the Naga community and perhaps even a small premium for Khasi mothers.  
 
  

84 Tests for equality of coefficients in Table 4.3 across inexperienced (column 3) vs. experienced (column 5) 
samples: Mother, p-value=0.30; Mother x Naga, p-value=0.54; Mother x Khasi, p-value=0.60. 
 
85 For the sake of completeness, we do explore sector and city specific heterogeneity. However, sample sizes are 
small as our ex-ante power calculations were not based on providing sector and city specific-estimates.  
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Table 4.4: Pooled sample (experienced and inexperienced) – Heterogeneity by sector 
 Dep. var. Callback (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mother -0.12*** -0.26*** -0.17*** -0.26*** -0.07** -0.27*** 
(0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.07) 
Naga -0.06*** -0.15*** -0.01 -0.05 -0.11*** -0.24*** 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) 
Khasi -0.06*** -0.19*** -0.04 -0.11* -0.09** -0.26*** 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) 
Mother x Naga 0.18*** 0.10 0.26** 
(0.07) (0.09) (0.10) 
Mother x Khasi 0.25*** 0.16* 0.34*** 
(0.07) (0.09) (0.10) 
Call center/BPO jobs 0.05 0.05 
(0.04) (0.04) 
Inexperienced -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 0.02 0.02 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
Constant 0.26*** 0.34*** 0.36*** 0.40*** 0.22*** 0.34*** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) 
P-values:    
Mother = - Mother x Naga  0.07  0.02  0.81 
Mother = - Mother x Khasi  0.70  0.14  0.26 
Sample Full Call Center/BPO Finance 
N 957 495 462 
Note: Linear probability model. City dummies not shown. Finance/Banking and Bengali are excluded categories 
in columns 1 and 2. Standard errors in brackets below point estimates are clustered at the job posting level (319 
jobs in column 1 and 2; 165 jobs in columns 3 and 4; 154 jobs in columns 5 and 6). Significance levels are 
denoted  *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
Heterogeneity by City 
In Table 4.5, we split samples by cities. The coefficient associated with motherhood is 
negative across all locations and specifications but varies across communities. 
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Table 4.5: Pooled sample (experienced and inexperienced) – Heterogeneity by city 
Dep. Var. Callback (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mother -0.20*** -0.40*** -0.12*** -0.20** -0.05 -0.19**  
(0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.09) (0.03) (0.08)    
Naga -0.05 -0.15* -0.07* -0.11 -0.06* -0.18**  
(0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.08) (0.03) (0.07)    
Khasi -0.00 -0.18** -0.06 -0.15* -0.12*** -0.20*** 
(0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07)    
Mother x Naga 0.23** 0.07 0.23**  
(0.11) (0.14) (0.11)    
Mother x Khasi 0.37*** 0.17 0.18*   
(0.12) (0.12) (0.11)    
Call center/BPO 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.06    
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)    
Inexperienced -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01    
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)    
Constant 0.36*** 0.44*** 0.33*** 0.38*** 0.22*** 0.30*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09) 
P-values:       
Mother = - Mother x Naga  0.04  0.13  0.57 
Mother = - Mother x Khasi  0.75  0.71  0.96 
City Sample Delhi Mumbai Chennai 
N 318 321 318 
Note: Linear probability model. Finance/Banking is an excluded categories. Standard errors in brackets below 
point estimates are clustered at the job posting level (106 jobs in columns 1 and 2; 107 jobs in columns 3 and 4; 
106 jobs in columns 5 and 6). Significance levels are denoted  *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
In Delhi, column 1 reports that mothers experience a penalty of 20%-points. Column 2 shows 
that the motherhood effect is particularly pronounced for Bengali women (-40%-points), is 
smaller for Naga applicants (-17%-points) while Khasi women do not experience a 
motherhood penalty. In Mumbai, the overall effect of motherhood amounts to -12%-points 
(column 3). The community-motherhood interaction terms indicate that at least qualitatively 
Khasi and Naga mothers suffer less. However, these interaction terms are imprecisely 
estimated. In Chennai, the overall motherhood penalty amounts to an insignificant 5%-points 
(column 5). This small effect masks heterogeneity by community origins. Bengali mothers 
face a penalty of 19%-points, while we find offsetting effects for both Naga and Khasi 
women.86 
 

86 Appendix Tables D1-D3 provide a detailed breakdowns of callback rates by gender, city and sectors in the 
inexperienced, experienced and pooled samples, respectively.  
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4.4 Discussion and Conclusion 
In contrast to, but building on the existing literature (e.g., Gneezy et al., 2009, Andersen et al. 
2013, Klonner et al., 2019), which has focused on gender, culture and competitive 
preferences, this chapter examined the downstream effect of culture on labor market success 
in the context of an important dimension of gender and labor markets, namely motherhood. 
Perforce, our study focused on two sectors in three mega-cities and represents only a tiny 
share of the labor market in each of these cities. This constrains the external but not the 
internal validity of our findings. 
 
Our findings are consistent with the gender and culture literature which has shown a negative 
monotonic relationship between patriarchy and women’s competitiveness. We found strong 
evidence of a motherhood penalty in callback rates to job applications in India. This penalty 
was starkly mediated by origin (Northeast and East India) and culture (patrilineal versus 
matrilineal).   
 
We do not have information on hiring preferences of managers/firms where CVs were sent, 
but results are consistent with the views of a number of key informants (head hunters and 
human resources managers) who argued that (i) it is important for mothers to have child-care 
support “unless there is family support we clearly prefer to hire non-mothers” [male, 48 
years, interviewed on January 8, 2018]; “we ask mothers who have young children who will 
take care of the child and if there is a mother-in-law or a full-time maid that increases 
chances of hiring” [female, 30 years, interviewed on May 20, 2018] and (ii) that mothers 
from the Northeast are more flexible and have a stronger work commitment, in part, due to 
greater child-care support -  “they have stronger family support” [male, 70 years, interviewed 
on January 6, 2018]; “they are more efficient - if they have children they know how to 
manage it” [female, 50 years, interviewed on January 10, 2018].  The negligible motherhood 
penalty for Khasi women is consistent with the idea of stronger family support for their labor 
market roles as compared to women from patrilineal societies.  
 
While our argument here and the argument in the existing literature is that a community’s 
organizational system (patrilineal, matrilineal or the degree of patriarchy), manifests itself in 
differences in competitiveness, family support, independence, flexibility and efficiency, and 
results in lower motherhood penalties for certain groups, it is not essential for employers to 
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know these origins. As long as potential employers have interacted with members of different 
communities and have experienced differences in their ability to handle job market needs it is 
likely to translate into the pattern of motherhood penalties that have been obtained in the 
chapter.  
 
There was also suggestive evidence that job experience may moderate the motherhood 
penalty. We did not find noteworthy gender differences in callback rates when we 
differentiated by community origins. In other words, gender norms are most relevant on the 
labor market when it comes to motherhood. We also documented differences in callback rates 
across ethnic groups (Khasi and Naga versus Bengali) and found that these differences were 
concentrated in the Finance/Banking sector. 
 
While it is not our intention to formally test whether differences in callback rates may be 
attributed to taste-based (Becker, 1971) or statistical discrimination (Phelps, 1972), our 
estimates link to both forms of discrimination. With regard to motherhood, if fully 
prejudiced, employers would discriminate against mothers regardless of their cultural 
background (matrilineal versus patrilineal) or ethnic origins. In contrast, statistical 
discrimination would predict that employers may discriminate against mothers, but may use 
observable signals of community or ethnic origin to proxy for unobservable traits such as 
competitiveness. The erosion of the motherhood penalty for women coming from a 
matrilineal background and the substantially lower motherhood penalty for women from the 
Northeast, who are generally considered more empowered as compared to women from other 
parts of India, points to statistical discrimination based on visible traits. 
 
With regard to ethnic-based differences in callback rates, if differences are mainly driven by 
animus towards people from the Northeast then callback rates should not vary substantially 
across job sectors. However, we find that in the BPO/Call Centre sector where there is 
limited face-to-face client interaction and traits such as English speaking skills and flexibility 
(late night shifts) are relatively more important, women from the Northeast face no 
discrimination, while in a sector (finance/insurance) where employee-client interactions are 
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more likely, employers tend to favor Bengalis.87 If we assume that clients prefer to interact 
with Bengalis then employers may favor Bengalis even if they themselves are not prejudiced. 
Overall, the difference in ethnicity-specific callback rates across sectors also tends to support 
statistical discrimination. 
 
Although we cannot pin-point the drivers of city-level differences in motherhood penalties, it 
is perhaps not surprising that Delhi, which is probably the most patriarchal and woman-
unfriendly of the three cities in our study, stands out. For instance, according to the 2011 
Census Delhi’s child sex ratio (number of girls per 1000 boys, 0 – 6 years of age) is 873, 
which is well below ratios in Mumbai (914), Chennai (951) and India as a whole (902).88 
Female-male literacy gaps are larger in Delhi (80.96% and 90.98%) compared to Mumbai 
(86.45% and 91.48%) and Chennai (86.55% and 93.86%). These statistics reflect gender 
attitudes, and underlie the larger motherhood penalty in Delhi.   
 
Our experimental evidence complements previous analyses of the “puzzling” Indian labor 
market. Klasen and Pieters (2015) report that the labor market participation rate of women in 
urban India has been stuck at around 18% over the period 1987 to 2011 despite drops in 
fertility and increases in female education. The authors argue that men’s education and 
household income have risen starkly so that women, despite having higher levels of 
education may choose to stay at home. Thus far, one important dimension that has received 
far less attention is motherhood and related gender norms. Our findings echo a recent paper 
by Das and Zumbyte (2017, p.5) pointing to a strong role of motherhood norms and the lack 
of modern childcare in India:“… women who are not perceived as fulfilling the role in the 
traditional sense are censured, either overtly or covertly, both within the home and outside.” 
Analyzing several rounds of employment surveys and controlling for a host of observables, 
Das and Zumbyte find that the odds ratio of employment among non-mothers compared to 
mothers (with at least one child under the age of 6) was 1.4 in 2011. In our experiment, the 
baseline odds ratio (Figure 4.2) is 2.3. Our outcome variable does not directly translate into 

87 One of our key informants, a former call center/BPO recruiter (male, 48 years) mentioned that for call center 
positions his firm preferred to hire women from the North-East as compared to Bengali women as it was easier 
to train women from the North-East to modify their English accents [interviewed on January 8, 2018]. Another 
key informant, an experienced recruiter (female, 50 years) argued that she does not discriminate but “filters” 
while recruiting. She went on to elucidate that for jobs that require sales and marketing skills she prefers women 
from Delhi and Mumbai while for jobs that require numerical skills she prefers women from the South 
[interviewed on January 10, 2018].  
     
88 Census data are available online at https://www.census2011.co.in/ [Accessed 28 August 2018] 
546567-L-bw-Majilla
Processed on: 6-8-2020 PDF page: 104
 104 
actual employment and our experimental setting focused on specific sectors and cities, but 
the sizeable motherhood effect size that we find squares with this relatively large 
observational estimate.  
 
As countries such as India develop, qualified women will be increasingly drawn into the 
expanding sectors investigated in this study such as BPO (Jensen, 2012). Even if fertility 
levels are on the decline, just one child may substantially penalize women on the labor 
market. This chapter finds that a supportive culture may mitigate this penalty. In addition, 
well-thought out and supportive labor market policies may also help, although it is unlikely 
that recent changes in the maternity benefits act in India are likely to do so.89  Our empirical 
work took place soon after the law came into force and it is unlikely to have had a bearing on 
our results. However, more generally, while the act may have been well-intentioned, the 
entire burden of providing paid leave, organizing and setting up a crèche as well as hiring 
additional workers is placed on the employer. Given such a construction it is likely that a 
consequence of the act is a reduction in the probability of hiring women of child-bearing age 
as well as downward pressure on women’s wages as firms may try to recover costs.90,91  
 
 
 
 



  

89 The Nordic countries are good examples (see Datta Gupta et al., 2008). 
 
90 The new act came into force in April 2017 and it entitles women to maternity benefits in the form of fully 
paid absence from work for a duration of 26 weeks, of which 8 weeks may be taken before birth of her child and 
the rest later. The act applies to all establishments that employ 10 or more employees and if an establishment 
has more than 50 employees, it is mandatory to have a crèche on the work premises. To be eligible a woman 
must have worked for at 80 days in the same establishment during the past 12 months. The main change in the 
revised act was the extension of the duration of benefits from 12 to 26 weeks. 
 
91 A number of articles in the popular press commented on the potentially adverse effects of the passage of the 
law for young women. For instance, see 
https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/XXInpbtQzgRWwe28GBr9aM/Opinion-Indias-wrong-approach-to-paid-
maternity-leave.html (accessed on December 1, 2019) and https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/indias-
maternity-benefits-law-will-do-more-bad-than-good-here-is-why/1225954/ (accessed on December 1, 2019). 
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Chapter 5
Does Signaling Childcare Support on Job Applications 
Reduce the Motherhood Penalty?

(with Arjun Bedi and Matthias Rieger) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
While gender differences in labor market indicators are tapering off in many parts of the 
world (Goldin, 2014), the presence of women and even more so of mothers in labor markets 
remains low in many developing countries.92 One much discussed case is India (Klasen and 
Pieters, 2015; Das and Zumbyte, 2017; Verick, 2018), where less than 30% of women 
participate in the labor force notwithstanding improvements in socio-economic and 
demographic conditions in recent years. The country’s overall female labor force 
participation rate has even dropped from 22 percent in 1987 to 17 percent in 2011 (Klasen 
and Pieters, 2015), with the labor force participation of women typically falling around first 
motherhood (see chapter 4).93  
 
There are several supply and demand side reasons for this decline. One potential reason why 
a non-prejudiced employer may be less likely to hire mothers is the belief that due to 
childcare and other family obligations, mothers are inflexible and are less dedicated to their 
jobs. This is likely to place mothers, especially in the case of jobs with traditional “9 to 5” 
work arrangements, at a severe disadvantage. Several studies suggest that mothers experience 
grave difficulties in balancing job and family demands and require supportive work 
arrangements (Goldin, 2014; Anderson et al, 2003).94 Theoretically, such behavior may be 
related to statistical discrimination against mothers. If statistical discrimination, motivated 

92 There are wide variations in female labor force participation across the developing world. For example, in 
North Africa less than 30% of women aged 25 years or older participate in the labor market. In South Asia, the 
female labor force participation ranges from less than 30% in Pakistan to 80% in Nepal. See Verick (2018) for 
more details. 
 
93 According to data from the Indian National Sample Survey (NSS), the gap between the labor force 
participation of mothers and married non-mothers in urban area was 7.5 percentage points in 2011 (Das and 
Zumbyte, 2017). 
 
94 Based on NSS 2011 data, in the Indian context, a majority (70%) of married women (aged 25-55) reported 
that they stay out of the labor market due to domestic obligations.  
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primarily by the perceived (by employers) inflexibility of mothers and their lack of 
commitment is a primary factor holding back mothers from participating in the labor market, 
one way of improving their labor market prospects would be to signal their flexibility to 
employers. If mothers can signal flexibility, for example, by indicating childcare support at 
home, then the motherhood penalty should be smaller. Using an experimental approach, 
where one may credibly control for observable confounding characteristics and abstract from 
self-selection of applicants into certain jobs, the aim of this article is to identify the 
potentially mitigating impact of childcare support on the motherhood penalty. 
 
While access to childcare may be expected to mitigate the motherhood penalty, it is possible 
that if employers are prejudiced against mothers/women (Becker, 1971) or do not believe that 
access to childcare is strong enough to undo traditional gender norms and patriarchal 
expectations, then, childcare availability may not have a substantial effect. In a similar vein, 
Benard and Correll (2010) argue that if mothers show a very strong commitment to paid 
work, and display traditionally masculine qualities, they may experience ‘normative 
discrimination’, that is, they may be “viewed as less warm and more interpersonally hostile 
(e.g., more selfish, cold, and devious) than other types of workers” (p. 617), which implies 
that mothers who violate traditional norms and display stronger labor market commitment 
may continue to experience discrimination as compared to other employees. Their argument 
is that “evidence of workplace competence and commitment will not eliminate discrimination 
but merely alter its mechanism” (p. 622), that is, from statistical or status-based 
discrimination to “normative discrimination”.   
 
In terms of empirical evidence on the motherhood penalty, a growing literature, mostly from 
sociology but increasingly in economics, finds that mothers experience disadvantages in 
terms of wages, promotions and job opportunities in the Global North (Anderson et al., 2002; 
Benard and Correll, 2010; Budig et al., 2012; England et al., 2016; Goldin et al., 2017; 
Gallen, 2018; Kleven et al., 2019a).95 For instance, in Germany each child reduces a 
woman’s wages by 16% - 18% (Gangl and Ziefle, 2009). In Denmark, having children 

95 Datta Gupta and Smith (2002) show a significant loss of human capital accumulation during the childbirth 
periods. 
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creates a gender gap in earnings by as much as 20% in the long run (Kleven et al., 2019b).96 
A related experimental literature has explored the motherhood penalty using fictitious CVs 
sent to actual job advertisements. In a CV experiment, Correll et al. (2007) found that by 
randomly adding at least one child to otherwise similar CVs, callback rates fell by 50%. Few 
such experiments have been implemented in the Global South. In chapter 4, we examined the 
labor market implications of motherhood and the effect of cultural norms (mothers from 
patrilineal versus matrilineal backgrounds) in India (Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai).  Based on 
callback rates to fictitious job applications in the service sector, we found that the average 
callback rate was 14% for mothers as opposed to 28% for non-mothers. We also found that 
the motherhood penalty was restricted to mothers from patrilineal backgrounds while mothers 
from matrilineal backgrounds (the Khasis from Northeast India), where “every kind of labour 
is respected” (Nongbri, 2006), did not experience a penalty.97  
 
In this chapter, we experimentally test for the mitigating impact of childcare support on the 
motherhood penalty. We employ a CV audit approach with random variation in CV 
characteristics and evaluate the impact of these characteristics on the likelihood of a callback 
for an interview. Specifically, we sent three applications to each job opening – one non-
mother applicant and two mother applicants. In one of the mother CVs, we explicitly reported 
the availability of strong childcare support at home.98 Building on our previous study, we 
searched for entry-level jobs in two relatively new and flourishing sectors in the Indian 
economy – that is, call centers/business process outsourcing (BPO) and financial sector firms 
in Delhi. We selected Delhi because it offers the most patriarchal context with the strongest 
motherhood penalty amongst the three cities in chapter 5, while at the same time it has a 
vibrant job-market in the two selected sectors.99 All our fictitious applicants had a Bachelor’s 

96 In a cross-country analysis Kleven et al. (2019a) find heterogeneity by culture. For example, they find that 
English speaking countries display a long-run child penalty of 31-44%, while in Germanic countries that penalty 
reaches 51-61%. 
 
97 In her work on the matrilineal Khasi community, Nongbri (2006, p. 168) writes, “Throughout the ages, the 
Khasis have lived in a casteless and classless society where every kind of labour is respected. Men and women 
work and talk together freely. Everyone knows that he or she is equal with others in the society” 
 
98 For instance, the skills section of the CV stated - Flexible and ready to adapt to corporate needs or Flexible 
and ready to adapt to corporate needs (strong childcare support at home). 
 
99 The other two cities were Mumbai and Chennai. In Mumbai and Chennai, mothers experienced penalties of 
12 and 5 percentage points, respectively compared to a motherhood penalty of 20 percentage points in Delhi.  
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degree and had two years of relevant work experience. In total, we sent 450 CVs to 150 job 
openings.  
 
This study is related to two strands of the literature. First, it is related to the literature on the 
labor market impact of motherhood (Angelov et al., 2016; Kleven et al., 2019a; Kuziemko et 
al., 2018). By investigating the effect of childcare support on mothers’ labor market success 
we address a potential channel through which the motherhood penalty arises and may be 
weakened.  This study is the first to experimentally quantify the effect of childcare support on 
callback rates in the Global South.100 Second, our research links to the wider literature on 
women’s participation in labor markets in emerging countries, in particular when it comes to 
demand side aspects. While there is a sizeable literature which examines the impact of 
education and fertility on female labor supply (Guo et al., 2018; Heath, 2017; Agüero and 
Marks, 2010; Bloom et al., 2009; Angrist and Evans, 1998) the influence of demand side 
factors on women’s labor market outcomes have been relatively less investigated.  
 
To preview our results, first, we find a large motherhood penalty, and second, we find that 
the childcare support signal reduces the motherhood penalty. On average, mothers’ callback 
rates were 20 percentage points lower as compared to non-mothers. This translates to a 57% 
decrease in the callback rate. The childcare support signal significantly dampens the 
motherhood penalty by 4 percentage points or by 20%. The childcare support signal appears 
to be at least qualitatively more effective in the case of financial firms as compared to the 
BPO/Call center sector. This difference may be attributed to the greater credibility of the 
child care signal in the case of financial firms which operate during traditional working hours 
as compared to call center firms. Taken together, the evidence presented here suggests that 
childcare support has a modest, albeit a discernible moderating impact on the motherhood 
penalty.  
 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 outlines the research design. Section 5.3 
presents results, and Section 5.4 discusses the findings and concludes the chapter.  
 

100 We were unable to find papers that have used an experimental approach to examine the effects of signalling 
child care support in countries from the Global North. There are related papers, for instance, Aranda and Glick 
(2014) that have (experimentally) studied the effect of signalling strong labor market commitment - devotion to 
work as opposed to family, in the case of mothers in the Spanish labor market.   
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5.2 Experimental Design 
This section outlines the experimental design. Our primary aim was to examine the effects of 
motherhood and childcare support on callback rates. We randomly reported both treatments 
in fictitious CVs allowing for within applicant as well as within job postings variation in an 
Indian city and two industry sectors. We then recorded if each application received a 
response from employers. Data collection took place between February and April of 2019. 
 
Hypotheses 
We test two hypotheses: First, mothers are less likely to receive callbacks as compared to 
non-mothers (H1). Second, a childcare support signal reduces the mother penalty (H2).  
 
Overview of the Experiment 
We collected several anonymous CVs of real job applicants from a human resource 
consultancy firm. Based on these CVs we composed 9 fictitious CVs. To reduce the 
possibility that a potential employer may know the schools, colleges or firms where people in 
the fictitious CVs had studied or worked, all the applicants were from the East Indian city of 
Kolkata applying to jobs in the North Indian city of Delhi. All applicants had the same 
number of years of education and received degrees from qualitatively similar colleges and 
high schools in similar academic streams – Political Science, Sociology and History. All CVs 
had a residential address in Delhi and each applicant had a distinctive phone number and 
email contact to record callbacks. All the applicants signaled that they were legally married 
and reported an age between 25 and 27. Two-thirds (300) of the applications indicated the 
presence of a young child (mother) while the remainder did not indicate the presence of 
young children (non-mothers).  
 
We looked for and applied to jobs through the most popular Indian job website (naukri.com). 
We restricted ourselves to low- to medium skilled service sector jobs. Building on our 
previous work, we chose jobs in two broad sectors which feature dynamic job markets: (i) 
Business Process Outsourcing (BPO)/ Call Center, and (ii) Banking/Finance jobs.101 

101 The service sector contributes around 61.5% of the India’s total GDP, and IT/ Fintech are amongst the fastest 
growing sectors providing over $ 155 billion in gross value addition. (see  https://www.investindia.gov.in/team-
india-blogs/service-sector-india-paradigm-shift) [Accessed December 22, 2019]. 
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BPO/Call Center jobs demand greater flexibility compared to the finance sector; night shifts 
are often required in BPO/ Call Center jobs but not in the finance sector.  
 
Childcare Support Treatment 
We signaled the availability of childcare support at home by adding a section on skills and 
competencies in all CVs. In half (150) of the mother CVs, we mentioned ‘flexible (strong 
childcare support at home)’ as one of the skills and competencies. ‘Flexibility’ was 
differently framed in the three CV formats. For instance, in one CV we mentioned 
‘willingness to work in different shifts’ to signal such flexibility. In the other two CVs we 
mentioned ‘flexible and ready to adapt to corporate needs’ and ‘flexible in working hours’. 
We allowed within (CV) profile variation of applicant identities. To do so, we first composed 
CVs of three applicants with unique identities. Subsequently, each of these three CVs had 
three versions/profiles: non-mother, mother and mother with childcare support. By doing so, 
we had nine CVs in total. In total, there were six potential combinations of these three 
applicant profiles. We randomly assigned one combination to each job opening/firm.  
 
In sum, every job opening received three applications from three different applicants with 
different CV formats/profiles that were randomly assigned. By doing so, our design enables 
us to randomly vary profiles and to rule out the possibility that our results are due to specific 
CV formats or applicant profiles (e.g. name, address). 
 
In total, we sent 450 applications to 150 job openings/firms.102 These 450 applications were 
equally divided between two sectors. Table 5.1 reports sample sizes by treatments and 
sectors. 
 
  

102 We targeted about 150 jobs over the fieldwork period. Given our previous work, we are comfortably 
powered for a small to medium effect. 
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Table 5.1: Sample Size  
 
 Non-mother Mother Mother+Childcare 
Total Job Applications 150 150 150 
By Sector    
BPO/ Call Center 75 75 75 
Banking/ Finance 75 75 75 
 
 
5.3 Results 
We begin by presenting our results graphically, and thereafter provide impacts of reporting 
motherhood and signaling childcare based on estimating linear probability regression models 
specified as,  
.;
    	)*<+6*,-!;
  	=- >"!;
  ;  ?
  :;
 ,  (5.1) 
where, .;
  is a binary callback variable for applicant i, profile p, sent to job opening j. and 
)*<+6*,-!;
 and =- >"!;
 are binary variables indicating whether an applicant is a 
mother or not and whether an applicant has access to child care or not, respectively. Some of 
the specifications include profile (;'and job opening $?
' fixed effects for robustness 
checks, while :;
  is an error term. 
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Figure 5.1: Callback Rates  
 
Δ p-value (N=450) 
Non-mother vs. Mother: 0.00 
Mother vs. Mother + Childcare: 0.01 
Non-mother vs. Mother + Childcare: 0.00 
Note: P-values stem from linear regression-based t-tests adjusted for clustering at the job opening level. 
 
Overall, 23.3% of applications received a callback. Figure 5.1 breaks down callbacks by 
treatments. We document a sizeable motherhood penalty. The non-mother callback rate was 
35% as compared to a mother callback rate of 15%. This amounts to a decrease of more than 
a half or 20 percentage points (p-value = 0.00). Consistent with the second hypothesis, 
mothers signaling childcare support experience a lower penalty (at 16 percentage points). The 
treatment reduced the baseline motherhood penalty by 20% or 4 percentage points (p-value = 
0.01). 
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Figure 5.2: Callback rates by sector 
 
BPO/ Call Center 
Δ p-value (N=225) 
Non-mother vs. Mother: 0.00 
Mother vs. Mother + Childcare: 0.16 
Non-mother vs. Mother + Childcare: 0.00 
 
Banking/ Finance 
Δ p-value (N=225) 
Non-mother vs. Mother: 0.00 
Mother vs. Mother + Childcare: 0.05 
Non-mother vs. Mother + Childcare: 0.00 
Note: P-values stem from linear regression-based t-tests adjusted for clustering at the job opening level.  
 
With regard to callback rates by sector (see Figure 5.2), non-mother applicants recorded 
callback rates of 35% and 36% in BPO/ Call Center and Banking/ Finance (compare Panel A 
and B), respectively. The motherhood penalty was also similar for both sectors – with 
mothers experiencing a 20 percentage point reduction in both sectors. While there are no 
differences in baseline callback rates or in the motherhood penalty across sectors, it seems 
that the childcare support signal is qualitatively more effective in the Banking/ Finance 
sector. Childcare support eases the motherhood penalty by 5 percentage points in the 
Banking/ Finance sector, compared to a reduction of 2 percentage points in the BPO/ Call 
Center sector. 
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Next, we provide results from linear probability models (1) where the dependent variable 
indicates whether an individual received a callback (=1) or not (=0). Table 5.2 summarizes 
our estimates. Consistent with Figure 6.1, we document a sharp motherhood penalty in 
Column 1.  
Table 5.2: Linear Probability Model 
 
Dep. var. Callback (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mother is excl. 
    
Non-mother 0.20*** 
(0.03) 
0.20*** 
(0.03) 
0.20*** 
(0.03) 
0.20*** 
(0.04) 
Mother+Childcare 0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.04*** 
(0.02) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
Sector (Finance is excl.)     
BPO/ Call Center  -0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
- 
Constant 0.15*** 
(0.03) 
0.16*** 
(0.04) 
0.16*** 
(0.04) 
0.15*** 
(0.02) 
Profile Fixed Effects No No Yes No 
Job Opening Fixed Effects No No No Yes 
N 450 450 450 450 
Note: Every column reports a separate linear regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are 
clustered at the job opening level. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
We find a statistically significant motherhood penalty of 20 percentage points. In addition, 
motherhood with childcare support yields a callback rate that is 4 percentage points (p-value 
= 0.01) higher than that of mothers without such support, and accordingly 16 percentage 
points less than that of non-mothers. This implies that the childcare signal reduces the 
motherhood penalty by about a fifth. Considering the very low-cost signal, this may be 
regarded as a substantial effect, although moderate in size compared to the overall 
motherhood penalty. In Column 2, we add an indicator for the sector. Our estimates are 
robust to this inclusion. This is perhaps not surprising because of the random assignment of 
treatment arms. Our findings are equally robust to the inclusion of profile and job 
opening/firm fixed effects (Columns 3 and 4).  This implies that our results are not driven by 
variations in the CV profiles sent to different job openings or variations in the specific needs 
of the job opening but by variations in CVs sent to the same job opening.  
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In Table 5.3, we split the sample by sectors. Column 1 shows a motherhood penalty of 20 
percentage points in the BPO/Call Center sector. The motherhood penalty for mothers with 
childcare support is 3 percentage points lower than for those without childcare support, 
although the effect is not statistically significant. We find a similar motherhood penalty in the 
Finance sector. In this sector, childcare support reduces the motherhood penalty by 5 
percentage-points, and the effect is statistically significant.103  
 
Table 5.3: Heterogeneity by Sector 
 
Dep. var. Callback (1) (2) 
Mother is excl. 
  
Non-mother 0.20*** 
(0.05) 
0.20*** 
(0.05) 
Mother+Childcare 0.03 
(0.02) 
0.05** 
(0.03) 
Constant 0.15*** 
(0.04) 
0.16*** 
(0.04) 
Sector BPO/ Call Center Banking/ Finance 
N 225 225 
Note: Every column reports a separate linear regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are 
clustered at the job opening level. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
5.4 Discussion and Conclusion 
We investigated how employers value childcare support for job applicants who are mothers 
as compared to mothers without explicit mention of childcare support and compared to non-
mothers who are otherwise similar. Using a CV audit study, we examined the impact of 
reporting childcare support at home on the probability of receiving a phone call in response to 
a job application in an Indian city and two industry sectors. Our study has two main findings. 
First, similar to our previous study, we document a strong motherhood penalty, and second, 
while childcare support reduces the motherhood penalty, it does so only partially. Whilst the 
evidence clearly indicates that the lack of childcare support is one of the channels through 
which the motherhood penalty manifests itself, in the context of Delhi, it has a modest effect.  
 

103 Differences in the mother plus childcare coefficient are not statistically different across sectors (p-value = 
0.41). 
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Although, the aim of the chapter is not to test theories of labor market discrimination per se, 
we comment on the link between our results and potential sources of discrimination. First, 
consistent with Benard and Correll’s (2010) conception of ‘normative discrimination,’ we 
find that displaying access to child care as a signal of a mother’s labor market attachment 
does not eliminate the motherhood penalty, although there is a reduction. Second, while 
access to reliable child care may be expected to reduce the motherhood penalty, it remains an 
imperfect substitute. It seems to be the case that employers are only partially convinced about 
the flexibility and commitment rendered by access to child care and the presence of both, 
statistical discrimination (Phelps, 1972) emanating from deep-rooted gender norms - other 
than childcare responsibilities, and taste-based discrimination (Becker, 1971) against 
mothers, may not be ruled out. This chapter probed the effect of access to child care in 
mitigating the motherhood penalty.  It is possible that a stronger signal, which focuses not 
only on access to child care but which shows that a mother is willing to sacrifice family for 
work will be more successful at crowding out statistical discrimination (see Aranda and 
Glick, 2014). For instance, in their paper on the Spanish labor market, where business 
students were asked to pose as human resource managers and provide job recommendations, 
Aranda and Glick (2014) found that self-reported personal priorities statements which 
signaled a mother’s strong commitment and devotion to work as opposed to family 
completely crowded out the motherhood penalty. 
   
While our study is able to show the mitigating effects of access to childcare at the point of 
labor market entry, it provides insights for just one (large) city and two (important) sectors. 
Furthermore, it was not possible to indicate the type of childcare support in a CV or to have a 
discussion on the childcare provider at hand which would have been possible in an interview 
setting. It is possible that employers hiring decisions are sensitive to the type of child support 
on hand – that is, whether it is provided by a professional childcare worker/crèche with fixed 
timings as opposed to care provided by a grandparent or another family member. To 
investigate such differences, one possibility maybe to employ lab-based CV audit studies and 
inform subjects about the nature of childcare providers. Despite its shortcomings and 
potential avenues for further research, this chapter shows that a low-cost signal - one-line in a 
CV - is able to play a role in influencing the decisions of employers in favor of mothers. 
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	 
Gray University Degrees: Experimental Evidence from 
India
 
(with Matthias Rieger)104 
 
6.1 Introduction 
It is an open secret that academic degrees can be bought in India. Local media have widely 
reported on this phenomenon with headlines ranging from “Degrees on sale: Jaipur study 
centers offer bachelor degree to PhD for money” (Kumar et al. 2011) to “Fake degree scam: 
No sweat, you can get a university degree in 10 days” (Ullas and Prasher 2013), as well as 
“PhDs, Bachelor's degrees on sale in Punjab” (Chowdhary 2011).  
 
How are degrees bought? To answer this question, we collected qualitative data through a 
local market review, as well as through interviews with agents and potential buyers in the 
state of West Bengal. Agents and intermediaries handle (parts of) the process. They advertise 
their services in local newspapers, the Internet, flyers and railway coaches, often using 
ambiguous language due the illegality of such services (see one such example in Figure 6.1). 
Most of the advertised degrees originate from privately funded universities in other states and 
often by means of distance education.105 Students can obtain degrees within as little as two 
months without even sitting in exams. However, the market and the offered service packages 
are very diverse. For instance, one interviewed agent summarized the service as follows: 
 
“We manage her [the student’s] signature much before the exam on the answer sheet 
[…]. During exam days she can send anybody to sit in the exam. The only 

104 This chapter has been published as Majilla, T., & Rieger, M. (2020). Gray University Degrees: Experimental 
Evidence from India. Education Finance and Policy, 15(2), 292-309. 
 
105 Most Indian states feature at least one state-funded open and distance learning university. These are ‘open’ in 
the sense that admissions are not selective. The largest and federally funded example of such an institution is the 
Indira Gandhi National Open University (IGNOU) with more than 4 million students. Note that the Indian 
distance education system is not an ‘online’ system. Rather students take part-time degrees and are not required 
to attend lectures. They receive self-study materials in hard copy. They may attend optional lectures, in some 
cases complete take-home assignments and finally take exams (for more details, see Gupta and Gupta 2012; 
Gaba and Li 2015). 
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requirement is that the person taking the exam needs to be female if the original 
student is female. She may wish to write something or not. We manage a certificate.”  
[translated from Bengali by the authors, interview dated 27 July 2016] 
 
Figure 6.1: Example of an online advertisement to buy degrees 
 
 
Note: This online advertisement is presented as an example and was not used in the experiment. Contact details 
were blanked. The original is available at: http://www.clickindia.com/detail.php?id=136428806 [Accessed 14 
July 2017]. Here 10th is referred to 10th standard, i.e., the board exam after 10 year of studies whereas 12th is 
referred to 12th standard, i.e., the next board exam after 12 years of study. Student typically sit in the 10th and 
12th standard exams at the age of 16 and 18 respectively. The categorization of universities is geographical, 
clustered in North and South India. 
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In this chapter, we focus on the most straightforward rationale for buying a degree, namely 
boosting job market success as proxied by callback rates to applications. Employers cannot 
perfectly differentiate between potentially bought and authentic or more credible credentials. 
However, they are likely to discount degrees from institutions that offer both authentic and 
bought degrees, as they cannot tell if a student has gained human capital. This chapter tries to 
quantify the extent to which this is the case. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no 
quantitative/experimental work on gray degrees in India or other developing countries. There 
is also no reliable data on the functioning, size and extent of the market other than anecdotal 
evidence. More broadly, we contribute to the literature on the value of different type of 
college degrees on the labor market: Notably, Darolia et al. (2015) and Deming et al. (2016) 
performed large correspondence studies to examine the value of for-profit college degrees in 
the US. Darolia et al. (2015) found no effect of such degrees relative to community college 
degrees or even to having no college degree at all. In contrast, Deming et al. (2016) document 
a negative effect for some online degrees compared to nonselective public institutions.  
 
We focus on questionable institutions where it is possible to buy degrees. These universities 
also issue valid and legal degrees. In what follows, we therefore refer to these as gray 
degrees. Informed by a simple conceptual model, we examine if employers discount such 
questionable degrees in applications to low skilled, entry-level jobs advertised on online 
platforms.106 Preparatory qualitative work informed the design of the experiment, which took 
place in the state of West Bengal. We first identified several universities from which gray 
degrees could easily be bought and we picked three of these. These universities tend to be 
distant from the local job market (West Bengal) and are clearly questionable; for instance, a 
simple Google search would reveal that at least one of them was involved in a degree scam.  
We also searched for comparably low ranked local (control) universities that issue strictly 
authentic degrees (details on the choice of institutions are given below). We then performed a 
resume study similar in procedure to those found in the broader labor economics literature 
(Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004; Carlsson and Rooth 2007; Correll et al. 2007; Pager et al. 
2009; Kaas and Manger 2012). We picked job advertisements in sectors that required neither 
specific skill training nor work experience or academic degrees. This is the relevant segment 
of the job market for our analysis, allowing us to test the impact of gray degrees on callback 
rates compared to both having no degree and authentic degrees (from universities that clearly 

106 In our local context, firms and applicants tend to use the term CV, which in the US context corresponds to a 
resume. We use the term resume throughout. 
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do not issue gray degrees). In other words, we can examine how gray degrees boost 
employment chances compared to no degrees, and if they are discounted by employers.107 In 
practice, we sent three resumes to 132 identified job openings, varying the type of degree. To 
assess the influence of gender, we sent female and male resumes to mixed sector jobs, and 
only female (male) resumes to female (male) dominated sector jobs. We then recorded 
callback rates for interviews.  
 
To preview our results: Resumes featuring a gray degree average 8%-points more callbacks 
than those with no degree. This amounts to a 42% increase in the number of callbacks. This 
difference is significant only for and driven by female applicants. These gendered patterns 
may be specific to the sampled jobs (and gendered industry differences) as well as the Indian 
context. That said, at least qualitatively we see similar patterns for men and women with an 
advantage of gray degrees compared to no degrees. Authentic degrees always fare better than 
no degrees (in particular among female applicants) and on average than gray ones. Note that 
these main findings are robust to controlling for sector, firm and resume/profile fixed effects. 
In a heterogeneity analysis, we also classified gray degrees into low, medium and high 
ranked degrees based on the perceived ease of acquiring these degrees according to agents 
and buyers in qualitative interviews. The lowest rank university has been involved in scams 
as discussed on the Internet. We see a corresponding empirical ranking of gray degrees. 
Reporting a low ranked degree is statistically the same as reporting no degree at all. 
Conversely, there are no statistical differences in callback rates between authentic and high 
ranked gray degree universities. Our results imply that employers have consistently formed 
beliefs. They appropriately discount questionable degrees as a function of degree rank. 
 
We rationalize these results in three ways: First, a degree from a questionable university is 
better than no degree at all. This finding is compatible with a simple model (outlined in 
Section 6.2) where employers cannot verify the authenticity of a degree from a questionable 
university but at least assign some corresponding probability. Second, authentic degrees are 
clearly preferred by employers compared to no or gray degrees, as indicated by the highest 
rate of callbacks. Taken together these findings indicate that, at least in part, the veracity of 

107 In India it is perfectly common that job seekers with university credentials apply to jobs that only require 
high school degrees due to the competiveness of the job market, while high skilled jobs are normally occupied 
by the applicants from elite and established universities. The Indian media has covered this phenomenon: “PhD 
holders apply for SSC's clerical posts in West Bengal” (Times of India, 20 September 2016). Available at: 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/kolkata/PhD-holders-apply-for-SSCs-clerical-posts-in-West-
Bengal/articleshow/54432085.cms [Accessed 13 July 2017]   
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degrees is judged well by employers. Third, we can understand our findings in the light of the 
literature on fake degrees (Brown 2006; Grolleau et al. 2008; Attewell and Domina 2011). 
Attewell and Domina (2011) argue that “those who are blocked from attaining degrees 
through normal means are those most likely to employ false credentials” (pp.59).108 This is 
backed by what one potential buyer of a gray degree stated during our qualitative interviews:  
 
“I need to take care of my baby, cook, collect water and take care of my parents-in-
law... I simply do not have time to study. The duty of a married woman is to take care 
of her household. If I start studying, who will take care of the household?”   
[translated from Bengali, interview dated 18 July 2016] 
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 6.2 gives a simple conceptual 
model, details some qualitative insights and describes the experiment. Section 6.3 presents 
the results. Section 6.4 discusses the findings, while section 6.5 concludes with some policy 
implications.   
 
6.2 Empirical Strategy 
 
In this section, we first briefly outline a conceptual model to motivate the experiment and to 
provide some predictions. Then we outline the experimental design as informed by 
qualitative information.  
 
Conceptual Model 
Applicants report degrees or no degrees on their resumes.109  Universities denoted as i vary in 
their quality Qi. A fraction (1-xi) of reported degrees is “bought.” This fraction captures that it 
is possible to both buy and legitimately earn a degree from a gray university. Employers 
evaluate resumes and then decide whether to interview the candidate at unit cost c. They hold 
beliefs about the fraction or prevalence of earned degrees xi for each institution. The unit 
quality of the degree Qi  positively correlates with the quality of the candidate. The lower the 
fraction of bought degrees (1-xi) and the higher Qi, the higher the likelihood of a callback. In 

108 Degrees also convey “a certain prestige or social status” which may motivate buyers (see Groulleau et al. 
2008, pp.680). 
 
109 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this model. 
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sum, callback probability or expected productivity minus interview costs can be written as yi 
= xi Qi – ci.  
 
In this simple model, differences in callback rates stem from employers’ perceived 
differences in xi. Say, the employer decides between two candidates from universities j and k, 
so she compares xj Qj – cj and xk Qk – ck. If we assume equal institutional quality Qj = Qk and 
interview costs cj = ck; further, if university k is associated with a lower prevalence of bought 
degrees so that (1-xj) > (1-xk), then university k will be preferred over j. As long as the fraction 
of bought degrees is less than one, then some degree will be better than none. To sum up, the 
results from our experiment below are interpretable in terms of beliefs. Employers assign a 
probability that a degree from a gray institution is “bought” rather than earned.  As a result, 
authentic degrees should receive most callback rates, followed by gray and then no degrees.  
 
Overview of the Experiment 
Our aim was to test the impact of those universities from where it is possible to buy gray 
degrees on callback rates to job applications relative to authentic degree providing colleges 
and having no degree at all. Based on insights from qualitative data collection efforts, we ran 
a resume experiment from July to September 2016 in West Bengal. We sent 396 applications 
to 132 job postings. We applied to each of the job postings using three generic male or 
female applicant profiles. For each job posting, the three profiles were arbitrarily distributed 
to the following three groups: (1) no university degree; (2) gray university degree; (3) 
authentic university degree. Our minimum target sample was at least 188 applications.110 We 
budgeted fieldwork time to achieve this target and in practice we exceeded it. 
 
Background 
The design of the experiment required input from qualitative interviews, since there is little 
information on the functioning of the gray degree market. The qualitative data were collected 
in two steps by the first author of the study in the state of West Bengal: First, we reviewed 
the local gray degree market and looked for flyers to identify universities from which degrees 
could be bought. Second, we did qualitative interviews using snowball sampling with sellers 
and agents in the gray degree market, as well as with prospective buyers (for details on the 

110 We carried out power calculations for a test of two proportions using the “pwr” package in R. Setting 
Cohen's h for a binary outcome to 0.5 (medium effect), power to 80% and significance level to 5%, the required 
sample size was 188.  
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ethnographic methodology and results, see Majilla 2016). More specifically, we gathered 
advertisements for suspect degrees and approached agents pretending to be prospective 
buyers. We also interviewed actual and potential buyers and accompanied them to the agents. 
In total, five interviews were done with agents and 23 with potential and actual buyers.  
 
How does this gray degree market function in practice in our study area? A university may 
have a distance education department, which is legally entitled to provide degrees under the 
name of the university. A university in a given state (private universities are always state 
universities, i.e., they are established and governed by laws of the state government) can have 
study centers across the state. Federally funded universities can also have study centers in 
other states. However, we did not find any federally funded university providing gray 
degrees. Study centers have links with agents/offices located in other states, most often 
located in state capitals. These offices have no legal authority to provide services to students. 
Recall, only proper study centers within the state have such legal authority. Study centers and 
these offices located in other state capitals cooperate with agents at the district level, and 
these in turn may work with agents at the block level.111 Official study centers are meant to 
provide learning support and also administer exams in the presence of invigilators from the 
central University. Yet, in reality, we found that buyers of gray degrees never actually seem 
to visit these real and legal study centers.  
 
We found that in most cases students contact local agents, who forward applications and 
requests to their contacts at a higher level within the state. Such agents are not common for 
authentic colleges and students in India.  Of course, legitimate and official educational 
consultants do exist, and their primary customers are students looking for engineering 
degrees in other states and students looking for foreign degrees. These consultants are merely 
advising students, but they rarely have any influence on the admission process. Consultants 
for arts or social science degrees are less common. The Indian education system is very much 
prestige driven and students try to enter the most prestigious colleges they can within their 
reach and budget.  
 
We found that gray degrees are “earned” through aforementioned informal agents. They not 
only guide students, they manage the entire “study” process and have substantial influence on 

111 In an administrative sense, a state consists of several districts, which consist of several blocks. 
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the university administration. They literally sell their ability to arrange gray degrees. In India, 
most undergraduate arts and social science degrees take three years and students sit in exams, 
either in semester mode or on a yearly basis after their coursework. Gray degrees in principle 
require coursework but if they are channeled through the distance education mode, then 
actual attendance in coursework is optional. We also found some agents who arrange gray 
degrees through full-time mode. We found most students do not actually sit in exams. In fact, 
most degrees are acquired through this distance education system. If students do need to sit in 
exams (as in the case of bachelor of law degrees), they just sign the answer sheet and 
somebody fills in responses for them; or sometimes answers are provided to them and they 
copy them onto the exam sheet.  
 
In terms of academic streams, we found arts and social science gray degrees to be most 
prevalent as these are easier to manipulate. These degrees are cheaper compared to science 
subjects. We found most students were buying gray degrees either (and equally so) at the 
bachelor or master level. We found that students can get undergraduate gray degrees within 
as little as two months. However, it also important to note that many different business 
models and service packages exist in this market and one can naturally only get a small 
glimpse of these during qualitative research. 
 
During the qualitative work, we identified several universities from which it was possible to 
(indirectly) buy gray degrees. Out of these we selected three universities that were popular 
among local agents. Our aim is not to “name and shame” these particular three universities, 
so we do not disclose their identities here. Details are of course available on request from the 
authors for replication and research purposes. These three universities are in three different 
cities and in three different regions.  It is important to underline that all three universities also 
offer authentic degrees, earned through actual academic work. However, it is possible to 
easily access and buy these questionable or gray degrees with the help of agents. In these 
cases, students do not write exams and agents take care of the entire process. More 
specifically, all gray degrees used in our experiment can be accessed through distance 
learning. The chosen degrees cost around INR 18,000-20,000 (~USD 275-300). Note that 
costs are roughly similar across the three ranks. We would also like to note that the three 
universities tend to be away from the applicant’s residence and the job market. For instance, 
the most questionable gray degree comes from a university that is roughly 1500 km away 
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from the home address of our job applicants.112 This is important since the qualitative data 
indicate that agents tend to collaborate with distant universities. Degrees from such 
universities should be discounted by employers. A local applicant could obtain an authentic 
degree from a nearby university.  
 
We also ranked these three questionable universities. We did this based on the perceptions of 
agents. The lowest ranked gray degree comes from a university that easily cooperates with 
agents and has been involved in scams as documented on websites. Naturally, there are no 
hard quality measures or measures on the prevalence of bought degrees available, so rank-
specific results have to be interpreted with caution. We need to assume that the difference in 
callback rates only stem from the relative prevalence of and beliefs about illegitimate degrees 
(as suggested by our conceptual framework).  
 
Selection of Authentic (Control) Degrees  
Recall that we compare resumes featuring gray degrees to both resumes with authentic 
university degrees and only high school degrees.  Our aim is to compare institutions that are 
of similar quality, so that differences in callback rates can be attributed to the existence of a 
market for bought degrees. 
 
To this end, we prepared a list of colleges in the state of West Bengal offering authentic 
degrees, which we thought would be comparable to the identified universities offering gray 
degrees. We had a four step strategy to select those used in the experiment. First, we showed 
our list of authentic institutions and those known for gray degrees to a human resource 
consultancy firm and asked a representative to rank and match institutes in terms of job 
market prospects. Second, we repeated the same exercise with two gray degree agents 
operating in the local market. Third, we asked several buyers to examine our list. However, 
their knowledge of gray degree universities (apart from their own) turned out to be limited 
and we did not use their input. In the end, we had a list of five comparable authentic and five 
gray degree institutions and we picked three of each for the experiment.  
 
 

112 We do not have data on the number of students travelling out of their state. Our anecdotal and qualitative 
evidence suggests that only top students move out of states for arts or social science degrees, mainly to study at 
elite colleges in big cities. One exception appears to be engineering, where many students move out of their 
state. 
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Further Education Characteristics  
We did not mention whether degrees were obtained through distance education or not (which 
is often the case for gray degrees) on resumes. Mentioning distance learning just for gray 
degrees may have confounded our results. However, one limitation is that we cannot test for 
the impact of reporting distance education on callback rates, which may differ between 
authentic and gray degrees, and which may provide an additional signal to the employer.  
Further, we had to make a choice on the academic discipline itself. Based on insights from 
the qualitative interviews, we opted for two comparable and relatively less prestigious 
academic disciplines in the Indian context, namely history and political science. Finally, all 
resumes featured comparable secondary and high school degrees located near the applicants’ 
residential address.  
 
Selection of Job Postings and Location  
We used three popular online portals in India to search for jobs.113 These portals allow 
applicants to create a profile, upload a resume and apply to job postings. We made sure not to 
apply to the same job twice across portals.  
 
We sent applications to entry level and relatively low-skilled jobs. We only selected job 
postings that were open to both inexperienced and experienced applicants. As these jobs did 
not require a university degree,114 we can test if gray degrees provide a competitive 
advantage over having no degree at all. More specifically, we picked job postings ranging 
from sales, in particular insurance or personal loan sales to administrative support, clerical 
support, call centers as well as medical representatives. We did not design the experiment to 
be able to detect impacts by specific sectors. Rather, we simply selected and classified jobs 
into female (N=99), male (N=99) and mixed sector jobs (N=198). We gendered the resumes 
of applicants according to this threefold classification. This allows us to examine patterns by 
the gender of the applicant and the gender of the sector. For instance, administrative jobs are 
typically held by females, while medical sales representatives are mainly male. Conversely, 
call centers are known to have a mixed work force. One limitation of our design and the 

113 The large majority of jobs were chosen and applied to through one of these three platforms. So we cannot 
break down results by job portal. 
 
114 Unfortunately, we could not find hard data on the percentage of employees without university credentials in 
the types of jobs included in our experiment. 
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small sample is that we cannot clearly disentangle gender differences (if any) from job and 
industry differences. 
 
We exclusively applied to jobs in the state of West Bengal (in east India), where also the 
qualitative fieldwork took place. We mainly applied to jobs based in Kolkata, and in some 
cases to jobs in district towns within the state of West Bengal. Related, we excluded job 
postings that would have required applicants to relocate. Our experiment closely mirrors what 
we found in the qualitative interviews with agents and buyers. Applicants in the local job 
market can either obtain an authentic local degree or buy degrees outside of their home state 
(in this case, West Bengal). The three gray universities were in three different regions (East-
central, West and South India) and located in mid to small-sized cities. The limitation of our 
design is that we cannot separate out the effect of geography from the overall effects of gray 
degrees. 
 
Design of Applicant Profiles 
We designed the resumes with three considerations in mind: First, we wanted to create 
realistic applicants for the chosen jobs and sectors.  We obtained typical and real resumes 
from a human resource consultancy. These resumes had Pan-India coverage, had been used in 
actual applications and were aimed at jobs where no work experience was necessary. Second, 
we needed to pick names for applicants that suited the Indian context. Discrimination by 
caste, gender and ethnicities is well researched and documented in the literature (Carlsson 
and Rooth 2007; Pager et al. 2009). For instance, there is evidence that employers 
discriminate using the names of job applicants (Banerjee and Knight 1985; Deshpande 2011). 
To minimize these kinds of sources of statistical noise and competing drivers of callback 
rates, we selected upper caste Hindu names. Furthermore, in India there is also prejudice and 
discrimination based on the state of origin. So we used only Bengali names. Finally, in 
mixed-sex sectors we randomly used male and female names. In the case of female (male) 
dominated sectors, we only applied with female (male) resumes.    
 
Experimental Procedure and Data Collection 
In total we used eighteen resumes: nine male and nine female resumes with three different 
names and each with three different types of education levels: gray, authentic and no 
university degree (high-school only). For each job, we sent three resumes. Across jobs we 
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varied the following features in a balanced way: (i) high school name and residential address 
and (ii) name and gender of applicants (for mixed gender sector jobs). 
 
We recorded callback rates through e-mails and phone calls. Every resume had a unique e-
mail and mobile phone number. We did not apply to jobs requiring applicants to directly call 
or visit the company. Further we used authentic residential addresses for all resumes; 
however for practical reasons and due to the fictitiousness of applicants we could not record 
responses by post.115 An applicant’s home address may come with labor market 
discrimination. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) found that applicants from dominantly 
black neighborhoods in the US receive relatively less callbacks than those from white 
neighborhoods. To minimize such effects, we used residential addresses located in semi-
urban areas in West Bengal that are mainly inhabited by Hindus. Sample sizes by degree and 
gender are summarized in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1: Sample sizes by university degree and gender 
University degree No Gray Authentic Total 
Male applicant 66 66 66 198 
Female applicant 66 66 66 198 
Total applications 132 132 132 396 
 
6.3 Results 
Gray degrees significantly increase callback rates compared to having no degree. The impact 
is moderate in size and stronger among female sector jobs and applicants. In addition, 
authentic degrees have a much larger, relative impact on callback rates. However, we can 
document heterogeneous impacts of gray degrees according to their ranking (as a function of 
the subjective ease of obtaining them). In particular, the positive impact of the high ranked 
gray degree is not statistically different from the one associated with authentic degrees, while 
the effect associated with the lowest rank one is insignificant. In what follows, we first 
present the main findings graphically, and then investigate the robustness and heterogeneity 
of the effects in a regression model. 
 
 

115 In any case, it is unusual for employers to use regular postal services for jobs advertised on online platforms.  
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Figure 6.2: Callback rates by type of university degree 
Panel A: Overall callback rates  
 
No vs. Gray degree: p-value=0.07 
Gray vs. Authentic degree: p-value=0.00 
No vs. Authentic degree: p-value=0.00 
 
Panel B: Callback rates by gender  
 
No vs. Gray degree: p-value=0.09; p-value=0.45 
Gray vs. Authentic degree: p-value=0.01; p-value=0.07 
No vs. Authentic degree: p-value=0.00; p-value=0.01 
 
Note: N=396 (see Table 1 for a breakdown by degree and gender). P-values stem from pairwise regression-
based t-tests adjusted for clustering at the job posting level. In Panel B, the first p-value refers to differences in 
the female and the second p-value to differences in the male sample. 
 
Overall, 30% of our applications received a callback. Figure 6.2 breaks down callback rates 
by the type of degree. Panel A show a clear hierarchy: resumes with no degree received 
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callbacks in 19.70% of all applications, while those with a gray and authentic degree 
averaged 28.03% and 41.67%, respectively. The impact of a gray degree on callback rates 
compared to no degree amounts to 8.33%-points (p-value=0.07, t-statistic=1.82, N=264).116 
This amounts to a 42% increase. In comparison, the impact of authentic degrees over no 
degrees is 21.97%-points (p-value=0.00, t-statistic=4.90, N=264). Finally, the difference 
between gray and authentic degrees amounts to -13.64%-points (p-value=0.00, t-statistic=-
3.29, N=264).    
 
We can also differentiate callback rates by degree and gender of the applicant (see Panel B, 
Figure 6.2). One limitation is that gender differences may in part be driven by sectoral 
differences. Further, our experiment was not designed to test for gender differences 
efficiently. That said, a similar ranking of degrees emerges: resumes with authentic degrees 
receive more callbacks than those with gray or no degrees. However, differences are stronger 
among female applicants. Overall, female receive more callbacks than males (36.36% vs. 
23.23%). And the difference in callback rates between female resumes with gray and no 
degrees amounts to 12.12%-points (p-value=0.09, t-statistic=1.72, N=132). The 
corresponding difference for male resumes is small in magnitude (4.55%-points) and 
insignificant (p-value=0.45, t-statistic=0.77, N=132). 
 
  

116 Throughout we present linear regression-based differences in means tests adjusted for clustering at the job 
posting level.  
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Table 6.2: Regression estimates of the effects of types of university degrees on callback rates 
Dep. var. Callback (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Degree type: 
(no degree excl. category)   
 
 
Gray 0.08* 0.08* 0.08*    
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)     
Gray (low rank)    0.04 
    (0.08) 
Gray (medium rank)    0.06 
    (0.08) 
Gray (high rank)    0.15* 
    (0.08) 
Authentic 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)    (0.05) 
Male applicant  -0.10  -0.09 
  (0.10)  (0.10) 
Male sector  -0.06  -0.06 
  (0.08)  (0.08) 
Female sector  -0.04  -0.04 
  (0.09)  (0.09) 
Constant 0.20*** 0.28*** 0.20*** 0.28*** 
  (0.03) (0.07) (0.03)    (0.07) 
Effect equality (p-value)     
Gray=Authentic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01;0.04;0.41 
Profile dummies  x  x 
Job posting fixed effects   x  
N 396 396 396 396 
Note: Linear probability models. Standard errors in brackets under point estimates are clustered at the job 
posting level. In column 4, we report tests of the equality between effects associated with the three gray degrees 
(low, medium, high) and the authentic degree. Mixed sector is the excluded category in columns 2 and 4. 
Significance levels are denoted  *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
Table 6.2 summarizes estimates stemming from a linear probability model117 where the 
dependent variable takes on one in the case of a callback and zero otherwise. Standard errors 
are clustered at the job posting level. Column 1 presents a stripped-down model with no 
covariates. “No degree” is the excluded category. The impact associated with gray degrees 
relative to no degree amounts to 8%-points. The corresponding impact of authentic degrees is 
22%-points. Column 2 gauges the sensitivity of these marginal effects to the inclusion of a 

117 Probit or logit models yield similar results and are available on request.  
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gender dummy, as well as sector and applicant profile/resume118 dummies. Point estimates 
associated with the main variables of interest are extremely stable, confirming that 
randomization and a balanced sample were achieved in practice. The point estimates 
associated with gender and the type of sector are insignificant. Column 3 shows that our main 
findings are also robust to the inclusion of firm/job opening fixed effects. Point estimates and 
standard errors are stable. Findings are robust within and across firms. 
 
Until now, we have estimated average effects of gray degrees on callback rates. However, in 
the experiment, we employed three different (subjective) ranks of gray degrees. Column 4 
shows the results of this heterogeneity analysis. The effects associated with these degrees are 
all positive. The effect of low and medium ranked degrees is however insignificant and small. 
Only the effect of the high ranked gray degree is large and significant (at the 10% level). 
What is more, we find that authentic degrees have lost some of their competitive edge over 
gray degrees. We can no longer statistically differentiate between the effects of authentic vs. 
high-ranked gray degrees (see p-values at the bottom of the table).119 In sum, callback rates 
are monotonically increasing with gray degree rank. This is suggestive evidence of proper 
market discounting by firms with respect to the ease with which gray degrees can be bought. 
  

118 These dummies account for effects of the 6 specific resumes (beyond the effects of gender and degree type). 
 
119 Also, the difference between authentic and medium ranked degrees in terms of callback rates is insignificant. 
However the economic difference is sizeable. Therefore we might be lacking power to test this difference. 
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Table 6.3: Gender heterogeneity 
Dep. var. Callback (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Applicants           Female             Male 
Degree type: 
(no degree excl. category) 
 
 
  
 
 
Gray 0.12* 0.12 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.03 
 (0.07) (0.11) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) 
Authentic 0.29*** 0.27** 0.30*** 0.15*** 0.18** 0.12 
 (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) 
Constant 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.24*** 0.17*** 0.12** 0.21*** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)    
Effect equality (p-value)       
Gray=Authentic 0.01 0.14 0.01 0.07 0.16 0.26 
Sector(s)  Female,Mixed Female Mixed Male,Mixed Male Mixed 
N 198 99 99 198 99 99 
Note: Linear probability models. Standard errors in brackets under point estimates are clustered at the job 
posting level. Significance levels are denoted  *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
Table 6.3 shows separate regression results for female and male applicants. In columns 1 and 
4, we show full sample results for female and male applicants, respectively. In the remaining 
columns, we provide gender-specific results by industry sectors. The effects of gray degrees 
within gender are similar across the various sub-samples. However, we lose precision in the 
smaller sectoral samples.120 We find that the effect of gray degrees on female callback 
chances is statistically significant only (at the 10% level) in column 1, yet always 
economically important and larger among female applicants (12%-points in columns 1-3 
compared to 3-6%-points in columns 4-6). Finally, note that authentic degrees fare (at least 
qualitatively so) better than gray degrees and no degrees. It is also interesting to note that the 
effect of authentic degrees is large among female applicants.  
 
6.4 Discussion 
Applicants with degrees from authentic colleges fare significantly better compared to both 
having no degree and degrees from questionable universities in our simple audit study. 
However, questionable degrees from gray universities can partially compensate the lack of 

120 We did not design the experiment to be able to document precise gender differences. We cannot efficiently 
disentangle gender and gendered-industry differences. 
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authentic credentials; and this finding is concentrated among female applicants and female-
sector jobs. These gender differences may be explained in that callback rates are higher for 
women in the first place and that women in India tend to have lower education levels than 
men and also tend to apply to lower skilled jobs. A related explanation for the gender 
differences in callback rates may stem from the fact that employers understand the difficulty 
of Indian women to accumulate human capital. Consequently, they reward any degree (gray 
or authentic) obtained by women relatively more.   
 
We rationalize our results in the sense that employers hold beliefs about the probability that a 
degree from a gray institution is bought rather than earned. It is clear that employers discount 
degrees from questionable universities. Table 6.4 breaks down callback rates at the firm 
level: 13% of firms called back applicants with degrees from authentic and gray universities 
and ignored applicants with no degree (see column 1). At the same time, 14% of firms only 
called back applicants with degrees from authentic universities. Conversely, 5% of firms 
called back applicants with authentic and no degrees, ignoring those with questionable 
degrees. These patterns are stronger for female resumes (compare columns 2 and 3). Our 
findings are thus consistent with a simple conceptual model (see section 2) and suggest that 
most employers lump gray degrees within a broad degree category. Simply put, employers 
prefer a degree (gray/questionable or authentic) over no degree at all. They cannot perfectly 
verify the authenticity of a degree from a questionable university but assign a positive 
probability (however small that may be) that the degree is nevertheless authentic.  
 
Table 6.4: Callback rates at the job posting/firm level 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Sample 
Firm-level response Total Male Female 
No applicant 0.48 0.59 0.38 
Only no degree 0.05 0.03 0.06 
Only gray degree 0.05 0.06 0.05 
Only authentic 0.14 0.11 0.17 
Only no degree and gray 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Only no degree and authentic 0.05 0.06 0.05 
Only gray and authentic 0.13 0.08 0.18 
All applicants and degrees 0.10 0.08 0.12 
Number of jobs 132 66 66 
Note: This table shows the distribution of callback rates within job postings.   
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Our qualitative insights complement our experimental findings. One agent summarized the 
economics of gray bachelor of law degrees (LLB):  
 
“Let’s talk about an LLB. You cannot do this on a part time basis. But honestly, tell 
me, is it worth spending three years doing an LLB unless you go to a good university? 
We are providing all LLBs at [Rupees] 60,000…If you pay, then you'll find that your 
answer script is ready and you just need to sign.” [translated from Bengali, interview 
dated 12 July, 2016]  
 
Do the benefits of gray degrees really exceed the costs? While our experiment suggests that 
gray degrees can increase callback rates by 8%-points, this does not inform about costs and 
benefits. That said, the gray degrees in our analysis cost about INR 20,000 (~USD 300), 
which can be around a fifth of a yearly salary121 in an entry-level job. But costs vary 
depending on the degree level, subjects and the extent to which the degree is managed by 
agents. For example, a LLB degree costs around INR 60,000 (~USD 900) compared to INR 
18,000 for a BA in History (~USD 270). The costs of such degrees are actually quite steep 
compared to the positive impacts on callback rates. Further research should examine the 
motivations of buyers beyond callback rates, including longer-term economic advantages and 
social motives. 
 
We would like to point out some immediate limitations of our study and sample: first, we 
only studied the impact on callback rates. We cannot document if these callbacks translate 
into getting an offer and keeping a job. Related, we do not have data on wages for holders of 
different degrees. Second, we focused on a small set of universities from which gray degrees 
can be obtained and on just one Indian state. Third, we focused on jobs advertisements that 
do not require higher education degrees. We do expect a higher scrutiny of resumes for 
higher ranked jobs that require academic credentials. 
 
Our experimental design also has several limitations: Most importantly, we cannot parcel out 
whether employers make inference about an applicant’s productivity based on the choice of 
schools – both in terms of size, type, mode of instruction (online, distance etc.) and location. 

121 According to our qualitative interviews, a yearly salary in the low skilled sector could be around 8000 to 
10000 INR (USD 1500 to 1880). Also note that the unskilled minimum wage in West Bengal is 5962 
INR/Month (Government of West Bengal, 2017, available at: 
https://www.wblc.gov.in/sites/default/files/synopsys/01-07-2017/agriculture.pdf  [Accessed 27 August 2017]). 
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For instance, gray degree institutions in our experiment tend to be relatively far away, and 
employer perceptions of productivity may vary depending on the distance between home and 
institution. Furthermore, we find relatively strong effect of gray degrees among women. 
However, we do not distinguish between mothers and non-mothers, which is an important 
dimension in the Indian labor market (Das and Zumbyte, 2017). Having a gray degree 
(potentially involving distance education) may tell the employer that the (female) applicant 
has children at home and may not have had time to obtain an authentic degree (in line with 
the above quote from the qualitative interviews). This in turn could imply that the applicant 
has lower commitment to the job, and will only be available part time (Correll et al 2007). 
Several further limitations of our design are worth mentioning: we cannot provide more 
disaggregated results by study subject (for instance, history compared to political sciences), 
as well as job board, firm or sectoral characteristics (see Deming et al. 2016 for a very 
thorough design along these lines in the case of post-secondary qualifications the U.S.).   
 
We would like to highlight avenues for future empirical and theoretical work: First, it would 
be interesting to quantify the screening costs for firms in the (expanding) presence of gray 
degrees. Second, it would be insightful to study to which extent employers make inference 
about human capital when reviewing applications (with different degrees). One possibility 
would be to randomly report additional skills (unrelated to university education) on the 
resume. Third, gray degrees may theoretically have predictive value of job productivity. For 
instance, Weaver (2018) documents that bribes to obtain a public sector job in developing 
countries may actually increase welfare, as the willingness to pay a bribe is positively 
predictive of subsequent productivity on the job.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, mentioning a gray degree from a questionable university on one’s resume 
improved callback rates relative to reporting no degree in our resume experiment. However, 
employers favored degrees from institutions that offer only authentic degrees. From our 
results, several policy implications emerge. First, it seems clear that authorities need to 
regulate and control the Indian higher education sector more thoroughly. We found that 
services relating to gray degrees are advertised quite openly; thus, either the legal framework 
is too lax or means to curb such practices are not adequately deployed. Some limited policy 
measures have been introduced such as the abolition of the inefficient ‘Distance Education 
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Council’ and the establishment of the ‘Distance Education Bureau’ as the new regulatory 
authority. However, the effectiveness of this new bureau has yet to be demonstrated. Further, 
authentic colleges need to keep distinguishing themselves clearly from gray institutions. They 
could, for instance, report gray degrees and agents operating in their areas to local and 
national authorities. Lessons may come from how other countries such as the U.S. regulate 
diploma mills or online colleges. In the U.S., states govern and regulate the education sector 
and some of them have issued “negative lists of unapproved, unaccredited, or illegal 
providers” (USNEI 2007, pp.1). Likewise, Indian authorities could list gray degree-issuing 
institutions in publicly available databases. This may help employers discount questionable 
degrees even more and may lower the incentives of students to buy degrees.  
 

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Chapter 7 
Summary and Remarks
 
This dissertation used experimental and non-experimental approaches to analyze and deal 
with two parallel but connected issues in policy relevant empirical development economics – 
intra-household parental resource allocation, and labor market discrimination. A unifying 
theme was that each essay attempted to uncover disadvantages experienced by women in 
different periods of their lives. The thesis offers five sets of results. First, it shows intra-
household gender disparity in parental allocation of shadow education expenditures. It shows 
a clear birth order gradient and disadvantages for girls at every birth order. Second, 
differential intra-household resource allocation together with the negative effect of family 
size may plausibly explain gender gaps in math test scores. These patterns clearly indicate 
elder son preference. Third, it shows a labor market penalty for mothers, but the existence 
and the magnitude of the penalty depends on community gender norms. Fourth, the penalty 
eases if mothers can signal availability of childcare at home. Finally, the thesis finds a labor 
market advantage for those with gray undergraduate degrees as compared to having no 
degree.  
 
Although, these chapters document disadvantage for women, the fifth and sixth chapters in 
particular show some promising results. The fifth chapter shows that childcare support at 
home may reduce motherhood penalty, and thus strengthens the case for policies that work 
towards providing childcare support. The sixth chapter also stands out as it explores a 
potential, although illegal, coping strategy that women may adopt to compensate their 
disadvantage. In particular, the chapter shows that gray degrees are more effective in helping 
women applicants as compared to their male peers. While the chapter shows that gray 
degrees are more beneficial for women, the result needs to be understood keeping in mind the 
context. In other words, attempting to acquire a gray degree itself is an outcome of multiple 
disadvantages, and unlikely to be a policy solution. 
 
The evidence presented here suggests a clear need to promote gender equality from early 
childhood. While there is no dearth of interventions in the country at the central or the state 
level which privilege girls and women, their effectiveness and the manner in which various 
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policies fit together, whether they are suitable and whether they may be bundled to enhance 
their effectiveness has rarely been systematically and carefully examined.  
 
For instance, in January 2015, at the federal level, the Indian government launched its ‘Beti 
Bachao, Beti Padhao’ (Save the daughter, educate the daughter) campaign. This is a 
behavioral change communication campaign which aims to “ensure girls are born, loved and 
nurtured without discrimination, educated and raised to become empowered citizens of this 
country with equal rights”.122 The scheme has three main objectives. First, it aims to prevent 
gender biased sex selective eliminations. Second, aims to ensure the survival and protection 
of the girl child, and, third, enhancing education and participation of the girl child. While the 
policy hits the right note, the reach and resources mobilized for the campaign are limited.123 
There are a number of programs across Indian states that incentivize parents by providing 
cash transfers or in kind support for “the girl child”. However, as shown in the second 
chapter, son preference is relatively greater in higher socioeconomic status families. Thus, 
there is no reason to suspect that poverty (or liquidity constraints to be more specific) leads to 
son preference and accordingly the usefulness of such cash transfer policies may be 
limited.124  Furthermore, parental concern over future labor market returns could explain 
differential resource allocation. Thus, there is a need for policies targeting female labor force 
participation. Unfortunately, to the best of my knowledge there is no coherent policy which 
systematically attempts to increase female labor force participation in India, although a 
number of the new digitally-oriented service opportunities emerging in India are perhaps 
more women friendly. Increasing female labor force participation also needs to deal with 
demand-side discrimination against women and especially mothers. A campaign such as ‘Beti 
Bachao, Beti Padhao’, but for adult females may help.    
 

122  For instance, see: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20141105190442/http://wcd.nic.in/tender/Beti_bachao_beti_padhao_campaign_24
072014.pdf accessed on 17 April 2020. 
 
123 Considering the magnitude of discrimination against girls in India, the scheme started with miniscule funding 
of 100 crore INR (~ 18.51 million USD). However, it has gradually increased over time. The federal budget of 
2020-21 allocated 28,600 crore INR (3.44 billion USD) for women specific programs which includes ‘Beti 
Bachao, Beti Padhao’. While this is a huge increase over time, but it is still quite small on a per capita basis. See 
https://www.financialexpress.com/budget/budget-2020-beti-bachao-beti-padhao-a-big-success-scheme-yielded-
tremendous-results-says-fm/1848214/ accessed on 23 May 2020. 
 
124 For a specific case, see the analysis of the Girl Child Protection Scheme in Tamil Nadu. In their analysis, 
Srinivasan and Bedi (2009) argue that the scheme assumes that only poor families are anti-daughters. 
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A promising result that this dissertation uncovers is that women from matrilineal 
communities faces no motherhood penalty. Motherhood penalty is most discernible for 
mothers from patrilineal communities. Thus women empowerment, proxied by matrilineal 
community origin but many employers read it as a sign of independence in our research, may 
ease the motherhood penalty. Once women have more resources through labor force 
participation or by means of other policy benefits, such independence may follow.125  
 
Childcare support has been found to be an important mitigating factor. Unfortunately India 
does not have a childcare support program as such. The country’s flagship schemes e.g., 
Anganwadi services and Pradhan Mantri Matru Vandana Yojana are per se not child care 
support schemes. These schemes primarily provide support in cash or kind to help with 
children’s nutrition. The Government of India has a National Crèche Scheme. However, the 
scheme is yet to reach scale and its reach has declined over time.126 
 
Together, the results presented in this thesis motivate an integrated and well thought-out set 
of evidence-based policies that may be used to address the multidimensional disadvantage for 
women.  The plethora of existing policies indicates that policy makers recognize the 
problems, but as is quite common implementation and effectiveness lags behind. A final issue 
is that most of the existing policies (cash transfers, nutritional support, free access to public 
school) are primarily intended for families in weaker socioeconomic circumstances. While it 
is ethically justified to target disadvantaged families, issues discussed in this thesis are not 
confined to any particular social strata and call for policies and actions that may spark deeper 
social change. 
  
 
 
 
	 

125 The Nordic countries are remarkably successful in increasing the labor force participation of mothers. This is 
primarily due to the family friendly policies (Datta Gupta et al., 2008). 
 
126 As of June 2019, only 7,930 Crèches were functional across the country with about 300,000 beneficiaries. 
Over time the number of creches has been declining. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/why-the-number-
of-creches-has-dropped-sharply-since-2017/articleshow/67765125.cms, accessed on 28 May 2020. 
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Appendix A 
 
Figure A1: Shadow Education Expenditures in 100 Hours 
 
Panel A: Pooled Sample 
 
Panel B: Urban Sample 
 
Panel C: Rural Sample 
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Table A1: Sample Size by Birth Order and Gender 
 
 
 
Birth Order Full Sample Boys Girls 
1st  21299 11124 10175 
2nd  17299 9300 7999 
3rd  8630 4625 4005 
4th+  5132 2751 2381 
 Notes: Sample size by gender in full sample - Boys: 27800 and Girls: 24560. 
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Table A2: Estimates for Shadow Education Expenditures (INR)  
Dep. Var. 
Shadow 
Education 
Expenditures 
(INR) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Girl -175.43*** 
(29.55) 
      
Girl × 1st Child  -235.76*** 
(46.92) 
-211.17*** 
(49.71) 
-247.39*** 
(75.42) 
-246.60*** 
(71.86) 
-209.70*** 
(46.52) 
-219.60*** 
(54.71) 
Girl × 2nd Child  -202.31*** 
(45.08) 
-189.43*** 
(45.68) 
-168.31** 
(62.38) 
-177.54*** 
(56.89) 
-180.27*** 
(48.21) 
-194.47*** 
(47.01) 
Girl × 3rd Child  -226.08*** 
(47.40) 
-147.57*** 
(34.90)) 
-158.50 
(117.47) 
-164.77 
(115.06) 
-134.80*** 
(39.22) 
-151.35*** 
(35.81) 
Girl × 4th+ Child  -66.61*** 
(33.64) 
-59.58* 
(29.99) 
-72.83 
(59.05) 
-74.10 
(57.67) 
-63.24 
(43.75) 
-61.84* 
(30.70) 
2nd Child  -173.53*** 
(47.04) 
-96.42 
(75.16) 
-45.45 
(82.67) 
-38.70  
(76.37) 
-17.36  
(80.45) 
-107.75 
(78.13) 
3rd Child  -410.14*** 
(59.16) 
-172.89** 
(70.56) 
-14.94 
(135.36) 
-5.36 
(125.61) 
-54.89 
(82.17) 
-186.31** 
(74.08) 
4th+ Child  -678.38*** 
(51.61) 
-106.50 
(71.66) 
63.22  
(180.08) 
71.96 
(159.30) 
46.10  
(101.04) 
-119.81 
(73.76) 
Other Controls Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mother Fixed 
Effect 
No No No Yes No No No 
Household Fixed 
Effect 
No No No No Yes No No 
PSU Fixed Effect No No No No No Yes  
Completed 
Fertility 
No No No No No No Yes 
Observations 45148 52360 45148 45148 45148 45148 43184 
Notes: Every column reports a separate linear regression. Standard errors reported in parenthesis are 
robust to within primary sampling unit (PSU) clustering. 2nd and 3rd child are indicators for children 
whose birth orders are 2 and 3, and, 4th+ indicates children with birth order 4 or later. In columns 4, 5 
and 6 main effects are absorbed by mother, household and PSU fixed effects respectively. Controls 
always include child’s age and its square, current standard of study, mother age and its square, 
maternal education, household income, household head’s education, family size and dummies for 
private school, teacher attendance at school, Hindu, forward caste and urban residence. ***p < 0.01; **p 
< 0.05; *p < 0.10. 
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Table A3: Weekly Duration and Probability of Shadow Education 
 
Dependent Variable Weekly Shadow 
Education 
2nd Child -0.07 
(0.14) 
3rd Child -0.39*** 
(0.12) 
4th+ Child -0.24 
(0.18) 
Girl × 1st Child -0.44*** 
(0.10) 
Girl × 2nd Child -0.49*** 
(0.13) 
Girl × 3rd Child -0.46*** 
(0.11) 
Girl × 4th+ Child -0.12 
(0.18) 
Other Controls Yes 
Observations 37634 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parenthesis are robust to within primary sampling unit (PSU) 
clustering. 2nd and 3rd child are indicators for children whose birth orders are 2 and 3, and, 4th+ 
indicates children with birth order 4 or later. Controls always include child’s age and its square, 
current standard of study, mother age and its square, maternal education, household income, 
household head’s education, family size and dummies for private school, teacher attendance at school, 
Hindu, forward caste and urban residence. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.  
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Table A4: Summary Statistics – ASER data 
 
Variables Full Sample Boys Sample Girls Sample 
Yearly Shadow Education Expenditures 643.15 
(2065.94) 
701.07 
(2132.93) 
582.82 
(1991.98) 
Proportion of Students Taking Shadow 
Education 
0.20 
(0.40) 
0.22 
(0.41) 
0.18 
(0.39) 
Yearly Expenditures in Shadow Education for 
Students with Non-Zero Expenditures 
3205.49 
(3613.71) 
3247.46 
(3578.30) 
3154.42 
(3655.75) 
Child Age 10.31 
(3.28) 
10.21 
(3.27) 
10.41 
(3.30) 
Mother Age 34.27 
(7.78) 
34.24 
(7.83) 
34.30 
(7.72) 
Mother Education1 8.06 
(3.09) 
8.08 
(3.09) 
8.05 
(3.09) 
Father Education1 8.86 
(3.21) 
8.87 
(3.21) 
8.85 
(3.21) 
Standard 5.23 
(2.97) 
5.12 
(2.93) 
5.34 
(2.99) 
Private School 0.31 
(0.46) 
2.53 
(0.97) 
2.58 
(1.01) 
Electricity at House 0.82 
(0.38) 
0.82 
(0.39) 
0.82 
(0.38) 
Toilet at House 0.54 
(0.50) 
0.54 
(0.50) 
0.54 
(0.50) 
Household has a Graduate 0.23 
(0.42) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
Notes: This Table reports means of the dependent variables and covariates. Standard errors reported 
in parenthesis. Around 49% of the full sample constitute Girls. 
(1) Education: Bachelor degrees is coded as 15, Master as 17, and 1-12 grades are coded as 1-12 
respectively. 
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Table A5: Association Between Shadow Education and Test Scores  
 
 Math Writing Reading 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Shadow Education 0.183*** 
(0.038) 
0.133*** 
(0.026) 
0.095*** 
(0.030) 
Observations 10046 9995 10083 
 
Notes: Every column reports a separate linear regression. All estimates include controls for child’s 
age and its square, current standard of study, mother age and its square, maternal education, 
household income, household head’s education, and dummies for private school, teacher attendance at 
school, ever repetition in exams, Hindu, forward caste and urban residence. To account for the 
unobserved ability shocks, I assume that parents (partly) predict this through children’s educational 
achievements. In the specification, I use a dummy which takes the value 1 if the children have ‘ever 
repeated’ in any exam. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.    
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Appendix B: Recentered Influence Function (RIF) Decomposition 
 
In this section, I decompose the test scores using Recentered Influence Function regression 
method suggested by Firpo et al. (2009).  
 
The joint distribution between test scores ,, the covariates  that include shadow education 
expenditures, and a categorical variable  @ $&(#' where 1 represents a girl child is 
AB(C(D$,( E( '. The cumulative distribution of F conditional on  is 
 
(B.1) GBD$,'  H GBICD $FIE' GCD$E' 
 
The difference between boys (  &) and girls (  #) for a given distribution statistics J is 
given by: 
 
(B.2) J  JK LJ  J MH GBICK $FI' GCK$'N L J MH GBIC $FI' GC$'N 
 
To estimate (B.2), I use the RIF127 regressions developed by Firpo et al. (2018). Specifically, 
 
(B.3) J  H $OGPFQ JPGRSTS GC$'  
U	V     A* @ $&(#' 
 
Following Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition in the main text, I decompose the test scores at 
mean.128 The test scores distribution under the counterfactual scenario is given by: 
 
(B.4) GBW  H GBIC $FI' GCK$' X H GBIC $FI' GC$'Y$' 
 
where Y$' is a re-weighting function that can be identified as: 
 

127 The Recentered Influence Function of a distribution statistics J is defined as: 
 
J$GB' 
ZJ$GB [ \B'
Z:  
 
where the last past is the influence function (IF). IF is a directional derivative that shows how the distribution 
statistics would response to a small change in the distribution. 
 
128 The RIF mean of any value of F is simply itself. One can do RIF decomposition analysis at any distributional 
statistics. See Firpo et al. (2018) for more detail. 
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(B.5) Y$'  ] _^
`$C'
] _^a$C'
 ]^_Ib$BKIC']^_Ib$BIC' 
;
c;
cd$BIC'
d$BIC'  
 
where e is the number of girls and, 9$F  #I' is the conditional probability of someone 
with characteristics  is a girl. I obtain the reweighting function using a probit model. The 
decomposition is then defined as: 
 
(B.6) J  KUP	VK L	VWS  $K LW'fg	VW  $W L'g	V  WU$	VW L	V' 
 
where the first two components are the aggregate unexplained part (structure effects) and last 
two terms correspond to the explained part (composition effects). First and third parts 
correspond to pure structure and composition effects respectively. The second term is the 
reweighting error and the last term is the specification error. 
 
The decomposition results are shown in Table B1. Reassuringly, disparities in shadow 
education can be accounted for substantial portions of gender gaps in test scores. To be 
specific, around 20%, 18%, and 13% of the explained gendered variations (composition 
effects) in the math, writing, and reading test scores can be attributed to the disparities in 
shadow education expenditures. Shadow education also contribute in unexplained variations 
(coefficient effects). Boys experience higher returns in math and writing test scores, but not 
in reading test scores where girls have clear advantage. The specification errors are 
insignificant, indicating that more flexible models are not needed. Taken together, the 
compositional effects of shadow education expenditures on test scores tend to be robust 
irrespective of the decomposition methods. 
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Table B1: RIF Decomposition of Test Scores 
 
 Math Writing Reading 
 Composition Coefficient Composition Coefficient Composition Coefficient 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Decomposition      
Aggregate 
Decomposition 
0.045*** 
(0.00) 
0.080*** 
(0.02) 
0.041*** 
(0.00) 
0.004 
(0.02) 
0.044*** 
(0.00) 
0.024 
(0.02) 
Pure Composition 0.046*** 
(0.00) 
 0.042*** 
(0.00) 
 0.045*** 
(0.00) 
 
Pure Coefficient  0.083*** 
(0.02) 
 0.007 
(0.02) 
 0.026 
(0.02) 
Specification Error -0.001 
(0.00) 
 -0.001 
(0.00) 
 -0.001 
(0.00) 
 
Reweighting Error  -0.003 
(0.01) 
 -0.002 
(0.01) 
 -0.002 
(0.02) 
Panel B: Percentage contributions in pure composition effects   
Shadow Education 19.87 5.21 17.83 59.29 12.53 -3.42 
 
Notes: Recentered Influence Functions decomposition. Composition and Coefficient refer to the 
decomposition due to composition (explained) and coefficient (unexplained) effects. Controls always 
include child’s age and its square, current standard of study, mother age and its square, maternal 
education, household income, household head’s education, and dummies for private school, teacher 
attendance at school, Hindu, forward caste and urban residence.  ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10. 
 
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Appendix C 
Figure C1: Reading Test Scores by Gender 
Panel A 
 
 
Panel B 
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Table C1: Math Score Distribution 
 
Math Score One Two Three Four Five 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Boy (%) 49.06 58.13 61.98 62.95 63.44 
Girl (%) 50.94 41.87 38.02 37.05 36.56 
 
 
Table C2: Son Preference in Math Score Distribution 
 
Dep. Var. Prob of 
Math Score 
Younger Age Group Older Age Group 
Math Score Five Four Five Four 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Girl × 1st Child -0.003 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.031*** 
(0.005) 
-0.027*** 
(0.004) 
Girl × 2nd Child 0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.019*** 
(0.005) 
-0.029*** 
(0.004) 
Girl × 3rd Child 0.003 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.015* 
(0.007) 
-0.031*** 
(0.006) 
Girl × 4th+ Child 0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.030*** 
(0.008) 
-0.026*** 
(0.007) 
2nd Child -0.010** 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.009 
(0.004) 
-0.008* 
(0.004) 
3rd Child -0.011** 
(0.003) 
-0.007 
(0.004) 
-0.013* 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
4th+ Child -0.012** 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.018** 
(0.007) 
Observations 143087 143087 104021 104021 
 
Notes: Every column reports a separate linear regression. Standard errors reported in parenthesis are 
robust to within village unit clustering. All estimations include controls for child, parent, household 
and school level variables. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.
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Table C3: Private Tuition Expenditure 
 
Dep Var. Private Tuition 
Expenditure 
  
 (1) (2) 
Girl × 1st Child -0.011 
(0.01) 
0.020 
(0.02) 
Girl × 2nd Child -0.003 
(0.01) 
-0.027* 
(0.02) 
Girl × 3rd Child 0.003 
(0.01) 
-0.012 
(0.02) 
Girl × 4th+ Child -0.011** 
(0.00) 
-0.016 
(0.03) 
2nd Child -0.034*** 
(0.01) 
-0.008 
(0.01) 
3rd Child -0.056*** 
(0.01) 
-0.006 
(0.02) 
4th+ Child -0.049*** 
(0.01) 
0.025 
(0.02) 
Age Group Younger Older 
Observations 143087 104021 
 
Notes: Every column reports a separate linear regression. The dependent variable is the standardized 
yearly private tuition expenditure. Standard errors reported in parenthesis are robust to within village 
unit clustering. All estimations include controls for child, parent, household and school level 
variables. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. 
 
 
 
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Appendix D 
Table D1: Breakdown of callback rates (in %) by city, gender and sector (inexperienced 
sample)  
  Delhi Mumbai Chennai 
  BPO Finance BPO Finance BPO Finance 
Panel A: Female CV 
Bengali Non-Mother 40.00 43.48 40.00 50.00 29.17 37.50 
Mother 0 7.69 15.00 8.00 12.5 15.00 
Khasi Non-Mother 33.33 23.53 30.00 18.75 19.05 4.76 
Mother 13.63 31.58 20.00 19.05 21.05 6.67 
Naga Non-Mother 35.00 28.57 38.82 20.00 17.65 5.56 
Mother 5.00 13.64 11.11 16.67 26.09 1.11 
Panel B: Male CV 
Bengali  35.29 50.00 30.77 41.67 33.33 35.71 
Khasi  50.00 14.29 37.50 7.69 25.00 11.11 
Naga  36.36 10.00 45.45 8.33 33.33 15.38 

 
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Table D2: Breakdown of callback rates (in %) by city, gender and sector (experienced 
sample)  
  Delhi Mumbai Chennai 
  BPO Finance BPO Finance BPO Finance 
Panel A: Female CV 
Bengali Non-Mother 57.14 44.44 42.86 14.29 33.33 40.00 
Mother 12.50 0 50.00 25.00 0 20.00 
Khasi Non-Mother 25.00 14.29 22.22 16.67 33.33 0 
Mother 28.57 25.00 16.67 22.22 0 20.00 
Naga Non-Mother 50.00 0 50.00 20.00 40.00 1.11 
Mother 22.22 14.29 22.22 20.00 20.00 16.67 
Panel B: Male CV 
Bengali  66.67 40.00 66.67 33.33 33.33 50.00 
Khasi  25.00 0 37.50 0 25.00 0 
Naga  25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 20.00 11.11 

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Table D3: Breakdown of callback rates (in %) by city, gender and sector (experienced and 
inexperienced sample)  
  Delhi Mumbai Chennai 
  BPO Finance BPO Finance BPO Finance 
Panel A: Female CV 
Bengali Non-Mother 44.44 43.75 40.74 36.84 30.33 39.10 
Mother 3.57 5.26 25.00 12.12 9.09 16.67 
Khasi Non-Mother 30.76 20.83 27.59 18.18 22.22 3.22 
Mother 17.24 29.63 19.23 20.00 14.29 10.00 
Naga Non-Mother 38.46 18.18 35.71 20.00 22.73 7.41 
Mother 10.34 13.79 14.81 17.65 24.24 12.50 
Panel B: Male CV 
Bengali  40.00 47.06 37.50 38.10 33.33 38.89 
Khasi  43.75 10.00 37.50 6.67 25.00 9.09 
Naga  31.58 14.29 40.00 12.50 33.33 13.64 

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ABSTRACTS 
 
Shadow Education, Intra-Household Resource Allocation and Educational Achievements in 
India 
 
Studying intra-household allocation of resources is challenging as direct parental monetary 
expenditures on individual children is difficult to isolate from aggregate household expenditures. 
Due to such limitations, previous studies tend to examine parental allocation of resources 
indirectly from household expenditures or through other non-monetary investments. This article 
studies intra-household allocation of direct parental monetary expenditures on private 
supplementary tutoring or shadow education. I show a birth order disadvantage for later-born 
children in shadow education expenditures and find evidence of disadvantages for girls in every 
birth order. I attribute these patterns to the well-documented preference for elder sons, which is 
common in India, and I subsequently test several features which stem out of this preference. The 
analysis also shows that intra-household disparity in shadow education expenditures accounts for 
a substantial part of the gender gaps in cognitive test scores. The inequality contributions from the 
disparities in shadow education expenditures in test scores decrease as one moves down the birth 
order. 
 
Gender Norms and Motherhood Penalty: Experimental Evidence from India (with Arjun 
Bedi and Matthias Rieger) 
 
This paper uses a field experiment to study the effect of perceived gender norms on the 
motherhood penalty in the Indian labor market. We randomly reported motherhood on fictitious 
CVs sent to service sector jobs. We generated variation in gender norms by signaling community 
origins of applicants. Employers are less likely to callback mothers relative to women or men 
without children. Mothers from North-East India experience a smaller motherhood penalty and 
those of matrilineal origin face no penalty, unlike those of patrilineal origin. We discuss findings 
in relation to the influence of ethnicity, the Indian context and theories of discrimination. 
 
Shadow Education and the Quantity-Quality Tradeoff in India 
 
This article presents evidence of a quantity-quality tradeoff using plausibly exogenous variation 
in family size due to elder son preference. Most previous studies tend to examine the relationship 
between family size and child quality indirectly through the consequences of the allocation of 
parental resources, e.g., educational and labor market achievements. In this article, I examine the 
quantity-quality tradeoff in direct parental monetary allocation of resources in shadow education 
expenditures (or private tuition). Exploiting the elder son preference typically observed in the 
study context, I instrument fertility with gender of the first child, two-girl and same sex birth. 
Subsequently, IV estimates show a parity specific quantity-quality tradeoff. However, the effects 
are heterogeneous and vary in both magnitude and sign. Specifically, in a subpopulation with high 
unobserved desire for a multi-child family, quantity and quality are complements.  
 
Who Benefits from Private Schools in India?  
 
While the growth of private schooling in India is phenomenal, little is known on what types of 
students benefit most. In this paper, I investigate attendance decision and heterogeneity in returns 
to private schools on test scores by exploiting exogenous variation in private school availability. 
Drawing on a large sample of school going children, I estimate marginal treatment effects in an 
environment of essential heterogeneity. In addition to a robust positive returns to private 
schooling across study populations, the results indicate a reverse selection into gains with respect 
to both observed and unobserved characteristics. Private schools generate large gains for girls and 
disadvantaged children, but they are less likely to attend private schools. Likewise, exposure 
effects are inversely related to the unobserved desire to attend private schools. These findings 
suggest that private school attendance serves as an equalizer - leveling the playing field. Liquidity 
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constraints restrict private school attendance of hard-to-reach children, but they are equally 
motivated, if not more. 
 
 
Son Preference, Family Size and the Gender Gap in Mathematics in Pakistan 
 
The gender gap in mathematics has been documented in many contexts, yet little convincing 
evidence exists to explain it. In this paper, I document a substantial gender gap in mathematics 
test scores using a large nationally representative dataset from Pakistan. I find that boys and girls 
have similar levels at the age of five, after which a monotonically increasing gap emerges. I also 
report a negative birth-order effect with boys outperforming girls in every birth order, but with a 
weaker gap in later-borns. I show that strong elder son preference, which skews parental resource 
allocation, is one of the underlying mechanisms of these gendered patterns. Elder son preference 
induces girls with elder brothers to do worse compared to those without. The gender gap is 
relatively more pronounced in larger families. In sum, elder son preference coupled with the 
adverse effects of family size plausibly explain the gender gap. 
 
 
 
Gray University Degrees: Experimental Evidence from India (with Matthias Rieger), 2020, 
Education Finance and Policy, 15(2), 292-309. 
 
Scams involving university degrees are flourishing in many emerging markets. This paper studies 
the impact of gray degrees, or potentially bought academic credentials from legitimate 
universities, on callback rates to job applications using a resume experiment in India. The 
experiment varied the type of degree (no, gray and authentic) in online applications to entry level 
jobs that require no university qualification. We find that gray degrees increase callback rates by 
42% or 8%-points relative to having no degree. However, we also document that gray degrees 
fare on average worse than authentic degrees. These empirical patterns are consistent with a 
model where employers have beliefs about the authenticity of degrees and are discounting gray 
degree universities probabilistically. We discuss our findings with respect to the Indian context. 
 
Does Signaling Childcare Support on Job Applications Reduce the Motherhood Penalty? 
(with Arjun Bedi and Matthias Rieger) 
 
There is substantial evidence that due to perceived childcare obligations, mothers are 
disadvantaged on labor markets. To what extent can childcare support ameliorate such a 
disadvantage? To answer this question, we ran a CV experiment in a large Indian city and 
examined whether signaling access to childcare support may offset the motherhood penalty 
associated with labor market entry. We randomly varied motherhood, as well as a childcare 
support signal in online applications sent to service sector jobs in Delhi. Indicating motherhood 
on a CV led to a 57% or 20 percentage point reduction in callback rates for interviews as 
compared to non-mothers. A simple childcare support signal (in the form of one-line in a CV) 
offsets the motherhood penalty by 20% or 4 percentage points. We interpret the findings taking 
into account the Indian context and with respect to potential sources of discrimination.

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